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• W2890438172 abstract "Although governments are developing and implementing policies to adapt to the impacts of climate change, it remains unclear which factors shape how states are developing these policies. This paper aims to assess whether or not administrative traditions matter for the formation of national climate change adaptation policy in 32 high-income countries. We operationalize administrative traditions based on five structural criteria: vertical dispersion of authority, horizontal coordination, interest mediation between state-society, role of public administrator, and how ideas enter bureaucracy. We construct a unique adaptation policy dataset that includes 32 high-income countries to test seven hypotheses. Our results indicate that countries’ adaptation policies align to some extent with their administrative structure, particularly dispersion of authority and horizontal coordination. However, we find limited evidence that other public bureaucracy factors are related to national adaptation policy. We conclude that administrative traditions matter, but that their influence should not be overestimated. 尽管政府正在制定并实行相关政策来适应气候变化影响，但目前尚不清楚的是，哪些因素会对国家如何发展政策一事产生影响。本文致力评估32个高收入国家中行政传统是否会影响国家气候变化适应政策的形成。作者基于5项结构性准则，对行政传统进行了操作化。这些准则分别是：权威的垂直分散、横向协调、国家和社会间的利益调解、公共行政人员的作用、以及不同观念如何进入官僚。作者建构了一个包含32个高收入国家的独特适应政策数据集，用于测试7项假设。测试结果显示，各国的适应政策在一定程度上和各自的行政结构保持一致，尤其是权威分散和横向协调。然而，作者发现，其他公共官僚机构因素和国家适应政策之间没有太多的相关性。本文结论认为，行政传统固然重要，但它们的影响也不应被夸大。 A pesar de que los gobiernos estén desarrollando e implementando políticas para adaptarse a los impactos del cambio climático, no es todavía claro qué factores le dan forma a cómo los estados están desarrollando estas políticas. Este documento busca evaluar si las tradiciones administrativas importan al momento de formular las políticas nacionales de adaptación al cambio climático en 32 países de alto ingreso. Operacionalizamos las tradiciones administrativas basándonos en cinco criterios estructurales: la dispersión vertical de la autoridad, la coordinación horizontal, la mediación de intereses entre el estado y la sociedad, el papel que juega la administración pública y cómo las ideas entran en la burocracia. Construimos un set de datos único para las políticas de adaptación que incluye 32 países de alto ingreso para comprobar siete hipótesis. Nuestros resultados indican que las políticas de adaptación de los países están alineadas hasta cierto punto con su estructura administrativa, particularmente con la dispersión de la autoridad y con la coordinación horizontal. Sin embargo, encontramos evidencia limitada de que otros factores de la burocracia pública estén relacionados con la política de adaptación. Concluimos que las tradiciones administrativas importan, pero que su influencia no debería ser sobreestimada. States are increasingly pressured to respond to the crosscutting problems that require collective action, including climate change, global terrorism, food (in)security, and economic crises (WEF 2018). These societal problems pose considerable governing challenges, particularly as states are generally considered ill-equipped to deal with new and crosscutting issues. Of the many reasons why states struggle to tackle collective action problems, one of the prominent reasons is the way in which bureaucratic machineries work: in their basic form, they are contrived of highly specialized institutions and policies that favor particular ways of thinking and acting (Peters, 2015). Public bureaucracies have distinctive features that influence how policy goals are defined and which policy choice options exist, and set the implementation preferences of policy actors (Howlett, 1991, 2004; Knill, 2001). These “administrative traditions” are the historically grown and relatively stable features of public bureaucracies that entail the particularities of how policy making and implementation are organized and acted upon by bureaucrats (Loughlin, Hendriks, & Lidström 2010; Painter & Peters, 2010). Administrative traditions are entrenched in legal, administrative, and cultural institutions that have been (re)shaped through reconfirmation of the civil servants’ activities (Dyson, 2010). While these traditions may gradually change over time in different contexts and for various reasons—for example, in established democracies of Spain, Germany, and Belgium (Loughlin et al., 2010) and in many post-colonial and transition states (Painter & Peters, 2010)—they provide relatively stable features upon which bureaucracy is built (Peters, 2010). The relative influence of administrative traditions and related concepts has been criticized in recent scholarship for lacking relevance in the rapidly changing network society of the twenty-first century. Key processes, it is argued, such as New Public Management, Europeanization and globalization, and neo-liberalization, are leading to convergence and increased similarity rather than differences in bureaucracies (Bennett, 1991; Drezner, 2001; Heichel, Pape, & Sommerer,2005). Although this might be conditionally true, many studies show how structural and cultural differences still exist and matter for policy making, particularly when it comes to setting preferences in the formation and implementation process around new policy issues (Meyer-Sahling & Yesilkagit, 2011). In situations of institutional voids and institution-building efforts, it is particularly important to assess the influence of administrative traditions. This is especially pertinent when considering the possibility of poor alignment of new policies with existing institutions and administrative traditions, which could lead to high degrees of resistance to change in existing practices making it difficult to realize political ambitions (Bürzel, 1999; Falkner, 2005). In this paper, we aim to empirically test whether administrative traditions are aligned with how states are adopting adaptation policies to respond to the impacts of climate change, focusing particularly on the structural dimensions of administrative traditions. Climate change adaptation is a novel policy issue that public bureaucracies and their administrative traditions are confronted with (Biesbroek, Peters, & Tosun, 2018). We make a clear distinction here between climate change mitigation, which refers to all (policy) efforts to reduce the emission of greenhouse gasses, and climate change adaptation—the focus of this paper—which refers to all (policy) efforts to reduce the negative impacts of climate change and/or take advantage of emerging opportunities. The role of bureaucracies in adaptation is critical to addressing the collective risk of climate change. This is a central argument underpinning the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, in which adaptation was politically placed on equal footing with mitigation, committing governments to start or intensify their adaptation efforts across sectors, levels, and societal groups (Lesnikowski et al., 2017; Magnan & Ribera, 2016). For over a decade, governments have been adapting to the projected impacts of climate change and many examples of adaptation policies, institutions, and instruments have been reported globally, including establishing interministerial climate change advisory committees, interdepartmental work programs, emergence of climate change ministries, developing new laws and regulations to ensure integration of climate change adaptation, investments in new research and policy experiments, and many others (Bauer, Feichtinger, & Steurer, 2012; Biesbroek et al., 2013; EEA, 2014; Ford, Berrang-Ford, & Paterson, 2011; Lesnikowski, Ford, Biesbroek, Berrang-Ford, & Heymann, 2016; Massey, Biesbroek, Huitema, & Jordan, 2014). However, since data on adaptation policy remain scarce, we construct a unique dataset of 32 high-income countries to quantitatively assess how administrative traditions align with the adoption and implementation patterns of climate change adaptation policy. Such understanding will be vital to inform how states can progress in climate change adaptation policy. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the existing scholarly work on adaptation policy and administrative traditions, and formulates seven hypotheses stemming from the literatures. Then, we present the research design, empirical setting, and methods of analysis. The results are presented in the fourth section followed by a discussion of the findings and implications. Some literature on adaptation policy suggests that there might be a link between how states respond to climate change risks and the socio-political and institutional context of a country. Vink et al. (2015) and Biesbroek (2014), for example, both show how the neo-corporatist traditions in the Netherlands and the British pluralist traditions shape the different ways in which responsibilities between public and private are divided, the types of policy instrument mixes proposed, which sectors are to be involved and in what way, and how adaptation policy is being decided and is implemented. Similarly, Granberg and Glover (2014) argue that the neoliberal political ideology in Australia’s bureaucracy has shaped several explicit pathways through which adaptation policy is formulated and implemented, and in doing so poses structural constraints for looking at alternative policy options beyond this paradigm (Fieldman, 2011). These few small-n case-study examples give rise to broader questions about if and how elements of administrative traditions influence the adoption and implementation of climate change adaptation policy across different types of countries. Different framings of what constitutes adaptation policy have left policy scholars struggling to define their dependent variable when comparing cases and scenarios. Here we follow Dupuis and Biesbroek (2013) and define adaptation policy as “... the production of outputs in forms of activities and decisions taken by purposeful public and private actors at different administrative levels and in different sectors, which deals intentionally with climate change impacts, and whose outcomes attempt to substantially impact actor groups, sectors, or geographical areas that are vulnerable to climate change” (p. 1480). In other words, we conceptualize something as adaptation policy when it is explicitly framed as such by policy makers, an approach that is consistent with most other comparative adaptation policy studies (Araos et al., 2016); (Austin et al., 2016). Given the multifaceted nature of adaptation, we unpack adaptation policy into three interrelated questions: 1) when is adaptation policy taking place (timing), 2) what kind of adaptation policy exists (action), and 3) how is this policy organized (structure). Several studies have started to identify early adopters in adaptation policy and explore whether or not early adoption has resulted in measurably greater policy progress over time (Berrang-Ford et al., 2014). In Europe, Massey et al. (2014) find in their sample of 29 European countries that adaptation policy innovations are driven predominantly by extreme events and scientific evidence that climate change is happening. Patterns of policy diffusion clearly show early adopters (such as Finland, U.K., and the Netherlands), followers (such as Italy and Portugal), and many non adopters. Similarly, Berrang-Ford et al. (2014) find in their dataset of 117 countries that GDP per capita and good governance are the best predictors for whether or not a country starts to adapt and when this adaptation will take place. Several studies have made distinctions between “groundwork” actions and “concrete” actions (Biagini, Bierbaum, Stults, Dobardzic, & McNeeley, 2014; Lesnikowski et al., 2016). Much of the reported activity of governments is at the groundwork level: policy efforts to ensure high stakeholder involvement, investments in impacts, and vulnerability assessments and adaptation research as well as developing climate change scenarios. These activities are necessary first steps in order to move to more concrete adaptation policy, including dedicated financial schemes and regulations, investments in infrastructure, public awareness and outreach campaigns as well as resource investments in organizational and staff development (Biagini et al., 2014; Lesnikowski et al., 2016. Although there are clearly leading countries that have moved well beyond groundwork actions, most are still at the groundwork stages and are experiencing considerable challenges moving toward implementing concrete adaptation actions. Adaptation is not a policy goal that can be achieved, but rather a continuous process of change that all levels, sectors, and actor groups need to consider in their policy process. Many authors have argued that groundwork and concrete adaptation actions should be “integrated” or “mainstreamed” into existing policies and practices to be effective (Dovers & Hezri, 2010; Runhaar, Wilk, Persson, Uittenbroek, & Wamsler, 2017). How this implementation is organized, however, differs across states; some countries have opted for a strong institutionalization of adaptation from which mainstreaming is coordinated or the development of key principles to guide how adaptation will be addressed nationally (Massey & Huitema, 2015). Other countries, however, have argued that adaptation is a local responsibility and that no additional institutional structure is needed to ensure uptake of adaptation at the most appropriate level (Storbjörk & Uggla 2015). Many scholars argue that horizontal and vertical coordination and integration is necessary to ensure that all actors and organizations take into account the adaptation actions of others (Urwin & Jordan, 2008). Some countries have therefore started to implement hard and soft laws to ensure timing, action, and structure for climate change adaptation (McDonald, 2011), with the UK Climate Change Act from 2008 being the first adopted and most frequently highlighted in research (Jude et al., 2017). Legislative approaches have become more prominent, indicating increasing seriousness in addressing adaptation (Lesnikowski et al., 2016). Hypothesis 1: Unitary centralized states are more likely to have dispersed authority on adaptation across scales in the form of coordinative mechanisms at the national level. Hypothesis 2: States with collaborative administrative traditions are likely to have dedicated interdepartmental coordination structures and instruments to address climate change adaptation holistically across sectors Hypothesis 3: Corporatist countries are expected to start adaptation at later stage than pluralist countries. Hypothesis 4: Corporatist states are more likely to mainstream adaptation into existing institutions rather than establish independent policy fields. Hypothesis 5: Legalistic systems are less likely to adapt early. Hypothesis 6: Managerial administrative systems are more likely to rely on procedural instruments to manage societal adaptation. Hypothesis 7: More open bureaucratic systems have a greater number of entry points for new ideas and so are likely to adopt policy innovations at an earlier stage. To date, no comprehensive dataset exists to test our hypotheses directly. We therefore combined information from different existing data sources to construct a novel dataset using available proxy variables to assess how administrative traditions align with national adaptation policy. The key challenge for comparative work on climate change adaptation policy is finding consistent, comparable, comprehensive, and coherent data, particularly because much of the conceptual and methodological work on this topic is still in early stages (Dupuis & Biesbroek, 2013). Three authoritative datasets are currently available on adaptation policy at the national level, and these were used here to construct our dataset. The original datasets are constructed of: self-reported adaptation activities through the UNFCCC National Communications 5 (~2010) and 6 (2012–2014) (Lesnikowski, Ford, Berrang-Ford, Barrera, & Heymann, 2013), self-assessment of EU Member States in response to the request of the European Environment Agency in 2013 (EEA, 2014), and an expert survey among scientists and policy experts from 29 European countries in 2013 (Massey et al., 2014). The respective code-book and materials are available through the original sources. Table 1 provides an overview of the dependent variables used in this study. [Continuous] Extent to which administration is open to public scrutiny. Higher values mean a more closed administration. Source: Teorell et al. (2011) As there are no readily available datasets on administrative traditions, we made use of different data sources: the Comparative Political Data Set III (1960–2012) by Armingeon, Weisstanner, and Engler (2014); the OECD Government at Glance 2013 report (OCED, 2013) and the OECD Government at Glance 2015 report (OECD, 2015); and the Quality of Government expert survey (1990–2012) by (Teorell, Dahlstrüm, and Dahlberg 2011). Of the many possible ways to conceptualize corporatism (Siaroff, 1999) for hypotheses 3 and 4, we selected the Corporatism Index developed by Jahn (2014) as it best fitted our definition of state–society relationship described in the theory section. While these datasets often include a longitudinal dimension, this analysis provides a snapshot of the period 2010–2014, so the most recent data were selected for each variable, except the corporatism for which the calculated mean was used. Table 1 provides an overview of the independent variables used in this study. This study included Annex I Member States of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).1 Of the 43 UNFCCC Annex I Members States listed in 2016, small nations and microstates (Liechtenstein, Monaco, Cyprus, Malta) as well as the EU were excluded because they are not comparable in structure. Ukraine, Turkey, Croatia, and Russia were removed due to lack of data on both administrative traditions and climate change adaptation policy. The final dataset included 32 states.2 We excluded low- and middle-income countries because their administrative traditions are poorly theorized and relatively unstable (Jreisat, 2010), access to trustworthy data to measure public administration and climate change adaptation policy is limited, and the conceptualization of adaptation is likely to vary between Annex I and II countries, thereby complicating comparative analysis (Dupuis & Biesbroek, 2013). It should be noted that 27 out of 32 are members of Europe(an Union) and the OECD. While this might influence individual member states on whether or not they start to adapt, the role of the EU and OECD has so far fulfilled merely an agenda-setting role. There are no formal competences by the EU in the formation and adoption of climate change adaptation policy, nor was there a common global or European framework before 2014 that prescribes how countries should adapt (Biesbroek et al., 2013; CEC, 2013; EEA, 2014). Therefore, it is unlikely that there is a direct influence of the EU or OECD on how adaptation policy of member states is taking place. Sensitivity analysis was conducted for GDP and the political orientation of governments as of the most recent election in 2012, as previous studies have shown that these are influential. Berrang-Ford et al, (2014) show that GDP per capita is strongly correlated to adaptation policy progress of countries globally. The GDP control variable is therefore used at the beginning of the time period for which the dependent variable is available. We use the OECD database as the source of GDP data (OECD, 2015). We also control for the political party in power for the past 5 years. Research suggests that countries with left-wing parliaments are more likely to formulate policy and implement adaptation actions compared to right-wing parties, which instead will place emphasis on mitigation and role of private actors to address climate change risks (Dupuis & Knoepfel, 2011). We would expect high variations in left–right orientation of a government to have a direct influence on the absolute amount of policy outputs (Schmidt, 1996). We used the Comparative Political Data Set III to control for political orientation (Armingeon et al., 2014). Based on the variables presented in Table 1—reflecting the best available proxies for our hypotheses—we constructed models to empirically test our hypotheses. Logistic and linear regression analyses were used to evaluate the statistical associations between five aspects of state structure and administrative traditions, and the presence of national adaptation efforts in 32 medium- and high-income countries. We built multivariable regression models for each of the six dependent variables in our dataset. The hypotheses and models are presented in Table 2. Multivariable exact logistic regression Multivariable exact logistic regression Ordinary least squares regression Multivariable exact logistic regression Note: there was insufficient power (sample size) to include multiple independent variables in a single model. More legalistic countries (legalism) will have a later year of initial national adaptation plan (timing) compared to less legalistic countries. Ordinary least squares regression In each model, we included any independent variables hypothesized to be associated with the dependent variable. We used multivariable models to allow consideration of confounding and interaction between variables, where feasible, though our relatively small sample size precluded inclusion of more than one or two variables or consideration of interaction in a single model without compromising model reliability. For continuous dependent variables (implementation mode, proceduralism, and timing), we used least squares regression; we used exact logistic regression for our dichotomous outcomes (national coordination, horizontal coordination, and national legal framework). We chose exact logistic regression due to the relatively small sample size of our dataset. Our modeling procedure was guided by our hypotheses. We first constructed core models combining each dependent and independent variable combination that best proxied our hypotheses. For each model, we conducted sensitivity analyses on each independent variable by including GDP and/or political preference variables to assess the extent to which the significance, strength, and/or direction of the independent variable effects were impacted. Model AIC (for linear; lower values indicate better model fit) and model score (for exact logistic; higher values indicate better model fit) were used to assess model performance. Prior to modeling, we assessed variables based on model assumptions, including linearity and normality. GDP was highly over dispersed, and we thus used a dichotomous GDP variable (0=below median GDP, 1=above median GDP) for sensitivity analyses. We assessed all models for significant outliers. All analyses were conducted in Stata (StataCorp v.13). There are some limitations in the data and our methods of analysis. First, given that two sources rely on self-reporting, there might be a bias in the types of activities reported and emphasis on positive policy outcomes rather than policy failures. Many authors acknowledge that it is conceptually difficult to distinguish symbolic policies from concrete adaptation outputs in these datasets, which hampers large-scale comparisons (Dupuis & Biesbroek, 2013). However, this is the best available data to date and more refined forms of adaptation tracking are needed to create better metrics for adaptation and allow for detail comparative assessments (Ford, Berrang-Ford, Lesnikowski, Barrera, & Heymann, 2013). Second, the datasets used are combinations of ordinal and categorical variables, which makes it complicated to test very refined propositions. Variables treated as continuous in our analyses were in fact continuous constructs, but measured as multiple-category ordinal variables, thus reducing precision and statistical power in our analyses. Comprehensive data for some of our theory-informed hypotheses were nonexistent, forcing us to use imperfect proxy variables. Third, our sample size is limited due to various reasons discussed above. This has implications for the tests used as well as robustness of our findings. Fourth and finally, we had to work with poor-quality data and limited sample size, which reduced reliability and validity of our findings and made it difficult to say with confidence whether or not these variables matter. We thus interpret our results with caution and focus on the stability, reliability, direction, and relative strength of different effects rather than the precision of estimates. We reflect on the implications for interpreting our findings in the discussion section. Consistent with our hypothesis 1, countries with a more unitary state structure were more likely to have National Adaptation Plan or National Adaptation Strategy (NAS/NAP) in place; this association was significant at p<0.05, though there was a wide confidence interval around the size of effect (Table 3). This effect remained similar when controlling for GDP, with a modest reduction in effective size and loss of significance. This implies that some of the association between state structure and NAP may be attributed to GDP, though the confounding effect is modest (e.g., Table 3, Model 1 versus 2). We were not able to model the impact of political preference given the small sample size and nonconvergence of the model. Dependent variable: National adaptation plan Independent Variables: Model 1 State structure only Model 2 State structure, controlling for GDP Model 3 State structure, controlling for political preference Federalist countries were significantly more likely to have a national working group on adaptation (Table 4, Model 1), which is the opposite of what we expected in hypothesis 2. We found no evidence for the second hypothesis that more pluralist countries are more likely to have a national working group (Table 4, Model 2). Indeed, less pluralistic countries had national working groups more frequently than more pluralistic countries in most of our models (3 of 4), though the direction of effect was inconsistent and not significant in any models. Notably, we found an interaction between pluralism and state structure. The effect of state structure on national working group was substantially stronger among less pluralistic countries (stratified models not shown). This can be observed in Table 4 in the difference in the effect of state structure between models 1 (without pluralism) and 3 (with pluralism), and the significance of state structure when pluralism is added to the model (Model 3): when accounting for pluralism, the effect of state structure on working group increased, though confidence intervals were very wide for state structure across all models. For example, of nine countries without national working groups, only one is federalist (Belgium), and the remainder unitary. Similarly, all federalist, less pluralistic countries in our dataset had national working groups (Spain, Canada, Germany, and the United States). Countries without national working groups were predominantly unitary and close to the median pluralism score, with the exclusion of Belgium. These trends can be seen in Figure 1. Thus, while pluralism itself does not seem to have a substantial effect on national working group, it may be mediating the extent to which state structure matters for creation of a working group. The very large coefficient for state structure in Model 3 reflects the importance of pluralism in affecting the role of state structure on national working group, but should not be interpreted with precision given a very wide confidence interval. Dependent variable: National working group Independent Variables: Model 1 State structure only Model 3 State structure + Pluralism Model 4 State structure controlling for GDP Model 5 State structure, controlling for political preference Model 6 Pluralism, controlling for GDP Model 7 Pluralism, controlling for Political preference Our sensitivity analyses of GDP and political preference indicate that neither variable had a substantial influence for these models. There is evidence of weak confounding by GDP on the effect of state structure on creation of a national working group (Model 4). Wealthier countries are more federalist and are more likely to create working groups (results not shown); national wealth (or country size) rather than federalism may thus play a role in influencing the creation of national working groups. The sample size was insufficient to model more than two variables at a time with robust results. We found no evidence—or indeed signals in the data—to indicate that more corporatist states have a greater share of adaptation initiatives that are implemented via mainstreaming (hypothesis 4) (results not shown). This was unaffected by GDP or political preference. Of the six most corporatist states (Germany, Austria, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden), for example, all but two (the Netherlands, Norway) mainstreamed adaptations at proportions below the median for the full dataset. Similarly, half of the six least corporatist countries (the United States, Canada, the U.K., Malta, Estonia, Poland) had mainstreaming levels above the median (Canada, Estonia, Poland). We found no evidence of significant relationships between corporatism (hypothesis 3), legalism (hypothesis 5), closedness (hypothesis 7), and on the timing of NAP implementation. Our sample size was low for these analyses (n=20), and we were thus underpowered to detect significance for these variables; no coefficients in this model group were significant at the 95% c" @default.
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• W2890438172 title "Do Administrative Traditions Matter for Climate Change Adaptation Policy? A Comparative Analysis of 32 High-Income Countries" @default.
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• W2890438172 doi "https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12309" @default.
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