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• W2904808818 abstract "How does unemployment risk affects workers welfare and how should policies face this fact? This is the broad question that glues the chapters of this thesis. An accurate answer would considerably improve the ability to insure workers against the uncertainty of job loss. This work shows different aspects of the importance of unemployment risk, by studying it from a theoretical point of view, with quantitative models and through empirical lenses. A crucial element that this thesis emphasizes is the central role of human capital accumulation and other life cycle considerations. In Chapter 1 the policies to insure unemployment risk are analyzed. The literature has focused on the optimal way to insure a worker that is searching for a job. The novelty of this chapter is to introduce life cycle considerations, that is to say, to explicitly model the fact that workers can experience job losses at different moments of their life, and at varying conditions. The initial conditions at layoff make workers to react differently to the unemployment insurance policy. For that reason, the optimal policy should take this into account by making unemployment insurance a function of (exogenous) indicators of these initial conditions. In this chapter the role of age is emphasized. The main conclusion is that unemployment insurance should be higher for young workers. In fact, liquidity provision is more important for them because they have not been able to accumulate financial assets. Additionally, distortions are less important for young workers, given that they are worried about their career prospects and they want jobs not only for the labor income but for the human capital accumulation that they entail. The chapter is a contribution in several ways. It highlights the importance of including life cycle considerations in the analysis of unemployment insurance. It shows how the main trade offs of the redistribution of unemployment insurance through the life cycle can be analyzed by a simple formula that can be evaluated using a minimal amount of data. It also solves the optimal life cycle unemployment insurance problem, as a benchmark. In Chapter 2 the assessment of frictional wage dispersion is revisited. The main conclusion is that differences in transition probabilities between workers is wide even after controlling for observables, and that this type of unobservable heterogeneity have profound consequences on the distribution of (residual) wages. In fact, the assessment through a quantitative model has an important result: most of the measured residual wage dispersion in the data can be generated by frictions in the labor market. That is to say, by luck in the search process. This result is at odds with part of the literature that has emphasized that calibrated search models typically generate a wage dispersion that is 20 times lower than the empirical one. While other papers have identified departures to the model (such as on the job search with counteroffers) that generate significant wage dispersion, our approach is to show how heterogeneity in unemployment risk can produce the same result. The main substantial contribution of this chapter is to disentangle the relative role of luck in the determination of wages. The message is that much of the labor income dispersion in the economy is generated by random results of the search process. This is important from a policy perspective, given that part of this luck can be (or should be) insured. Chapter 3 focuses on the empirical approximation of unemployment insurance policy. It is an attempt to implement different methodologies for estimating the optimality of unemployment insurance, using a unique dataset. With Social Security data from the universe of unemployed insurance beneficiaries from Argentina, we identify and estimate important parameters (the lasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benefits and severance pay, and the elasticity of reemployment wages with respect to benefits) which are useful for evaluating the optimality of the unemployment insurance system. The main conclusion is that a shorter benefit provision would generate welfare improvement. The main intuition behind this result is that, in the presence of widespread informality, moral hazard is exacerbated and shorter benefits would make disincentives to look for an informal job milder. This work generates several veins for future research. Concisely, the main avenues are (i) to analyze jointly unemployment insurance and any type of severance pay in the context of human capital loss at displacement and (ii) to extend empirical analysis to include endogenous separation. Two types of shocks arise when a displacement occurs: a temporary income loss related to the uncertainty in the duration of the unemployment spell, and a persistent income loss mainly due to human capital destruction. To insure workers against job loss implies covering both risks with two different instruments: unemployment insurance for the risk in duration and an unconditional transfer at layoff to compensate for the persistent loss. In this analysis, again, life cycle considerations are crucial. The intuition suggests that while unemployment insurance could be very distortive for older workers, persistent losses can be high and should be compensated through some kind of transfer. For the young, the converse should be true. This transfer can be associated with traditional severance payments but also to a permanent labor income tax rebate, which would at the same time compensate for losses and enhance reemployment. This venue of research demands the endogeneization of separation, given that in this context, moral hazard issues would arise because of unobservable effort while unemployed and also while employed. Thus, it is important to introduce this aspect in the analysis of optimal protection to the displaced. For example, the measurement of the elasticity of separation with respect to this type of policy (unemployment insurance and severance payments) would be useful. Eventually, a simple formula can be derived to interpret this result at the light of a structural model." @default.
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• W2904808818 date "2011-01-01" @default.
• W2904808818 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W2904808818 title "Essays on unemployment risk and inequality" @default.
• W2904808818 hasPublicationYear "2011" @default.
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