FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2938143178> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2938143178 endingPage "671" @default.
• W2938143178 startingPage "666" @default.
• W2938143178 abstract "A good reputation is the basis for rice farmers to survive and gain trust from buyers in a competitive business environment. However, due to the existence of information asymmetry between buyers and rice farmers, the moral hazard problem is the key obstacle that impedes the benefits of related shareholders and hinders the efficiency of contract farming negotiations. It is crucial to design a control mechanism to avoid the negative impact of the moral hazard. This paper studies the principal and agent relationship between rice farmers and buyer in contract farming negotiation. Because of the influence of information asymmetry, many buyers have suffered from being cheated by rice farmers who fail to comply with the terms of the contract or provide fraudulent products in practice. These frequent cases will function to deteriorate any long-term relationships between rice farmers and buyers. The study focuses on the analysis of the causes of moral risks and the effect of reputation on moral risk utilizing repeated game theory. The purpose of this paper is to help both rice farmers and buyers effectively avoid moral hazards and achieve a win-win situation in contract farming negotiation. The result show that the rice farmer in contract farming practices has the incentive to maintain his reputation in order to gain more profits in the future. That also accounts for the reasons why the rice farmer will invest more to improve the customer’s service level, caring about the quality of product and the comments of finished contractor customer, to keep a longer farmer-buyer relationship. The rice farmer in contract farming practices has the incentive to maintain his reputation in order to gain more profits in the future and this means that contract farming can be developed with great success in Benin. Key words: Contract farming negotiation, moral hazard, reputation model, game theory, rice &nbsp" @default.
• W2938143178 created "2019-04-25" @default.
• W2938143178 creator A5008739814 @default.
• W2938143178 creator A5036675892 @default.
• W2938143178 creator A5050097930 @default.
• W2938143178 creator A5080038174 @default.
• W2938143178 creator A5083385008 @default.
• W2938143178 creator A5083953134 @default.
• W2938143178 date "2019-03-28" @default.
• W2938143178 modified "2023-10-04" @default.
• W2938143178 title "Reputation effect of the moral hazard on contract farming market development: Game theory application on rice farmers in Benin" @default.
• W2938143178 cites W2160184254 @default.
• W2938143178 cites W2294663482 @default.
• W2938143178 cites W2577727907 @default.
• W2938143178 cites W2902630382 @default.
• W2938143178 doi "https://doi.org/10.5897/ajar2019.13930" @default.
• W2938143178 hasPublicationYear "2019" @default.
• W2938143178 type Work @default.
• W2938143178 sameAs 2938143178 @default.
• W2938143178 citedByCount "1" @default.
• W2938143178 countsByYear W29381431782021 @default.
• W2938143178 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2938143178 hasAuthorship W2938143178A5008739814 @default.
• W2938143178 hasAuthorship W2938143178A5036675892 @default.
• W2938143178 hasAuthorship W2938143178A5050097930 @default.
• W2938143178 hasAuthorship W2938143178A5080038174 @default.
• W2938143178 hasAuthorship W2938143178A5083385008 @default.
• W2938143178 hasAuthorship W2938143178A5083953134 @default.
• W2938143178 hasBestOaLocation W29381431781 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C137577040 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C144024400 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C162853370 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C177142836 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C199776023 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C2778348673 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C2779993469 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C2780202544 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C29122968 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C36289849 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConcept C48798503 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C10138342 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C137577040 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C144024400 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C144133560 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C162324750 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C162853370 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C175444787 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C177142836 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C17744445 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C199539241 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C199776023 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C2778348673 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C2779993469 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C2780202544 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C29122968 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C36289849 @default.
• W2938143178 hasConceptScore W2938143178C48798503 @default.
• W2938143178 hasIssue "13" @default.
• W2938143178 hasLocation W29381431781 @default.
• W2938143178 hasOpenAccess W2938143178 @default.
• W2938143178 hasPrimaryLocation W29381431781 @default.
• W2938143178 hasRelatedWork W1868061039 @default.
• W2938143178 hasRelatedWork W2064044459 @default.
• W2938143178 hasRelatedWork W2122552832 @default.
• W2938143178 hasRelatedWork W2269392318 @default.
• W2938143178 hasRelatedWork W2350979147 @default.
• W2938143178 hasRelatedWork W2366725294 @default.
• W2938143178 hasRelatedWork W2389995912 @default.
• W2938143178 hasRelatedWork W2414312834 @default.
• W2938143178 hasRelatedWork W2938143178 @default.
• W2938143178 hasRelatedWork W3121986726 @default.
• W2938143178 hasVolume "14" @default.
• W2938143178 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2938143178 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2938143178 magId "2938143178" @default.
• W2938143178 workType "article" @default.