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• W2891775174 abstract "There remains little agreement, despite several decades of increasingself-scrutiny, about what analytic philosophy is.1 Until fairly recently,however, there has been almost universal agreement about what it isnot; namely, whatever it is that Hegel and the Hegelians were up to.According to its founding myth, analytic philosophy arose out ofBertrand Russell’s and G. E. Moore’s reactions against British Hegelianism. Hegel was taken to have demonstrated that the only viableapproach to traditional categorical logic was dialectical. The dialecticalmethod enabled one to see that all philosophical claims, whether aboutmeanings or things, amounted to partial truths that could be shown toconverge upon a single truth concerning the Absolute. Against thisapproach, Russell and Moore argued that philosophy should take theform of conceptual analysis, guided by a new, quantificational logicthat allowed one to see how individuals and referring expressionsentered into facts and sentences, respectively. The aim of analysis, sounderstood, was to resolve propositional complexes into their basicatomic constituents. Russell had initially applauded Hegel for revealingthe inherent limitations of categorical logic, and had joined him inembracing contradiction, the engine of dialectic, as the means ofovercoming these limitations. Once he began applying the lessons ofquantificational logic to solving philosophical problems, however, hecame to think that abandoning the law of non-contradiction was alamentable misstep, in part because it led directly to the conceptualand ontological holism he and Moore so fiercely rejected. As Russellsaw it, the new logic suggested that the world consisted of discrete factsand things, an ontology that Hegel’s commitment to the basicframework of traditional logic simply prevented him from seeing.Russell promulgated the view among analytic philosophers thatHegelian philosophy was either incompatible with the analytic enterprise or, still worse, not a genuine philosophical enterprise at all. Yetcon-ofa broadly analytic stripe have recently begun to recognize. Russell’spolemical interpretation obscured the fact that Hegel did not abandon,so much as redirect the use of, the law of non-contradiction. He is bestunderstood as engaged in a variety of conceptual analysis not unlike,indeed arguably more thoroughgoing than, the sort that Russell laterembarked upon. Furthermore, Hegel’s logic is more properly regardedas a concept logic than is Gottlob Frege’s Begriffsschrift (ConceptScript), the system of quantificational logic whose propositional formbecame canonical in the analytic tradition. It certainly departs moredecisively than either Frege’s or Russell’s logics from the subjectpredicate model that all three sought to free us from. However, appreciation of Hegel’s philosophical ingenuity and significance wouldnot come to analytic philosophy until many years after it began toreflect on problems inherent to its own notion of logical analysis,including various logical paradoxes and the difficulty of accounting forthe unity of propositions (including those that are true, which Mooreand Russell initially equated with facts).Confronting these problems initially prompted Russell and his fol-lowers to develop more holistic, but still non-dialectical, approaches tosemantics and ontology. By the middle of the twentieth century, Hegelcould be begrudgingly credited with recognizing the errors of naiveempiricism and logical atomism, but such piecemeal acknowledgementdid little to rehabilitate his reputation as a befuddled logician and anobscurantist metaphysician. With the recent abandonment or questioningof several early analytic orthodoxies, including those of bivalence andthe much discussed “dogmas of empiricism”, there have been glimmeringsof a rapprochement with Hegel, a trend led by philosophers whobelieve that the semantic and logical holisms of W. V. Quine, WilfridSellars and Donald Davidson have made Hegelian doctrines morephilosophically attractive and relevant. Among these, Robert Brandom,John McDowell, Graham Priest and Robert Pippin are the most prominent. Each has found in Hegel a fruitful approach to a topic ofcurrent philosophical concern, such as the nature of meaning, truth,rationality or subjectivity. Their work is generally acknowledged as animportant development within analytic philosophy, but it remains at itsperiphery, an indication of the tradition’s continued suspicion of Hegeland its inescapable connection to him.A significant but neglected aspect of this connection is the linkbetween Hegel’s and the early Russell’s respective conceptions of logic,namely, that the purpose of logic is to afford access to the ontologicalrepresents and theanalytic tradition. What makes current efforts insufficient is the prevailing tendency, following Alfred Tarski, to approach logic as a purelyformal system without regard to its metaphysical underpinnings. WhatRussell objected to in Hegelian logic was not its metaphysical mooringas such, but its intrinsic metaphysical idealism. Whether Hegel’s idealismis best interpreted as a form of metaphysical holism (as Russell took it)or as a form of conceptual realism closer to Platonism (as we might beinclined to take it) is a question we leave to one side. The importantpoint is that in rejecting Hegel’s logic, Russell did not, as might beexpected, adopt the view that logic is metaphysically neutral. On thecontrary, he agreed with Hegel that the task of logical inquiry was toprovide a metaphysically correct picture of the world. Believing at thetime that Moore’s “Platonic atomism” (as Peter Hylton calls it) provided such a picture, he applied himself to identifying its correspondinglogic (Hylton 1990: 105-275, passim).In our view, the salient features of Hegel’s conception of logic andtruth are his treatment of logical form as an expression of consciousnessand concept, and his famous requirement that in grasping a concept weultimately, if imperfectly, grasp “the True, not only as Substance, butequally as Subject” (PS 10). Part of what this implies is that acts ofconceptual articulation are the primary bearers of truth, in the specificsense of actualizing rather than merely representing reality or theworld. Such a view is fundamentally at odds with prevailing analyticperspectives which consider propositions, sentences, statements or evenbeliefs (considered as representations) to be the primary loci of truth. Italso represents the most intractable barrier to understanding Hegel(besides the notorious obscurity of his language). A curious indicationof this difficulty is to be found in the ill-repute of Frege’s notion ofassertion, or rather of assertoric force, which, as we hope to show,constitutes a profitable point of contrast and intersection with Hegel’snotion of the speculative concept as both the form and act of cognitiveengagement. We also hope to show that there are good reasons forrevisiting the Russell/Hegel debate, not least because the prevailingview of logic tells equally against Hegelian idealism and Platonicatomism. Perhaps it is possible to tease out a viable view of logic thatHegel and Russell both share, one that doesn’t begin by pulling therug out from underneath their respective conceptions of a logicalmetaphysics.The story of Hegel’s relationship to analytic philosophy is a morephilosophically and historically rich one than we can do justice to inthe best logicalissues that first led to the divergence between Hegelian and analyticphilosophy and that continue to keep them apart. In good Hegelianfashion, we divide the history of analytic philosophy’s relationship toHegel into three stages or dialectical moments:1 abstract negation, or the simple repudiation of Hegelian philosophyas such;2 determinate negation, or the implicit incorporation of repudiatedHegelian doctrines; and3 the negation of negation, or a reconciliation with the Hegelianposition as a determining ground of the analytic project properlyconceived." @default.
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• W2891775174 title "Hegel and analytic philosophy" @default.
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