Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2923011330> ?p ?o ?g. }
- W2923011330 endingPage "352" @default.
- W2923011330 startingPage "321" @default.
- W2923011330 abstract "How to Be an Analytic Existential Thomist Turner C. Nevitt SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS'S metaphysics of existence was a central focus of the twentieth-century Thomistic revival and remains a defining interest of the school of Existential Thomism.1 The Thomistic revival flourished mostly among Catholic intellectuals outside the mainstream of contemporary analytic philosophy. But just as the revival began to wane among Catholic intellectuals, analytic philosophers [End Page 321] started taking more interest in Aquinas. That interest has continued to grow over the past fifty years, giving rise more recently to the school of Analytic Thomism.2 Yet in spite of an enthusiasm for other aspects of Aquinas's thought, interested analytic philosophers have been hesitant about his view of existence; indeed, some of them have been positively scornful of it. Anthony Kenny, for example, calls Aquinas's view of existence sophistry and illusion3 and thoroughly confused.4 This negative assessment of Aquinas's view of existence is due in large part to a positive assessment of the rival view of existence developed by Frege, Russell, and Quine.5 That positive assessment is near universal among contemporary analytic philosophers. But a growing number of analytic philosophers have come to question this mainstream consensus, and to propose alternative views of existence more like Aquinas's [End Page 322] own.6 This recent development suggests the possibility of a Thomism that is both analytic and existential. Some Existential Thomists have been pessimistic about such a possibility, suggesting that Continental philosophy (especially phenomenology) would be a better partner.7 But there is reason to be more optimistic: analytic philosophers have already shown their openness to views of existence like that of Aquinas. This article explores the strategies available for defending Aquinas's view of existence in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy. Not all of these strategies can be accepted by Thomists, but some of them certainly can be, and those that [End Page 323] are unacceptable can be supplemented by other acceptable strategies. The article unfolds as follows. Section I traces the basic outlines of the mainstream view of existence prevalent among contemporary analytic philosophers. Section II summarizes some of the best reasons to question that view. Section III traces the basic outlines of Aquinas's alternative view of existence. Sections IV and V address the main contemporary analytic objections to Aquinas's view. Section VI considers strategies for defending the meaningfulness of Aquinas's view of existence. Section VII considers one strategy for defending the truth of his view, and section VIII proposes a better strategy. By the end of the article I hope to have allayed at least some of the doubts about the possibility of developing an Analytic Existential Thomism. I. The Frege-Russell-Quine View of Existence The mainstream view of existence among contemporary analytic philosophers was developed and defended in different forms by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and W. V. Quine.8 [End Page 324] Their view can be explained most easily by contrasting it with what Colin McGinn calls the naïve view,9 which I prefer to call the commonsense view. According to the commonsense view, existence is similar to other properties we ascribe to individuals or objects.10 Given this similarity, statements of existence (both singular and plural) are similar to other statements that ascribe properties to individuals or objects. Socrates is wise, for example, ascribes a property to a single individual, that is, wisdom to Socrates. Tame tigers are harmless ascribes a property to multiple individuals, that is, harmlessness to tame tigers. According to the commonsense view, statements of existence are similar. Socrates exists ascribes a property to a single individual, that is, existence to Socrates. Tame tigers exist ascribes a property to multiple individuals, that is, existence to tame tigers. That is the commonsense view of existence. According to the Frege-Russell-Quine view, however, existence is not similar to other properties we ascribe to individuals or objects. Indeed, existence is not a property of individuals or objects at all. Accordingly, statements of existence (both singular and plural) are not similar to other statements that ascribe properties to individuals or objects. Instead, existence is..." @default.
- W2923011330 created "2019-04-01" @default.
- W2923011330 creator A5074928327 @default.
- W2923011330 date "2018-01-01" @default.
- W2923011330 modified "2023-10-17" @default.
- W2923011330 title "How to Be an Analytic Existential Thomist" @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1481196597 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1497897393 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1516748551 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1524765234 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1527052990 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1530503949 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1534041357 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1534690426 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1539384251 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1549435278 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1574485825 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1592712342 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W165980815 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1966110909 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1968216796 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1980491396 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1995955756 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1998059498 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2020512783 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2035260372 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2056202888 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2061556512 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2067251193 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2068978754 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2075926176 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2089196478 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2090992897 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2110463406 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2116941335 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2161340888 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2162622888 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2171309948 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2340412467 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2504043787 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2546408443 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2798312733 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2799147727 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W2807197706 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W295096671 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W3000400422 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W3181443823 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W38353541 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W403246105 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W568553209 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W579135871 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W584251869 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W589973647 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W601751692 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W613159230 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W627796312 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W84066183 @default.
- W2923011330 cites W1491509458 @default.
- W2923011330 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/tho.2018.0024" @default.
- W2923011330 hasPublicationYear "2018" @default.
- W2923011330 type Work @default.
- W2923011330 sameAs 2923011330 @default.
- W2923011330 citedByCount "1" @default.
- W2923011330 countsByYear W29230113302020 @default.
- W2923011330 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
- W2923011330 hasAuthorship W2923011330A5074928327 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConcept C127882523 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConcept C135646171 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConcept C182744844 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConcept C27206212 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConcept C2777617010 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConcept C522434184 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConcept C534595448 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConcept C84269361 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConceptScore W2923011330C111472728 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConceptScore W2923011330C127882523 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConceptScore W2923011330C135646171 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConceptScore W2923011330C138885662 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConceptScore W2923011330C182744844 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConceptScore W2923011330C27206212 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConceptScore W2923011330C2777617010 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConceptScore W2923011330C522434184 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConceptScore W2923011330C534595448 @default.
- W2923011330 hasConceptScore W2923011330C84269361 @default.
- W2923011330 hasIssue "3" @default.
- W2923011330 hasLocation W29230113301 @default.
- W2923011330 hasOpenAccess W2923011330 @default.
- W2923011330 hasPrimaryLocation W29230113301 @default.
- W2923011330 hasRelatedWork W188618102 @default.
- W2923011330 hasRelatedWork W1988448218 @default.
- W2923011330 hasRelatedWork W2165911545 @default.
- W2923011330 hasRelatedWork W2381904606 @default.
- W2923011330 hasRelatedWork W2382269345 @default.
- W2923011330 hasRelatedWork W2408088984 @default.
- W2923011330 hasRelatedWork W2895772206 @default.
- W2923011330 hasRelatedWork W2995487514 @default.