Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2742973717> ?p ?o ?g. }
Showing items 1 to 85 of
85
with 100 items per page.
- W2742973717 abstract "We introduce a game theory model of individual decisions to cooperate by contributing personal resources to group decisions versus by free-riding on the contributions of other members. In contrast to most public-goods games that assume group returns are linear in individual contributions, the present model assumes decreasing marginal group production as a function of aggregate individual contributions. This diminishing marginal returns assumption is more realistic and generates starkly different predictions compared to the linear model. One important implication is that, under most conditions, there exist equilibria where some, but not all members of a group contribute, even with completely self-interested motives. An agent-based simulation confirms the individual and group advantages of the equilibria in which behavioral asymmetry emerges from a game structure that is a priori perfectly symmetric for all agents (all agents have the same payoff function and action space, but take different actions in equilibria). And a behavioral experiment demonstrates that cooperators and free-riders coexist in a stable manner in groups performing with the non-linear production function. A collateral result demonstrates that, compared to a ―dictatorial‖ decision scheme guided by the best member in a group, the majority-plurality decision rules can pool information effectively and produce greater individual net welfare at equilibrium, even if free-riding is not sanctioned. This is an original proof that cooperation in ad hoc decision-making groups can be understood in terms of self-interested motivations and that, despite the free-rider problem, majority-plurality decision rules can function robustly as simple, efficient social decision heuristics." @default.
- W2742973717 created "2017-08-17" @default.
- W2742973717 creator A5036902586 @default.
- W2742973717 creator A5062452335 @default.
- W2742973717 creator A5063277796 @default.
- W2742973717 creator A5083068244 @default.
- W2742973717 date "2010-01-01" @default.
- W2742973717 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
- W2742973717 title "Democracy under uncertainty: The ‘wisdom of crowds’ and the free-rider problem in group decision making" @default.
- W2742973717 hasPublicationYear "2010" @default.
- W2742973717 type Work @default.
- W2742973717 sameAs 2742973717 @default.
- W2742973717 citedByCount "0" @default.
- W2742973717 crossrefType "posted-content" @default.
- W2742973717 hasAuthorship W2742973717A5036902586 @default.
- W2742973717 hasAuthorship W2742973717A5062452335 @default.
- W2742973717 hasAuthorship W2742973717A5063277796 @default.
- W2742973717 hasAuthorship W2742973717A5083068244 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C14036430 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C144237770 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C15744967 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C162222271 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C178790620 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C185592680 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C196788367 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C202063016 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C20701700 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C22171661 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C2778348673 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C2781311116 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C29122968 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C72273685 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C77805123 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C78458016 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C85510643 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConcept C86803240 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C14036430 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C144237770 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C15744967 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C162222271 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C162324750 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C175444787 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C178790620 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C185592680 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C196788367 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C202063016 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C20701700 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C22171661 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C2778348673 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C2781311116 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C29122968 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C72273685 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C77805123 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C78458016 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C85510643 @default.
- W2742973717 hasConceptScore W2742973717C86803240 @default.
- W2742973717 hasLocation W27429737171 @default.
- W2742973717 hasOpenAccess W2742973717 @default.
- W2742973717 hasPrimaryLocation W27429737171 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W107932786 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W1197011330 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W1600141075 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W1875029160 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W2006089043 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W2090717275 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W2137138732 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W2140873518 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W2608813984 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W2610960307 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W2905059294 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W2982241831 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W3119191224 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W3123429689 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W3124706779 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W3126093370 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W3149169987 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W40657447 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W2169485356 @default.
- W2742973717 hasRelatedWork W2187979406 @default.
- W2742973717 isParatext "false" @default.
- W2742973717 isRetracted "false" @default.
- W2742973717 magId "2742973717" @default.
- W2742973717 workType "article" @default.