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• W2968285619 abstract "Why Negotiating Matters Dan Reiter (bio) Oriana Skylar Mastro's new book The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime is a fresh and welcome addition to political science scholarship on the dynamics of war termination diplomacy. Both scholars and policymakers focused on Asia will be especially intrigued by this book, given its deep, well-researched historical case studies of the Korean War, the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and the Vietnam War. The book will also be of interest to international relations scholars more generally. Indeed, its insights are more important than the modest title might imply and shed light on diplomatic behavior outside as well as during war, negotiations over territorial disputes, weapons of mass destruction programs, and other timely issues. To frame the book's argument, consider first the conventional political science wisdom that wars end when belligerents negotiate by exchanging what might be called war termination offers. That is, one side might say, I am willing to end the war if I receive 60% of the disputed territory, and the other side might say, I am willing to end the war if I receive 70% of the disputed territory. The war ends when the two sides agree on the terms of a deal. If this sounds similar to two people haggling over the price of a used car, it should, as the basic bargaining insights were imported from economics. Mastro builds on this theoretical framework by importing an insight that leaders, policymakers, and historians have long recognized: that an essential element of war termination policy is not just what offers the belligerents exchange but also whether they negotiate at all. The potential problem is that the very act of offering to negotiate can be perceived as a sign of weakness, and belligerents concerned about conveying weakness might not elect to open peace talks. Adolf Hitler recognized this, for example, when, brushing off suggestions in late 1942 that he open peace talks with the Soviet Union, he remarked that a moment of weakness [was] not the right time for negotiations with the enemy.1 This fear of appearing weak [End Page 170] helps explain in part Abraham Lincoln's unwillingness to negotiate with the Confederate leadership during much of the Civil War, Winston Churchill's unwillingness to negotiate with Hitler in the dark days of May and June 1940, and Japan's unwillingness to negotiate with the Allies throughout most of World War II.2 The most recent historiography on the Vietnam War suggests that North Vietnam was also concerned about the possibility that agreeing to peace talks might convey weakness.3 An important contribution of The Costs of Conversation is its careful unpacking of the logic of why belligerents might hesitate to negotiate—agreement to negotiate being what Mastro refers to as an open diplomatic posture. The book goes much further than past works in developing the internal logic of how belligerents think about open and closed diplomatic postures (the latter being a refusal to negotiate or an agreement to negotiate only under certain conditions). It develops specific propositions for the conditions under which belligerents adopt an open versus a closed diplomatic posture. When reading this book, one cannot help but think about all the contemporary Asian conflicts that the argument speaks to (sometimes directly flagged in the text). Some propose that President Donald Trump's willingness to meet with Kim Jong-un to discuss North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, perhaps a switch to open diplomatic posture, was ill-advised because it conveyed weakness.4 Iran, modeling a closed posture, may be unwilling to talk with the United States about the many issues on which they disagree because proposing talks while sanctions are crippling the Iranian economy might suggest weakness.5 The on-and-off-again negotiations between the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan have been hampered by similar concerns over diplomatic posture. Indeed, some speculate that the Taliban couples feelers for peace with high-profile attacks to signal that their decision to negotiate emerges from a position of strength rather than weakness, an approach not dissimilar to the Nixon administration's decision to bomb Cambodia and Laos to provide cover..." @default.
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• W2968285619 date "2019-01-01" @default.
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• W2968285619 title "Why Negotiating Matters" @default.
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• W2968285619 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2019.0039" @default.
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