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• W2772397486 abstract "The Meaning of Cause and Prevent: The Role of Causal Mechanism Clare R. Walsh (clare.walsh@plymouth.ac.uk) School of Psychology, University of Plymouth Plymouth, PL4 8AA, U.K. Steven A. Sloman (Steven_Sloman@brown.edu) Department of Cognitive & Linguistic Sciences, Brown University Box 1978, RI 02912 USA A second theory is based on the idea that a cause involves a process of transmission or exchanges along a causal pathway from cause to effect. This idea can be found in generative theories of causation in philosophy (e.g., Dowe, 2000; Salmon, 1984) and psychology (e.g., Shultz, 1982). Abstract What is a cause? Some theories propose that A causes B if A’s occurrence makes a difference to B’s occurrence in one way or another. Other theories propose that A causes B if some quantity or symbol gets passed in some way from A to B. The aim of our studies is to compare these theories’ ability to explain judgments of causation and prevention. We compare judgments for causal paths that involve a mechanism, i.e., a continuous process of transmission or exchange from cause to effect, against paths that involve no mechanism but nevertheless a change in the cause brings about a change in the effect. We describe three experiments which show that people are more likely to make attributions of causation when there is a mechanism but attributions of prevention when the mechanism is interrupted. “Make a Difference” Theories of Causation Causal Attribution A number of theories of causation incorporate the notion that a cause is something that makes a difference to the effect, without regard to how the effect is brought about. According to Hume, people infer causation from the regular co-occurrence of distinct events (Hume, 1739/1960) even though this practice cannot ultimately be justified. The great problem of induction according to Hume is that past experience cannot be used to justify prediction without incoherence or circularity. Nevertheless, past experience is all we have and is, therefore, what we use. More recent proposals about how we know that causes make a difference to their effects include counterfactual and manipulability theories. They also assume that causation can be judged without appealing to the mode of operation of a specific causal mechanism. Counterfactual theories of causation propose that causation can be defined in terms of a counterfactual conditional. In other words, it is the case that “event c caused event e” provided that “if c hadn’t occurred then e wouldn’t have occurred” in the closest possible world to our own (e.g., Lewis, 1973). Using a related idea, manipulability theories propose that “event c causes event e” provided that if I manipulate or intervene in a particular way that involves changing c, then this should change e also (e.g., Halpern & Pearl, 2001; Pearl, 2000). Rather than relying on the notion of a closest possible world, Pearl (2000) proposes that an intervention to change “c” leads to a counterfactual in which the consequences of “c” are changed but its causes are left unchanged. These approaches capture many of our intuitions, for example, it seems to make sense to say that the alarm not going off caused me to be late, provided that if the alarm had gone off I wouldn’t have been late. Despite this, several major difficulties have emerged for counterfactual theories over the years. One important difficulty is that they can lead to the wrong prediction in cases where the outcome is over- determined, that is, where more than one cause occurred and each alone would have been sufficient to produce the outcome. One of these situations occurs in cases of “pre- emption.” For example, imagine both Billy and Suzy throw Causal attributions are central to our ability to make sense of the world and to explain events as well as to plan for the future. Events tend to be preceded by many influences and, in one sense of the word, each is a “cause”; however, in making a judgment, people are selective in choosing only some events as causal. For example, if I slip on the pavement, I may attribute cause to the fact that there was ice-cream on the pavement or to the person that dropped it there. I am unlikely to attribute cause to other events in the causal sequence, to the fact that I bought ice cream or to my decision to follow that particular route. Our aim is to examine how people decide whether an event caused or prevented a particular outcome. The answer for “cause” and “prevent” may or may not be the same. The statement “c prevented e” may be equivalent in meaning to “c caused not e” as Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird (2001) argue. However, the statements may differ in both their semantics and their pragmatic implications. For instance, people may consider different possibilities in making judgments regarding each (Mandel & Lehman, 1996). Attributions of causation and prevention may also be distinct in the type of linkage they require between events. One theory of cause is based on the idea that a cause is something which makes a difference to the effect. This idea is found in regularity theories (Hume, 1739/1960) as well as probabilistic (Reichenbach, 1938; Suppes, 1970), counterfactual (e.g., Lewis, 1986) and manipulability theories of causation (e.g., Pearl, 2000; Woodward, 2003)." @default.
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• W2772397486 title "The Meaning of Cause and Prevent: The Role of Causal Mechanism" @default.
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