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- W2736702798 abstract "Abstract Distributed radar network systems have been shown to have many unique features. Due to their advantage of signal and spatial diversities, radar networks are attractive for target detection. In practice, the netted radars in radar networks are supposed to maximize their transmit power to achieve better detection performance, which may be in contradiction with low probability of intercept (LPI). Therefore, this paper investigates the problem of adaptive power allocation for radar networks in a cooperative game‐theoretic framework such that the LPI performance can be improved. Taking into consideration both the transmit power constraints and the minimum signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) requirement of each radar, a cooperative Nash bargaining power allocation game based on LPI is formulated, whose objective is to minimize the total transmit power by optimizing the power allocation in radar networks. First, a novel SINR‐based network utility function is defined and utilized as a metric to evaluate power allocation. Then, with the well‐designed network utility function, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash bargaining solution are proved analytically. Finally, an iterative Nash bargaining algorithm is developed that converges quickly to a Pareto optimal equilibrium for the cooperative game. Numerical simulations and theoretic analysis are provided to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm." @default.
- W2736702798 created "2017-07-31" @default.
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- W2736702798 date "2017-08-01" @default.
- W2736702798 modified "2023-10-17" @default.
- W2736702798 title "Power allocation for target detection in radar networks based on low probability of intercept: A cooperative game theoretical strategy" @default.
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- W2736702798 doi "https://doi.org/10.1002/2017rs006332" @default.
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