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• W2899875897 abstract "The study of Kurosaki (2018) is a very interesting, empirically rich, and well-referenced analysis of micro and small enterprises in Indian manufacturing and service industries. He compares registered and unregistered enterprises, centering on the question, does informality make a difference? The major finding is that, although there are differences between the two groups of enterprises, overall formality has a rather limited effect on most aspects of their operations. Many of the findings are unsurprising: the owners of the unregistered enterprises are younger and less educated, and more likely to be female, migrants, and drawn from minority communities. One might hypothesize that enterprises that are formally registered with the state apparatus would be more likely to comply with official regulations, including labor laws, taxation requirements, environmental regulations, and so on. These impose exactions on the enterprises, but it might also be expected that official status facilitates access to government resources (finance, fiscal incentives, etc). It might also confer at least some protection from arbitrary harassment by officialdom. Conversely, the unregistered enterprises may have greater flexibility in their operations, with fewer compliance requirements. They may also be more likely to operate in the “black economy,” avoiding tax and other obligations. However, their unofficial status might render them more vulnerable to harassment from government officials, unless of course their informality lowers their official visibility. The crucial parameter in this framework is the nature of the state and its regulatory regime. The more complex and “predatory” it is, the more likely it is that enterprises will deliberately seek informality. The earlier (prereform) “Licence Raj” acted as an incentive to remain informal and small. It might have been useful if Kurosaki could provide some guidance on this issue before embarking on the empirical analysis. Do remnants of the Licence Raj still exist, and what form do they take, particularly as they affect small and micro enterprises? How does India now compare on the various international “ease of doing business” metrics? It is also useful to see this dichotomy of enterprise organization through evolutionary lenses. Enterprises typically start small owing to financial and information constraints, and then the successful ones evolve along a dynamic, experimental path. One wonders therefore, is informality a pathway to the formal sector? If so, a snapshot dichotomy may be observing a transitory state of affairs that changes over time. Alternatively, if the regulatory, financial, and other barriers are high, then informal enterprises may remain “trapped” in small, low productivity operations. More broadly, how much social mobility is there among the informal entrepreneurs and their businesses? Kurosaki hints at issues related to the caste system. It would be interesting to know whether these informal enterprises constitute an entrenched under class. Turning to the paper's methodologies and main results, I make the following observations. First, with regard to the database, surveying small and micro enterprises in developing countries is notoriously difficult. It would be useful to know more about the survey – who were the enumerators, were there presurvey trials, which data were the most difficult to secure, etc.? Also, are the unregistered enterprises completely cut off from the state apparatus? Perhaps they connect to lower tiers of government, for example, for land and building ownership? Second, the findings on trust of official institutions among the two groups are somewhat contrary to received wisdom. Kurosaki concludes that “unregistered entrepreneurs trust the police and law officers more than registered entrepreneurs.” Is there any obvious explanation for this finding? Third, I would have expected access to finance to be a more significant factor. The survey results show that capital investment of the registered enterprises is almost three times that of the unregistered enterprises, and that those enterprises with access to the formal credit market are more likely to be profitable. This is where I would conjecture that registration confers advantages. It might also be the case that clear land ownership title provides the collateral that enables these enterprises to borrow. Yet credit does not appear to be a decisive factor. Should one therefore conclude that the stereotype of informal operations being “capital-starved” and therefore unable to grow is overstated? Or perhaps informal credit markets are efficient and flexible enough to overcome these barriers? Fourth, there are interesting findings on innovation. Kurosaki maintains that registered firms are more likely to undertake process innovation (at least in manufacturing), but less likely to undertake marketing and product innovations. Here, access to capital may be a factor. One possible explanation for the marketing finding may be that registered firms are more likely to benefit from public procurements. The final section of the paper explores the effects of the 2016 demonetization on the two groups of enterprises. Both groups reported substantial reductions in activity, more so among the unregistered firms. A relevant factor here is bank access: very few (6%) unregistered enterprises have current accounts with banks, whereas the majority (73%) of registered enterprises do. Overall, the conclusion is one of surprisingly limited impact." @default.
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• W2899875897 date "2018-11-07" @default.
• W2899875897 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W2899875897 title "Comment on “Informality, Micro and Small Enterprises, and the 2016 Demonetisation Policy in India”" @default.
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• W2899875897 doi "https://doi.org/10.1111/aepr.12247" @default.
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