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• W2767739989 abstract "The aim of these essays is to contribute both theoretically and empirically to a better understanding of the role of social status in intergenerational income mobility. Sociological theories have emphasized the role of social status in the generation of persistent ex-ante inequality between families, but it has received limited attention in economics.In order to advance in this direction, the first chapter proposes a theoretical model to analyze the role of reference groups and inequality in intergenerational mobility. Based on recent empirical findings, and the alternative assumptions of standard theory and prospect theory, we model the effect of reference group income on effort decisions. Findings suggest that reference group affects the inequality of economic success between identical individuals with different social origins. The size and direction of this effect depend on four key issues: (a) the composition of the reference group; (b) the functional form of relative concern; (c) ex-ante inequality and relative effort rewards; (d) expected effort beliefs and past mobility trajectories. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the reference group effect leads to individuals making sub-optimal social welfare decisions.This first chapter considers only one perspective of status and focuses on the comparative role of the reference groups. However, previous literature suggests that relative concern can be addressed from different perspectives. The second chapter presents an extension of the model, which incorporates an additional perspective of social status: social rewards based on how others value the observable actions of individuals. This approach allows us to assess both the role of each status motive separately (reference group and social rewards) and their interaction. The model confirms the importance of social status to explain effort decisions and allows us to discuss under what circumstances both status motives could be an additional mechanism for the persistence of inequality between generations. We identify three different mechanisms of inequality persistence. Mobility could be low because the poor people are not sufficiently motivated to move up, due to the reference group composition. They are being discouraged by society as a whole because of low status rewards. Finally, they are discouraged by expected peer effort, because their peer group failed past attempts to move up. However, under certain circumstances, status motives could reduce economic inequalities. This is the case when reference groups of agents with a low social origin include agents from a high social origin or when the social rewards of economic success are high. The first two chapters show that the response in the effort decisions to changes in expected reference income depends on the concavity or convexity of the relative concern curve. While generally confirming the asymmetry of relative concern, previous empirical research on the levels of satisfaction considering the peers income as a reference point, is ambiguous with respect to its concavity or convexity. The third chapter contributes to the empirical economic literature with new evidence on how relative income with respect to the reference group can affect economic satisfaction, testing the assumptions of prospect theory. Furthermore, we analyze how some aspects of personality affect relative concern and economic satisfaction. Unlike previous findings, convexity is confirmed between people facing relative deprivation, which corresponds to diminishing marginal sensitivity as they move away from the reference income. Therefore, relative concern is more important among those who are close to the reference income level, and its sensitivity is greater for those in the area of relative deprivation. These results are consistent with the assumptions of prospect theory. Furthermore, we confirm that some personality characteristics affect the marginal satisfaction of income comparisons." @default.
• W2767739989 created "2017-11-17" @default.
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• W2767739989 date "2015-01-01" @default.
• W2767739989 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W2767739989 title "The role of the reference group on income mobility" @default.
• W2767739989 hasPublicationYear "2015" @default.
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