FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2790456095> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2790456095 abstract "In the context of the philosophy of mathematics, the term “naturalism” has a number of uses, covering approaches that look to be fundamentally at odds with one another. In one use, the “natural” in naturalism is contrasted with non-natural, in the sense of supernatural; in this sense, naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics appears in opposition to Platonism (the view that mathematical truths are truths about a body of abstract mathematical objects). Naturalism thus construed takes seriously the epistemological challenge to Platonism presented by Paul Benacerraf in his paper “Mathematical Truth” (cited under Ontological Naturalism). Benacerraf points out that a view of mathematics as a body of truths about a realm of abstract objects appears to rule out any (non-mystical) account of how we, as physically located embodied beings, could come to know such truths. The naturalism that falls out of acceptance of Benacerraf’s challenge as presenting a genuine problem for our claims to be able to know truths about abstract mathematical objects is sometimes referred to as “ontological naturalism,” and suggests a physicalist ontology. In a second use, the “natural” in naturalism is a reference specifically to natural science and its methods. Naturalism here, sometimes called methodological naturalism, is the Quinean doctrine that philosophy is continuous with natural science. Quine and Putnam’s indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects places methodological naturalism in conflict with ontological naturalism, since it is argued that the success of our scientific theories confirms the existence of the abstract mathematical objects apparently referred to in formulating those theories, suggesting that methodological naturalism requires Platonism. A final use of “naturalism” in the philosophy of mathematics is distinctive to mathematics, and arises out of consideration of the proper extent of methodological naturalism. According to Quine’s naturalism, the natural sciences provide us with the proper methods of inquiry. But, as Penelope Maddy has noted, mathematics has its own internal methods and standards, which differ from the methods of the empirical sciences, and naturalistic respect for the methodologies of successful fields requires that we should accept those methods and standards. This places Maddy’s methodological naturalism in tension with the original Quinean version of the doctrine, because, Maddy argues, letting natural science be the sole source of confirmation for mathematical theories fails to respect the autonomy of mathematics." @default.
• W2790456095 created "2018-03-29" @default.
• W2790456095 creator A5066004917 @default.
• W2790456095 date "2015-08-31" @default.
• W2790456095 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W2790456095 title "Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics" @default.
• W2790456095 doi "https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0276" @default.
• W2790456095 hasPublicationYear "2015" @default.
• W2790456095 type Work @default.
• W2790456095 sameAs 2790456095 @default.
• W2790456095 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W2790456095 crossrefType "reference-entry" @default.
• W2790456095 hasAuthorship W2790456095A5066004917 @default.
• W2790456095 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W2790456095 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2790456095 hasConcept C33923547 @default.
• W2790456095 hasConcept C43236755 @default.
• W2790456095 hasConceptScore W2790456095C111472728 @default.
• W2790456095 hasConceptScore W2790456095C138885662 @default.
• W2790456095 hasConceptScore W2790456095C33923547 @default.
• W2790456095 hasConceptScore W2790456095C43236755 @default.
• W2790456095 hasLocation W27904560951 @default.
• W2790456095 hasOpenAccess W2790456095 @default.
• W2790456095 hasPrimaryLocation W27904560951 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W1574143164 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W1589950552 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W1630397483 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W1689738227 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W1938007123 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2025795567 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2042508813 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2047386055 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2093643983 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2107362244 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2171157570 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2481296659 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2495304006 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2599256398 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2621322980 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2986780771 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W2995550894 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W3034390674 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W3197285487 @default.
• W2790456095 hasRelatedWork W45329838 @default.
• W2790456095 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2790456095 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2790456095 magId "2790456095" @default.
• W2790456095 workType "reference-entry" @default.