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- W2767454970 abstract "A Catalytic Theory of Embodied Mind P. A. Carpenter (Carpenter+@cmu.edu) Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA Christopher J. Davia (c.j.davia@Sussex.ac.uk) Centre for Research in Cognitive Science, University of Sussex Sussex, UK sensory receptors that transmit the signal. For example, it assumes that we see because of our eyes and hear because of our ears, an assumption that is called ‘Muller’s Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energy.’ But both this doctrine and the assumption that the perceiver is representing an independent environment have been challenged by research on ‘sensory substitution.’ Abstract This paper describes a catalytic theory that grounds cognition in biology, building on the proposals of (a) Gibson and ecological psychologists concerning the role of invariance and (b) Shepard, Gestaltists and neuroscientists concerning the role of ‘resonating’ neural waves. Enzyme catalysis increases the speed of a molecular reaction, perhaps via a type of wave, a soliton, whose formation, persistence and form depend on the structural invariance of its environment. Generalizing to cognition (Davia, 2006), the waves of neural activity constitute a catalytic process, with the organism’s perception- action invariance playing the role of the environmental structure. This ‘generalized catalysis’ is a process by which an entity mediates its environment and is the organism’s experience. Sensory-Substitution Research Keywords: Perception; Consciousness; Neuroscience Over the last two and a half decades, research has demonstrated that individuals who are blind can learn to use other modalities in order to recognize objects and navigate the world (White et al., 1970). The use of the eyes is not critical to experiencing the visuo-spatial environment; instead, it appears to be dependent on the invariant patterns that relate the organism’s perceptions and actions. This point is best explained by briefly describing the research. In tactile-visual substitution systems, the input from a camera is fed to a vibro-tactile array located either on the person’s back or tongue (Bach-y-Rita, Tyler & Kaczmarek, 2003). Importantly, the individual must manipulate the camera, by panning or zooming, for a tactile sensation to be experienced as an event or object. If the camera is kept in a static position, the person’s experience of ‘the environment’ ceases. Also, another person cannot control the camera; its movements must be linked to those of the perceiver/actor. Participants initially report sensing the stimulation as coming from the location of the device. But with practice, they locate the source as outside themselves, and the patterns become interpretable in terms of visuo-spatial events and objects. The stimulation at the device’s location is less salient. For example, after only 10 hrs of practice with a vibro-tactile array on the tongue, congenitally blind individuals can catch and throw balls and report perceiving the flicker of candle flame for the first time. Another mapping is given by an auditory-visual system called vOICe (Oh-I-See). Grey-scale images from a video camera are mapped into sounds via a left-to-right scan, with pitch indicating elevation and loudness indicating brightness (Meijer, 1992). Considerable practice is needed with this device. One individual, who had lost her eye-sight as an adult through an industrial accident, practiced for two years in her bedroom, and she reported gradually acquiring spatial navigation and object recognition in that context before acquiring sensitivity to visual texture, depth, object An Independent World vs. Invariance In this paper, we will consider the relation of ‘mind and brain,’ a phrase that expresses a problematic duality for our field. In one attempt to bridge it, some scientists assume the reductionist stance that the ‘mind’ eventually will be understood in terms of the neurology or biochemistry of the brain and body. Other researchers, inspired by the computer metaphor, study the ‘mind’ as though it were independent of its biological implementation. But benefits might arise from examining the nature of the relation between life and its environment. We will discuss one such proposal based on enzyme catalysis (Davia, 2006). We explain how it accounts for ‘sensory substitution’ data that are problematic for conventional approaches and briefly consider some of its potential implications for cognitive science. The Modal Theory The modal theory of the relation of mind and brain is based on a causal sequence of physical processes. An event occurs in the environment; ambient energy from the event impinges on the receptors of the organism. The organism’s nervous system transmits this signal to the brain. The organism’s experience is a psychological correlate of the code that the nervous system uses to transmit information about the environment. In this model, the environment is independent of the organism. The model also assumes that the quality of the perceptual experience depends upon the particular" @default.
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- W2767454970 title "A Catalytic Theory of Embodied Mind" @default.
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