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• W2896028865 abstract "Purpose The purpose of this study is twofold: First, to assess the economic impact of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) on European acquiring firms from the beginning of the sixth merger wave onward. And second, to investigate the effect of CG mechanisms such as board size, voting rights and anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) on acquirers’ gains, along with a set of control variables. Design/methodology/approach For the purpose of the study, the authors use a sample of 349 completed M&As across all business sectors between European firms from 01/01/2003 to 31/12/2017. Abnormal returns are estimated by applying an event study methodology, and the effects of CG mechanisms are assessed with univariate and multivariate cross-sectional regressions. Findings The authors present evidence that acquirers realize significant positive excess returns upon the announcement of M&As. The authors find past profitability to be a strong indicator of value creation, while most of the traditional firm-specific and deal variables fail to interpret the results. The authors’ analysis indicates that the examined CG measures have a significant effect on acquirer’s gains. More specifically, the authors find that boards in excess of eight directors are negatively related to announcement-period abnormal returns. In contrast, the wealth effects for acquiring firms are positively related to shareholders’ voting rights and/or to the number of ATPs. The estimated coefficients of all three CG mechanisms are statistically significant across alternative model specifications. Research limitations/implications A clear implication is that the existence of certain CG mechanisms leads to value-enhancing strategic decisions for European acquirers. In terms of policy direction, the authors’ findings assist practitioners and/or national and transnational institutions in perceiving the efficacy of certain CG practices. Practical implications This study indicates that Corporate Governance Statements (CGSs) fail to provide adequate information to investors to understand in-depth the CG mechanisms that companies apply. Thus, the authors recommend that CGSs should provide not only narrative information but also information that may generate value for shareholders and other stakeholders as well. Such information should be qualitative and/or quantitative in nature and be made available to market participants to support their decision-making. Originality/value To the authors knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the effect of CG on the economic impact of M&As for European acquirers, using three widely examined CG mechanisms, namely, the board size, the voting rights and the ATPs. The authors’ empirical findings form the basis for further examination of the linkage between M&As and CG, with the intention of establishing the appropriate CG framework that will ensure shareholder wealth creation. This line of research could produce new insights in the field, allowing investors and policymakers to appreciate the benefits of effective CG." @default.
• W2896028865 created "2018-10-26" @default.
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• W2896028865 date "2018-10-01" @default.
• W2896028865 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W2896028865 title "The effect of corporate governance mechanisms on European Mergers and Acquisitions" @default.
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• W2896028865 doi "https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-05-2018-0166" @default.
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