FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2902882176> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2902882176 endingPage "119" @default.
• W2902882176 startingPage "106" @default.
• W2902882176 abstract "Decades from now, when historians and political scientists look back at the turbulentyears of the Bush presidency, they will undoubtedly ask – what were they thinking?What was President Bush thinking when he ordered the invasion of Iraq? Whatadvice were his closest advisers – Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz,Condoleeza Rice and Colin Powell – giving him as insurgents in and around Baghdadwere wreaking havoc on US and allied soldiers? And what, if any, role did policy expertsbrainstorming at the nation’s leading defense and foreign policy think tanks play inadvising the Bush administration on how to establish a more stable world order?Until the memoirs of leading policy-makers involved in Bush’s inner circle and thebriefing notes summarizing high-level meetings between the president and his principaladvisers become available, one can only speculate on what ultimately influenced theBush administration’s decision to resort to force. Moreover, until this and other relevant information surfaces, it will be difficult to confirm why, in the face of considerablepublic opposition, the president sacrificed thousands of lives and billions of dollars tofight an unpopular and inherently destabilizing war. Although it may take years topiece together an accurate and complete assessment of what led to this foreign policydebacle, it is nonetheless possible to shed light on some of the key domestic influenceson US foreign policy during the Bush years.In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, the American and foreign media, hundredsof interest groups and several other non-state and non-governmental organizationstook part in the national conversation over the war on terror. While a study detailingthe involvement of these and other actors in the foreign policy-making process wouldmost certainly raise critical questions about the impact of ideas on the Bush administration, in this chapter we will focus solely on how one set of institutions – thinktanks – sought to leave an indelible mark on US foreign policy. In doing so, we canfurther explore how policy experts – who are neither appointed, or elected to publicoffice – can become important actors in the foreign policy-making process.The aim of this chapter is not to chronicle the evolution of think tanks in the UnitedStates, nor is it to engage in a lengthy discussion about the different types of thinktanks that populate the policy-making community. These and other issues related tothe growth and diversity of American think tanks have been addressed elsewhere(Abelson 1996, 2002, 2006; Rich 2004). Rather, the purpose here is to address whatclearly has become a major shortcoming in the burgeoning literature on think tanks.Although scholars who study think tanks in the United States and in otherindustrialized and developing countries have gone to great lengths to explain how andunder what circumstances these organizations become involved in policy-making(Stone 1996; McGann and Weaver 2000; Stone and Denham 2004), the majority ofstudies have neglected to consider how to assess or evaluate their impact. As a result,although we know far more about the types of think tanks that have emerged in recentyears and the various public and private channels on which they rely to market theirideas (Weaver 1989; Abelson 1996, 2002), the extent to which they are able to wieldinfluence at different stages of the policy-making process largely remains cloaked inmystery.In an effort to address this deficiency, this chapter will explore how a small group ofthink tanks sought to influence US defense and foreign policy during the Bushadministration. Particular emphasis will be placed on how the Project for the NewAmerican Century (PNAC) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) were able toshare their insights on how to wage war in Iraq and in other conflict-ridden countrieswith key advisers in the Bush White House.While there is little doubt that think tanks specializing in defense and foreign policymade a concerted effort to influence President Bush’s thinking during his tumultuousterms in office, it is important to clarify how and under which circumstances theyappeared to have had an impact. For instance, shortly after the United States invadedIraq, journalists in North America and in Europe claimed that the Project for the NewAmerican Century had in effect become the architect of Bush’s foreign policy. However,as the war progressed, it appeared that scholars at AEI may have played an even moreimportant role in convincing the Bush administration not only to stay the course inIraq, but to increase the number of troops being deployed. Support for the ‘surge’ inIraq has been closely linked to several projects undertaken at AEI.Still, as tempting as it may be to make sweeping claims about how influential somethink tanks are in official policy-making circles, scholars must be better equipped toanalyze the nature and degree of their involvement. As we will discover in the pagesthat follow, some think tanks have been able to make important contributions to foreign policy by generating timely and policy relevant studies that promote lively discussion and debate among key stakeholders. In doing so, they have made great strides ininforming and educating the public and policy-makers about how to meet the manychallenges confronting them in the twenty-first century. However, it will becomeequally apparent that establishing close ties to high-level decision-makers does notguarantee that think tanks will be able to achieve policy influence. Unless and untilpolicy-makers are prepared to listen to their advice, there is little think tanks can do totranslate policy recommendations into concrete public policy. For think tanks to succeed in the marketplace of ideas, policy-makers on Capitol Hill, in the White Houseand throughout the bureaucracy, must be prepared to trust their judgement. Otherwise,scholars residing at think tanks will be left to debate among themselves and membersof the attentive public about the virtues and vices of US foreign policy.In the first section of the chapter, a brief discussion of the many methodologicalobstacles scholars need to address in studying think tank influence will be provided.This will be followed by a detailed case study of how PNAC and a handful of otherconservative think tanks attempted to influence both policy discussions and publicdebates over the war on terror. Finally, we will discuss why it is important to understand the management style of presidents in any assessment of think tank influence atthe highest levels of government." @default.
• W2902882176 created "2018-12-11" @default.
• W2902882176 creator A5023920866 @default.
• W2902882176 date "2009-06-19" @default.
• W2902882176 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W2902882176 title "What were they thinking? Think tanks, the Bush presidency and US foreign policy" @default.
• W2902882176 cites W1528023588 @default.
• W2902882176 doi "https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203878811-15" @default.
• W2902882176 hasPublicationYear "2009" @default.
• W2902882176 type Work @default.
• W2902882176 sameAs 2902882176 @default.
• W2902882176 citedByCount "2" @default.
• W2902882176 countsByYear W29028821762013 @default.
• W2902882176 countsByYear W29028821762022 @default.
• W2902882176 crossrefType "book-chapter" @default.
• W2902882176 hasAuthorship W2902882176A5023920866 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConcept C2781243023 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConcept C3018437817 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConcept C3116431 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConcept C93377909 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConceptScore W2902882176C17744445 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConceptScore W2902882176C199539241 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConceptScore W2902882176C2781243023 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConceptScore W2902882176C3018437817 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConceptScore W2902882176C3116431 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConceptScore W2902882176C93377909 @default.
• W2902882176 hasConceptScore W2902882176C94625758 @default.
• W2902882176 hasLocation W29028821761 @default.
• W2902882176 hasOpenAccess W2902882176 @default.
• W2902882176 hasPrimaryLocation W29028821761 @default.
• W2902882176 hasRelatedWork W2058637058 @default.
• W2902882176 hasRelatedWork W2141947143 @default.
• W2902882176 hasRelatedWork W2230883729 @default.
• W2902882176 hasRelatedWork W2385853716 @default.
• W2902882176 hasRelatedWork W2491297607 @default.
• W2902882176 hasRelatedWork W2902882176 @default.
• W2902882176 hasRelatedWork W3028449555 @default.
• W2902882176 hasRelatedWork W3138660828 @default.
• W2902882176 hasRelatedWork W843886709 @default.
• W2902882176 hasRelatedWork W934757125 @default.
• W2902882176 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2902882176 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2902882176 magId "2902882176" @default.
• W2902882176 workType "book-chapter" @default.