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• W289592713 abstract "Controversy has been prevalent for many years surrounding the relationship between executive pay and firm performance. Public interest has fueled, and often creates, many of the debates regarding levels of executive pay (Byrne and Hawkins, 1993). A recent example of this controversy appeared in the main article entitled for No Performance, in the 1998 special section on Executive Pay in the Wall Street Journal (Mercer et al., 1998). This article implies there is a trend of decreased financial risk associated with being a CEO. Investors have seen CEO financial risk change as executive compensation has assumed different forms over the years. In the 1950s the predominate forms of compensation were salaries and cash bonuses. Stock options became popular in the 1960s and the use of appreciation rights, restricted stock and performance units appeared in the 1970s and 1980s. In each decade, with the advent of new compensation components, one question has been foremost in the minds of investors, Has the CEO earned the pay he/she receives? Investors want to know the effect on both the owners and the firm of the implementation of a new component of CEO's pay. Investors are not always disgruntled and some investors are completely satisfied with the pay received by CEOs. These investors most likely feel the CEO is doing his/her job well when the stock price rises. Granted, this is a desired outcome for any business, but can market prices be viewed in isolation? Did the state of the economy and the industry drive the stock price more than changes in the value of the firm that came about through the decisions made by the CEO? Researchers have examined some of these issues in an attempt to address both public support and criticism. Research on the financial implications of executive compensation has typically been in one of two areas. One area of financial research has analyzed various components of executive compensation to assess the effects of those components on aspects of firm performance. Another branch of financial research has considered how shareholders perceive the adoption of compensation packages or package components. In the latter case, the results have been mixed. Efficient markets theory suggests shareholders impound information efficiently and should respond to the adoption of a component of compensation accordingly. The results of studies that have examined the market's reaction to the adoption of a long-term, performance-based compensation component have been inconclusive, however. Some studies found positive reactions to the adoption of long-term components (Larker, 1983; Brickley et al., 1985) while another la rger study found negative results (Gayer et al., 1992). Studies examining the relationship between performance-based compensation components and improved firm performance as measured using accounting variables have been conflicting as well. Some studies have shown that accounting-based compensation components motivate managers to make decisions that increase their own wealth but do not improve firm performance (Healy, 1985; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Lambert and Larker, 1987). Others have shown a significant relationship between improvement in accounting variables and increased executive compensation (Ely, 1991; Abowd, 1990), but these studies did not link improvement in accounting variables to improved firm performance. The relationship between executive pay and firm performance continues to be an area of interest and controversy because of issues such as public concern, implementation of new tax laws, and the prevalence of mergers and acquisitions. Prior studies related to the relationship between pay and performance have produced conflicting results. Inconsistencies exist in part because a majority of these studies have considered only one accounting measure of performance and have treated this measure as being equally important across firms. In addition, these studies have predominately measured performance variables for a short time period. …" @default.
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• W289592713 date "2000-09-22" @default.
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• W289592713 title "Do Performance Plan Adoptions Improve Firm Performance? an Analysis of Nine Industries" @default.
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