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• W2912903428 abstract "This article examines the dynamics of recent attempts by operators to negotiate contracts which apportion more liability to contractors in the event of a catastrophic incident. Among the various sources of tension that have arisen in the offshore petroleum industry since the Macondo oil spill, this is probably the most acute. By “operator” is meant the party holding a licence or lease which is responsible for petroleum operations; by “contractor” is meant the party responsible for the provision of services to the operator in relation to say field operation and production (well services, facilities hire and operations and maintenance). The allocation of their respective shares of liability in such events is typically carried out under standard industry contracts which have been established over many years. Until the Macondo oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, these standard models of liability allocation have been largely non-contested, and where reviewed before the courts, have been held to be enforceable. Nonetheless, operators in a wide variety of settings have begun to challenge the traditional allocation of liability or imposed changes to the risk allocation. This article also examines the attempt on the part of regulators to shift from a long-held position that regulators look only to the operator/licensee on liability issues to one in which regulators are attempting to hold contractors liable as well. This long-held position stems from the fact that it is the operator which negotiates with the regulators and commits to a certain well design and well programme, and other safety/environmental conditions; it is the operator that acts as the authority for the selection and approval of the various contractors, controls operations of the contractors on the well site and verifies that the results of the work plan have been duly achieved by the contractors. As a consequence of the private and government litigation arising from the Macondo oil spill and revised perceptions of risk exposure, evidence suggests that operators generally are seeking to modify the established approach to liability allocation through individual contract negotiations with contractors, and regulators are attempting to hold contractors liable. This has significant and potentially very adverse financial implications for the contractors and for the long term competitiveness and sustainability of the industry. Operators have significant risks, up-front investments and an important long-term financial upside. They can choose to operate through consortia with other operators to share these risks, investments and upside. Service companies (not counting the drilling contractor) on the other hand provide services on a typical well in the UKCS for a duration of anywhere in a range between five and 100 days with typical average contract values of between $500,000 and $10,000,000 depending on the services provided. Traditionally, operators have carried risks via insurance or self-insurance, on the understanding that such risks are counter-balanced by the considerable rewards of EP these occur across the portfolio of the operators’ licences, each with decades of revenue-earning ability, and which the contractor cannot share in. In this way, the risk-reward relationship has structured the liability relationship and related insurance. The risk structure also takes into account the fact that the operators decide the well design/programme and is in charge of the execution of this programme by running the operations at the wellsite. This is of fundamental importance since (a good well design/programme and its subsequent execution is crucial to permit safe drilling or drilling and completion of a well. A good well design/programme also provides for the correct number of barriers which would stop an uncontrolled flow of petroleum from the geological formation to the surface. In running the operations the operator has to continually ensure the integrity of these barriers at each step of the programme. The operator also prescribes and selects from the products and/or services offered by the contractors, and organises and manages the various and often simultaneous and/or inter-relating activities of the various contractors on the rig. It is the operator too which decides at each critical step whether to proceed, stop and modify plans or abandon the well based on actual well conditions encountered. The operator selects the drilling rig and the Blowout Preventer to be used. The well belongs to the operator and an unsuccessful well will usually impact mostly upon the operator; the operator therefore is the party that generally makes all the final decisions on activities that take place on the rig. To better appreciate the traditional risk allocation and why the operator has shouldered the greater part of the risk, some understanding of the inherent technical risks and uncertainties surrounding the drilling and abandonment and/or completion of a well is required. The best technology available today does not guarantee a full or correct understanding of what is expected to be encountered from rock formations exposed through the" @default.
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• W2912903428 date "2012-01-01" @default.
• W2912903428 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W2912903428 title "Liability for Catastrophic Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry" @default.
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