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• W286941966 abstract "We are not seeking here to provide a comprehensive overview for Asian approaches to the RMA. Rather, we are establishing a baseline from which to understand the challenge for regional partners of the United States to pursue the RMA. It is clear that the Asian industrial allies of the United States, notably Japan, Australia, and South Korea, find themselves in a situation different from those in Europe in confronting the RMA and the American transition. All these factors provide for a push for a regional RMA within Asia. * Asian States are not in a formalized alliance akin to NATO, which binds them to one another. * Asian States do not have large legacy military industries and systems blocking innovation. * Asian States have to confront an ascendant power in the region, China, whereas the Europeans are dealing with a descendant or collapsed power in their region--Russia. * The growth of the threat from the ascendant power is roughly calibrated with the timeline of an unfolding RMA. * The maritime interests of key U.S. allies provide a natural military partner for the Asians, namely the U.S. Navy. * Broad infrastructure changes are underway in the civilian enablers of the RMA, namely satellite, space, information and telecommunications sectors. * The Asian currency crisis has set back efforts to bring forth local primes to compete with the United States and thus underscore the need to network with industry outside of the region. * The Asian allies have the opportunity to partner with U.S. firms, to play off the competition among U.S. firms, and to partner with European firms seeking to build global alliances in high-technology industries. There have been three variants of a regional RMA within Asia evident in the past few years. * The Australian model focuses upon building wide area surveillance, information, and command links to become a regional military integrator within the region able to work with the United States and with Australia's adjacent allies. (1) * The Japanese model draws upon its technological relationship with the United States and its military relationship with the U.S. Navy to put in place a naval RMA and to build from this to adjacent military technology areas. (2) * The South Korean model has been based on the effort of the large industrial combines to work within the United States and Europe to forge global partnerships that would allow Korean firms to become primes in the development of their own military platforms. The currency crisis has derailed this model. Paul Dibb recently provided an overview of the RMA and Asian security. We will draw upon his analysis in this section to provide some baseline judgments about the regional specific dynamics of the RMA. Dibb underscores a key point for the RMA considerations of regional powers. It is important to accept that regional countries will adapt the RMA concept to their own assessments of how to deal with credible military threats. Those regional states which worry about higher levels of potential military threat from well-armed neighbors may be more attracted to the concept. Conversely, countries which perceive a non-threatening or benign strategic environment may (correctly or incorrectly) see little utility in the RMA. There may be a third category of countries which--whilst perceiving no immediate threat--seek to assert a margin of military excellence through the judicious use of the RMA adapted to their particular geographical and technological circumstances. This latter point raises another related issue. The RMA as developed by the United States is generally perceived in the region as too expensive and being on a scale of offensive fire power that has limited relevance to most (but not all) countries in the region. (3) In characterizing the probable adoption of RMA approaches in the region, Dibb argues that there are three key discriminators: the relationship to the United States, the capacity to absorb RMA technologies, and threat perception. …" @default.
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• W286941966 date "1999-04-01" @default.
• W286941966 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W286941966 title "The RMA and Regional Allies: The Asian Case" @default.
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