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• W2765760003 abstract "Can Exposure to Post-outcome Information “Debias” the Hindsight Bias? Ivan K. Ash (iash@odu.edu) Department of Psychology Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA 23529-0267 on almanac trivia questions (Hell et al., 1988). Understanding the cognitive mechanisms that lead to this effect is important for several reasons. The robustness and ubiquity of the hindsight bias phenomenon suggests that it can offer a window into how humans store and retrieve information and use information to make judgments (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Hoffrage & Pohl, 2003). Furthermore, the fact that it has been observed in many “real life” situations, such as jurors’ decisions and medical diagnoses, has profound practical implications (Christensen- Szalanski & Willham, 1991). Therefore, the goal of providing and testing a theoretical explanation for the hindsight bias phenomenon is important for both scientific and practical reasons. Abstract The present study investigated the effects of post-outcome information on retrospective judgments. Participants completed a within-subjects scenario-based hindsight paradigm. After being exposed to outcome information participants were dismiss, exposed to outcome congruent post-outcome information, or exposed to outcome incongruent post-outcome information. Results revealed the largest hindsight bias in the incongruent post-outcome group. These results are discussed in terms of their fit with competing cognitive reconstruction models of retrospective judgment making and hindsight bias. Keywords: Hindsight Bias; Judgment Formation; Surprise; Expectation; Representational Change. Theoretical Explanations of the Hindsight Bias The Hindsight Bias Effect “Creeping determinism” accounts (Fischhoff, 1975; Carli, 1999; Wasserman, Lempert, & Hastie. 1991) propose that outcome information is automatically integrated in one’s memory representation and that this updated representation is used to make the retrospective judgment. This account would expect memory updating anytime one is exposed to post-prediction information that activates memory elements supporting a particular outcome. Therefore, this theory proposes that anytime individuals are exposed to post-prediction information that supports a potential outcome, their retrospective judgments will be more in favor of that outcome. Metacognitive cue based accounts (Ofir & Mazursky, 1990;1997) propose that when making a retrospective judgment people first judge whether or not they found an outcome surprising and then use this metacognitive information to estimate their predictive state of mind. According to this view, expected or unsurprising outcomes give people an “I would have known that!” feeling. This theory proposes that this metacognitive reaction causes people to be overconfident about their predictive accuracy, which leads to inflated retrospective judgments. It is then this over-estimation that causes the hindsight bias effect. Furthermore, this view proposes that unexpected or surprising outcomes give people an “I would have never known that!” feeling. This metacognitive reaction leads people to be under-confident in their predictive accuracy. This serves to deflate retrospective judgments, thereby reducing or perhaps reversing the hindsight bias effect. Finally, the surprise cued sense-making account (Pezzo, 2003) proposes that hindsight bias happens when people successfully “make sense” of outcome information. Successful “sense-making” leaves people with an updated representation of the situation that favors the given outcome. On retrospective judgments, people use this updated Imagine that it is November 7, 2000 around lunchtime. Today is Election Day in the U.S., however none of the polls have closed anywhere in the nation. Someone you are having lunch with asks, “What do you think each presidential candidate’s chances of winning are?” What would you have said? Sanna and Schwarz (2003) had undergraduates predict the percentage of votes that each of the presidential candidates would receive. On average, participants predicted that the Gore/Lieberman ticket would win the popular vote by a margin of 4.45%. After a hotly contested election, several recounts, and a Supreme Court decision, the final official popular vote count had Gore/Lieberman ahead of Bush/Cheney by only 0.35% percent. After the media had announced the official results of the election, Sanna and Schwarz asked the same participants to attempt to remember what vote-predictions they had made before they knew the actual outcome of the election. On this retrospective judgment, participants’ average margin between the two tickets was reduced to 0.58%. This was significantly lower than the original margin they had predicted in foresight. In other words, participants’ post-outcome retrospective answers were closer to the actual election results than their pre-outcome predictive answers thereby overestimating the accuracy of their initial beliefs as if they “knew-it-all along.” This hindsight bias or the “knew-it-all along” effect is one of the most frequently cited judgment biases in the literature and has been shown to be robust across a wide variety of domains and task environments such as: medical diagnoses (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988), legal judgments (Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995), jurors’ decisions (Casper, Benedict, & Perry, 1989), victim degradation in rape scenarios (Carli, 1999), stock purchases (Louie, 1999), sporting event results (Roese & Maniar, 1997), and answers" @default.
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• W2765760003 date "2006-01-01" @default.
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• W2765760003 title "Can Exposure to Post-outcome Information Debias the Hindsight Bias?" @default.
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