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• W2767793669 abstract "Counterfactual reasoning appears to be a universal phenomenon of human inference from childhood to adulthood, yet, the prevailing explanations seem able to capture only a limited aspect of the process and are in need of an overarching framework. We propose that David Lewis’ possible worlds analysis offers a first approximation to such a framework and gives a psychologically plausible account of counterfactuals. It identifies the unique properties of our ability to reason from false assumptions—whether talking about pretense or revising our beliefs. Three experiments are offered to suggest the plausibility of this account. Counterfactual Reasoning Counterfactual or hypothetical reasoning is ubiquitous in human interaction. It ranges from children’s pretense (Scott, Baron-Cohen, & Leslie, 1999), everyday regret for the past, planning for the future (Roese & Olson, 1995), revising our knowledge base (e.g., Elio & Pelletier, 1997), to testing hypotheses (Farris & Revlin, 1989). Theories or descriptions of how this type of reasoning is actually accomplished are as varied as the situations they describe. Models of pretense rely on broadly specified processes, such as activation of “possible world box”, input from “belief box”, etc. (e.g., Nichols & Stich, 2000). Social psychologists describe tendencies to uphill vs. downhill reasoning when considering how events could have been different (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Models of belief revision range from minimizing the number of discarded propositions (e.g.,Elio & Pelletier, 1997) to preferences for certain types of sentences (e.g.; Revlis, Lipkin, & Hayes, 1971). Models of reasoning emphasize semantic and inference procedures (e.g., Walsh & Byrne, 2002) or modal logic categories (e.g., Revlin, Cate, & Rouss, 2001). A proposal for the process of counterfactual reasoning that has only slightly been represented in research paradigms is one offered from philosophical writings by David Lewis (1973, 1986) in his proposal of Possible Worlds. Our purpose here is to explore the consequences of Lewis’ possible worlds treatment for counterfactual judgments in a belief-revision paradigm. We begin by describing the paradigm and why it might be useful as well as some basic findings. Then we turn to a description of Lewis’ possible worlds and how it might be useful in understanding the findings of at least the beliefrevision paradigm. Belief Revision Paradigm When we conjecture about some hypothesis, whose truth is in doubt or when we consider the consequences of some conjecture for what we already know or believe, we are doing counterfactual or hypothetical reasoning (Revlis & Hayes, 1972). A formal definition would be reasoning from false assumptions (Chisholm, 1946; Rescher, 1964). Let us suppose that you have discovered a new creature--it lays eggs and can live under water for prolonged periods of time and has no external mammary teats. On the face of this evidence you believe the animal is a reptile and treat it that way. However, someone proposes that you should assume, for the sake of argument, that it is a mammal”. To evaluate this conjecture, you might assemble some pertinent facts from your belief portfolio and add the new “fact” to it 1 : (1) (a) All mammals have live births (b) This creature lays eggs (c) This creature is a reptile (not a mammal) (d) Assume: this creature is a mammal There are two inconsistencies here. First the assumption directly contradicts statement (c), which must now be labeled “false”. Second, the assumption, when joined with statement (a), contradicts statement (b) [If all mammals have live births and this creature is a mammal, then this creature must not lay eggs]. Later we will refer to this as the Generalist Path. Alternately, if we join the assumption with statement (b), the two jointly contradict statement (a) [This mammal lays eggs so not all mammals have live births]. This will be referred to as the Particularist Path. Given that these assembled “facts” are the pertinent ones to be considered, how shall we resolve the inconsistency introduced by this assumption, which contradicts our beliefs (at least it contradicts the belief that this creature is a reptile)? This is not a toy problem. The characteristics of the creature in question in (1) are among those of the platypus whose inclusion in the category of mammals was 1 Technically, the suppositions described here are beliefcontravening in that they contradict an accepted assertion, but do not necessarily deny a long held statement of fact. The paradigmatic problems are called belief-contravening problems by Rescher (1964)." @default.
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• W2767793669 date "2003-01-01" @default.
• W2767793669 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W2767793669 title "Counterfactual Reasoning: How to Organize a Possible World" @default.
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