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• W2775809036 abstract "An interesting paper by Burgos (2016) argued that when radical behaviorists present criticisms of mentalism, such as the type typically practiced by cognitivists, the arguments commonly entail criticisms of dualism as well. Burgos made the case that conflating antidualism with antimentalism in such criticisms constitutes a misunderstanding of contemporary mentalistic practices in psychology, and weakens or confuses the case to be made against mentalism in psychology and behavioral science. This commentary will examine briefly this issue in the context of the different languages and practices of philosophy and of science.A question that presents itself is whether a cumulative, progressive, and useful scientific field needs metaphysics or to address ontological issues. The issues are interesting and important to philosophical concerns, but what scientists working in a cumulative scientific field need are clearer empirical questions, better scientific methods, more effective research technologies, and explanatory practices that engage new directions, discoveries, and applications. A standard search online once led me to a group that has an interest in ontological issues in physics, but my impression is that physicists are generally uninterested in such issues (there is apparently a joke that when a physics student begins to suggest metaphysical themes in discussions, the mentor recommends, Shut up and calculate.)The field of behavior analysis is a cumulative and progressive science. It may be the only field among the social/behavioral sciences that shares with physics, chemistry, and biology an inductive or bottom-up historical/scientific development. These fields began not with philosophy or extensive theory, but with careful observation, measurement, and often accidental discoveries that raised empirical questions and established new themes and directions for research. All four scientific fields eventually began to produce effective applications.In contrast, virtually all areas of experimental psychology (cognitive psychology, social psychology, developmental psychology, etc.) began with ordinary-language terms and concepts, and conduct experiments to test hypotheses. The results of the latter strategy are massive amounts of data and a large patchwork collection of various types of theories. Nearly all such theories are incapable of producing applications, in principle, because the hypothetical explanatory entities are unable to find contact with the phenomena under investigation, except in the case of inference when conducting experimental research (the biological areas of psychology can engage technical vocabularies that allow for some applied developments, but that is because the biological sciences are progressive and cumulative fields with effective, empirically-based technical vocabularies and interrelated empirical domains).Language Games of Philosophy and ScienceA central problem with the application of traditional philosophical issues to scientific fields concerns the functional differences between the vocabularies of the two verbal communities (cf. Skinner, 1957). Traditional philosophical terms engaged in Burgos' (2016) discussion include mental, behavioral, causation, and functional. Each term has an extensive etymological history in the development of ordinary language practices (e.g., Skinner, 1989), with additional issues or connotations developed throughout the long history of philosophical analysis. A term such as mental can be described or discussed in ontological, theoretical, or phenomenological terms. The term behavior in the history of psychology has generally been reserved for overt, publicly-observable actions, but has been extended in the history of behavior analysis to also include private events as phenomena observable to the individual (e.g., Leigland, 2014; Skinner, 1945).In the concluding section of the paper in a discussion of mental causation, Burgos states: I thus recommend radical behaviorists to embrace mental causation. …" @default.
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• W2775809036 date "2016-01-01" @default.
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• W2775809036 title "Comments on Burgos' (2016) Antidualism and Antimentalism in Radical Behaviorism" @default.
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