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• W2910347296 abstract "Countries and citizens often raise significant expectations every time a new International Environmental Summit is settled. Unfortunately, few solutions have come out of these meetings. This represents a challenge on our current understanding of models on decision-making: more effective levels of discussion, agreements and coordination must become accessible (Barrett, 2005). Mitigating the effects of climate change requires cooperation, and arguably the welfare of our planet accounts for the most important and paradigmatic example of a public good game humans face: a global good from which every single person profits, whether she contributes or not to maintain it. However, these summits failed to recognize the well-studied difficulties of cooperation in public-good games. Indeed, in most cooperation problems faced by humans, individuals, regions or nations opt to be free riders, hoping to benefit from the efforts of others while choosing not to make any effort themselves driving the population into the tragedy of the commons. When dealing with such an essential public good as climate, many efforts are made to avoid this, so that efforts are shared for all and balanced measures can then be taken. One of the multiple flaws often appointed to such agreements is a deficit in the overall perception of risk of widespread future losses, in particular the perception of those occupying key positions in the overall political network that underlies the decision process (Santos, Santos and Pacheco, 2008; Santos and Pacheco, 2011). Another problem relates to the lack of sanctioning mechanisms to be imposed on those who do not contribute (or stop contributing) to the welfare of the planet. Moreover, agreeing on the way punishment should be implemented is far from reaching a consensus, given the difficulty in converging on the pros and cons of some procedures against others, and (occasionally) narrow impact of punishment in promoting cooperative actions (Vukov et al., 2013). The impasse over these measures is expected since their consequences do not have a solid theoretical or even experimental background. Here we discuss i) the effect of group size and risk awareness in the decision making process and ii) the emergence and impact of different types of sanctioning in deterring non-cooperative behavior in climate agreements, as reported in (Vasconcelos, Santos and Pacheco, 2013; Santos, Vasconcelos et al. 2012). To this end, climate agreements are defined as Collective Risk Dilemmas (CRD), a simple Public Goods game with uncertainty that mimetizes the problem at stake (Santos and Pacheco, 2011). We model the decision making process as a dynamical process, in which behaviours evolve in time, taking into consideration decisions and achievements of others, which influence one’s own decisions. We implement such behavioural dynamics in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, in which the individuals are simulated to respond to the most successful (or fit) behaviours. This way, one is able to describe strategic interactions between individuals, complemented by evolutionary principles. In particular, we do so in finite populations, where such fitness driven dynamics occurs in the presence of errors (leading to stochastic effects), both in terms of errors of imitation as well as in terms of behavioral mutations (µ), the latter accounting for spontaneous exploration of the possible strategies. Therefore, instead of resorting to complex and rational planning or rules, individuals revise their behavior by peer-influence, creating a" @default.
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• W2910347296 date "2018-07-02" @default.
• W2910347296 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W2910347296 title "Bootstrapping back the climate with self-organization" @default.
• W2910347296 hasPublicationYear "2018" @default.
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