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• W274555407 abstract "MARINE MAJOR GENERAL discussing his role in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia concluded, We aren't prepared for these operations very well. An Army colonel recalling his staff officer duties in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti stated, single hardest thing that I've had to do in my military experience was to come up with an OOTW [operations other than war] campaign plan.... A Special Forces lieutenant colonel, generalizing his own experience in Haiti, implored fellow officers to anticipate different environments in which they would be required to perform tasks for which they had little or no training. A Ranger lieutenant had learned the same lesson several years earlier in Panama during Operation Just Cause when he engaged in night combat operations at Rio Hato-the easy part, as it turned out. At dawn, he was informed his platoon was to move out immediately to administer to a small Panamanian town. He later conceded that he had not clearly understood, nor had he been trained to do, any of the half-dozen tasks given him as a part of this new, highly sensitive mission. These brief examples and countless others like them illustrate the difficulty many, if not most, US officers have in coming to grips with unorthodox military operations-operations that fall outside what is generally regarded as the military's primary focus and traditional role of fighting conventional wars. OOTW, the current doctrinal terminology for such nontraditional undertakings, covers a broad spectrum, ranging from support to US, state and local governments, disaster relief, nation assistance and drug interdiction to peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, noncombatant evacuation and peace enforcement.1 Other nontraditional operations include humanitarian assistance, strikes and raids, antiterrorist activities and, as some would argue, overseas interventions designed to maintain, restore or change the status quo in the target area. Some interventions include combat operations, often intense, but usually too brief to qualify as general, or even limited war.2 That US officers often find themselves adrift in such operations is not without a touch of irony in that these undertakings are nothing new; they have not been spawned or even accelerated, as some commentary would suggest, by the post-Cold War environment. Rather, the US military has engaged in these nontraditional, unorthodox operations throughout its far more often than it has waged conventional warfare, as depicted in the figure on page 52.3 The historical record is readily available for any officer to study. Furthermore, for at least several decades now, there has been a growing body of doctrine that discusses nontraditional military activities within the framework of the terminology in vogue: stability operations and counterinsurgency in the 1960s, lowintensity conflict in the 1980s, and operations other than war, military operations other than war, and stability and support operations today.4 Why is it then that the body of testimony regarding the lack of preparation for such operations continues to mount? The answer is complex, the reasons numerous. One significant cause is the various ways in which many US officers approach the history of their own profession with respect to these operations. To begin with, there are officers who are convinced that, for one reason or another, military history is largely irrelevant to their current concerns and operations, whether conventional or unorthodox. Whatever might be gleaned history is not worth the time expended studying the past. Analogies Others do consult the historical record, but selectively, often regarding anything that happened before World War II-or as the years creep by, Vietnamas ancient history, and therefore of marginal relevance for today's military professional. It is not, they acknowledge, that there is nothing to learn analyzing the Second Seminole War of 1836 to 1842; Captain William Clarke Quantrill's exploits during the Civil War or the Reconstruction of the South that followed; the Philippine-American War at the turn of the century; or the Sandino Affair in Nicaragua. …" @default.
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• W274555407 date "1997-07-01" @default.
• W274555407 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W274555407 title "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes" @default.
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