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- W2911382693 abstract "In two-sided matching problems, there are twodisjoint sets of agents, for instance, firms and workers,hospitals and interns. Each agent has a preference order overagents on the other side. An outcome of the problem is a match.Stability has been considered to be the main property that accountsfor the success of many matching processes. It is a robustnessproperty: no coalition has a good reason to disrupt the suggestedmatch. A well-studied question is to what extent it is reasonablefor agents to be truthful about their preferences. Agents may havean incentive to misrepresent their preferences. Therefore,procedures that produce stable matches with respect to theannounced preferences may not produce stable matches with respectto the true preferences. Then, a natural question to ask is: Whatare Nash equilibria? A significant portion of this volume isdevoted to full-fledged game theoretic analysis in one-to-one,many-to-one and many-to-many matching problems. In the firstchapter, we study the problem of allocating indivisible goods toagents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Our mainrequirement is strategy-proofness. Our second goal is fairness.Fairness is incompatible with efficiency. We consider twoinstances of this problem: (1) the supply of each object is one;and (2) the supply of each object may be greater than one. For eachinstance, we identify a fair and strategy-proof rule that Paretodominates any other rule satisfying the two properties. In thesecond chapter, we consider many-to-one and many-to-many matchingproblems where each agent has substitutable and separablepreferences. We analyze the stochastic dominance (sd) Nashequilibria of the game induced by any vii probabilistic stablematching rule. In the third chapter, we model decentralizedmatching as a sequential game in which firms sequentially make joboffers to workers. The complex and uncertain aspects ofdecentralized processes are represented by a randomly selectedorder according to which firms make offers. We study the sd-Nashand realization independent equilibria of the Decentralized Gamewe define. In the fourth chapter, we show that the so-called‘rural hospital theorem’ generalizes to many-to-many matchingproblems where agents on both sides of the problem havesubstitutable and weakly separable preferences. We also show thatthis domain of preferences is maximal." @default.
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- W2911382693 date "2012-01-01" @default.
- W2911382693 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
- W2911382693 title "Essays in matching theory" @default.
- W2911382693 hasPublicationYear "2012" @default.
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