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• W2951696522 abstract "Author(s): Taylor, Michael James | Advisor(s): Norena, Carlos F. | Abstract: Abstract This dissertation is a comparative study of the great powers in the Mediterranean world during the third and second centuries BC: the imperial republics of Rome and Carthage in the West, and the great Hellenistic dynasties of Antigonid Macedonia, Ptolemaic Egypt, and the Seleucid Near East. These states fought a series of wars among one another; the end result was the establishment of Roman hegemony across the entire Mediterranean. Why Rome? This dissertation treats two metrics of state power, manpower mobilization and state revenues, and examines them in relationship to the known outcomes of interstate warfare. Part I of the dissertation reconstructs the manpower resources of each power. Each chapter in this section focuses on a particular power and explores three separate issues. I first determine the maximum mobilization each state could achieve. Next, I explore the strategies each state used to obtain recruits, in particular citizen soldiers, subject levies, and mercenary hires. Finally, each chapter concludes with a discussion of the military organization employed by each state in arranging coherent fighting units. Part II reconstructs the state revenues of each power, using a method of forensic accounting based on estimated expenditures (in particular the cost of armies) and critical examination of fragmentary source references to tax rates, mining revenues, and other sources of state income. The dissertation concludes that the Romans enjoyed a substantial comparative advantage over any of the Hellenistic powers in terms of the maximum mobilization rate, with a peak deployment of 175,000 soldiers in 190 BC. By comparison, the maximum Seleucid and Ptolemaic mobilizations both stood at around 80,000, while the Macedonian mobilization peaked at approximately 45,000. While this advantage has important explanatory power as to why Rome defeated the Seleucid and Macedonian kingdoms, is important to note that Rome deployed only a fraction of her manpower against these kingdoms, and frequently fought outnumbered in the decisive battles of the period. Moreover, Rome lacked significant manpower superiority over Carthage during much of the Second Punic War. In fact, during the opening decade of the war, Carthage deployed more soldiers than Rome did. Here the varying manpower strategies of the two states proved decisive. While Carthage managed to detach some of Rome’s Italian allies, an enormous core of citizen manpower remained to Rome’s advantage. While Carthage’s military deployment rivaled Rome’s in size, with approximately 170,000 troops deployed in 215 BC, it lacked a similar core of citizen troops. Through force and diplomacy, the Romans peeled away the subject populations that provided the bulk of Carthaginian manpower, in particular the Iberians and Numidians. On the side of state finance, the dissertation finds surprising disconnects between state revenues and military success. The wealthiest state, the Ptolemaic dynasty, extracted enormous revenues from the agricultural regions of Egypt (roughly 90 million drachmai), but after the middle of the third century the geopolitical fortunes of the dynasty declined markedly. Meanwhile, the Romans had perhaps the smallest revenues during the third century, and their lack of fiscal sophistication was represented by a clumsy system of caste bronze coinage. Roman revenues did rise over the course of the successful imperial activity in the second century, but remained comparatively modest even during the period of unquestioned military dominance. The organization of the Roman state accounts for its ability to mobilize more men for less money. The Roman habit of exploiting subject populations in Italy for unpaid military service dramatically lowered Roman military costs. Furthermore, citizen troops served for far lower pay than their counterparts in the Hellenistic East. Finally, the Republican nature of the Roman state (and Carthage as well) eliminated the substantial expense of maintaining a sumptuous royal court. The dissertation concludes by discussing the role of resources in the arc of Mediterranean history during the period. It argues that Macedonia was an under resourced state both in terms of manpower and revenues, but one that “punched above its weight” due to an effective, well-organized army based on a heavily militarized citizenry. It notes that the geographic position of both the Seleucids and the Ptolemies made it difficult for them to exert control over the entirety of the Mediterranean, although each had the resources to gain hegemony over the Eastern Mediterranean, in the manner of the Ottoman Turks in the early modern period. Yet dynastic difficulties in both states and a tripartite balance of power in the East prevented either power from gaining permanent control over the east. Ultimately, the dissertation concludes that, on the level of resources, Carthage was the only serious challenger to Rome. Like Rome, Carthage was centrally located, a geographic advantage that could have supported extending domination over the whole Mediterranean basin. During the Second Punic War, Carthage’s revenues and manpower mobilization equaled, and at times exceeded, that of Rome. It is not difficult to imagine an alternative history in which Carthage gained hegemony of the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, Rome’s republican system of government, its expansive system of citizenship, and its exploitation of Italian subjects for military service allowed it to raise unusually large, effective military forces despite a limited fiscal base. As a result, Rome was not only an effective conquest state, but the only state in history to unify the Mediterranean." @default.
• W2951696522 created "2019-06-27" @default.
• W2951696522 creator A5018617957 @default.
• W2951696522 date "2015-01-01" @default.
• W2951696522 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W2951696522 title "Finance, Manpower and the Rise of Rome" @default.
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