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W2973195518 abstract "Imagine you are walking through a park in the twilight. Suddenly, a mugger points a gun at you, threatening to shoot you if you do not hand over your valuables. Is this an instance of domination? Many authors working within the neo-republican framework—including Philip Pettit himself—are inclined to say ‘yes’.2 After all, the mugger case seems to be a paradigmatic example of what it means to be at someone’s mercy; to be dependent on someone else’s will. However, I argue that this conclusion is based on a misleading, purely interactional account of domination that misconceives its essentially structural character. Domination, I maintain, is a structurally constituted form of power. Whether the mugger in the park dominates you or not can only be established by analysing the wider power structures in which your interaction is embedded. My argument is a contribution to neo-republican debates on the concept of domination. I focus on a power-theoretic analysis of the structural dimension of domination. I do not address the merits of non-domination as a conception of freedom (though I briefly highlight implications of my argument for critics of Pettit’s theory of freedom in Section III). Neither do I provide a full account of domination. My aim is limited: I will show that domination, as conceived of in neo-republican terms, is best interpreted as a structurally constituted form of power. This holds for both interpersonal and systemic domination. While this argument contributes to the recent debate on ‘structural domination’,3 my point is not that neo-republicans fail to take structures seriously. Rather, I argue that because of its structural dimension, domination should be kept distinct from interactional, opportunistic forms of power. I start with a brief reconstruction of Pettit’s seminal account of domination, highlighting his emphasis on the mere capacity of interference being sufficient for domination. Against this background, I introduce the mugger case to show that Pettit’s account points to a conceptual dilemma. Either the mugger is taken to dominate everyone that he could shoot; this interpretation, however, seems too indiscriminate to capture the social reality of domination. Or the mugger dominates only the person at whom he points his gun. Yet, following this interpretation, the notion of domination loses its distinctiveness and collapses into an account of interference. In a second step, I propose a solution to this dilemma, which specifies the social reality of domination without jeopardizing its distinctiveness vis-à-vis interference. The notion of domination, I argue, refers only to structurally constituted forms of power. I distinguish two kinds: interpersonal domination is based on a robust capacity to interfere; systemic domination highlights the systematic disempowerment the dominated suffer over and beyond their relation to a particular dominator. Purely interactional forms of power, which are based on an opportunistic capacity to interfere, however, are not instances of domination. Hence, whether and whom the mugger dominates depend on whether his power is structurally enabled and thus serves as the basis of a persisting status asymmetry. In the last section, I argue that keeping an account of domination distinct from opportunistic kinds of power matters for three reasons. First, conceptualizing both opportunistic and robust capacities to interfere as forms of domination risks losing sight of what is distinctive of non-domination as opposed to non-interference. Secondly, it is precisely on the grounds of conflating opportunistic forms of power with domination that Pettit’s theory of freedom has been misread as a choice-based rather than a person-based account of freedom by some of his critics. Third, distinguishing domination from opportunistic forms of power proves crucial for critical social analysis; otherwise we risk misconstruing domination as an anomaly perpetrated by individual wrongdoers instead of as a feature that pervades society. The notion of domination is at the heart of neo-republicanism as developed, most systematically, by Philip Pettit. Originally meant to articulate an ideal of political freedom as non-domination, it has resonated well beyond theories of freedom. The core idea is that domination does not require the exercise of power; the mere capacity to interfere is sufficient (Section I.A). This idea, however, proves ambiguous: as the mugger case reveals, it either points towards a conception that is far too broad to capture the social reality of domination or it collapses into an interference-based view that loses touch with what is distinctive about domination (Section I.B). The notion of domination is meant to express the classic Roman concern about the dependence on the will of others. According to Pettit’s seminal definition, ‘someone has dominating power over another … to the extent that (1) they have the capacity to interfere (2) on an arbitrary basis (3) in certain choices that the other is in a position to make’.4 This core idea of domination as the capacity to interfere (arbitrarily)5 sets it apart from the classic liberal notion of interference. It draws attention to the crucial relevance of power asymmetries over and beyond the exercise of power and, more particularly, instances of interference. Whether you suffer from interference is not essential. I might not care, at least for now, how you choose to act and let you go about minding your own business. And yet, as long as I retain the capacity to interfere, you depend on my remaining benevolent or indifferent with regard to what you do. This dependence ‘on my will remaining a goodwill’6 is what the idea of domination as the capacity to interfere is meant to capture. Pettit’s emphasis on the mere capacity to interfere and the resulting dependence on someone else’s will shows that domination describes an evil which is distinct from interference. Domination does not merely restrict choice. As Pettit points out, the ‘terrible evil brought about by domination, over and beyond restricting choice, and inducing a distinctive uncertainty, is that it deprives a person of the ability to command attention and respect and so of his or her standing among persons’.7 Thus, domination is a status-related notion. It refers to how we are related to one another and to whether we can speak out forthrightly without reason for fear or deference, that is, whether we are equally taken to be ‘a voice worth hearing and an ear worth addressing’.8 Given that domination refers to the mere capacity to interfere arbitrarily, securing non-domination requires more than just the absence of interference. It calls for removing the capacity to interfere at will altogether—and thus for robust non-interference. If you merely enjoy non-interference because your wishes happen to coincide with mine or in virtue of my good mood, you depend on our wishes coinciding or on my staying happy. I will have replaced each of your options by that-option-provided-it-is-to-my-taste.9 In order to enjoy non-domination, your enjoyment of non-interference needs to be robust across changes regarding what I want or what you want. Non-domination needs to repeal your dependence on my will. Hence, it requires safeguards, provided by suitable legal institutions, which give you a form of ‘antipower’10 by establishing an equal status for all.11 With this core idea of domination as the capacity to interfere (arbitrarily) in mind, I will introduce a case, which shows that the core idea of domination as the capacity to interfere does not easily capture episodic forms of power. Imagine you are walking in a park in the twilight. Suddenly, a mugger points a gun at you, threatening to shoot you if you do not hand over your valuables. Is this an instance of domination? At first sight, one might be inclined to say ‘yes’. If domination is characterized by the dependence on the will of the powerful, who has the capacity to interfere at will, the mugger case seems to be a paradigmatic example. After all, whatever you do, you depend on the good will of the villain to let you do it. Even if you decide to comply and hand over your valuables, there is no guarantee that you won’t be shot. The mugger has not simply altered your choice set by removing the joint option of leaving the park alive and with your valuables. He has replaced each of the options x, y, z that you previously had with the options x*, y*, z*, where * stands for ‘if the mugger allows’.12 Or, to take up another metaphor that Pettit uses, the mugger has not only closed some doors which used to be available to you, he has taken up the role of the doorkeeper who could close any door if you decided to choose it.13 This is what it means to be in the power of someone else, that is, to be dependent on someone else’s will. Hence, Pettit himself explicitly considers the mugger to be an instance of domination.14 However, a closer look at the mugger case reveals that it is not so clear cut. Paradigmatic cases of domination, like slavery and marriage, are institutionally stabilized forms of relationships. In these cases, domination is a power relation that stretches over time. For as long as you are a slave or a married woman, the slave holder or husband retains the capacity to interfere with you at will. The transient, episodic nature of your encounter with the mugger, by contrast, raises the question: when exactly does the mugger start or cease to dominate you? Are you only dominated once he points his gun at you? This first reading seems misleading. After all, the point about the notion of domination is precisely that it is not essential what the dominator does. Pointing a gun at you is certainly a (fairly intrusive) form of interference. And yet, for a power relation to constitute domination, the capacity to interfere is sufficient, whether it is exercised or not. But why then does it matter that the villain puts a gun to your head at all? Wouldn’t the mere capacity to point a gun at you be sufficient to constitute domination? This second reading, however, seems too indiscriminate to capture the point about being dependent on the will of another. Are you dominated simply because there happens to be someone in the park who carries a gun that he could point at your head? As Richardson has pointed out, it is implausible to say that a kidnapper dominates all potential victims, which might include all of us.15 After all, ‘a mugger or pickpocket is not even focusing his attentions on a particular person at the outset; and once he has chosen a victim, the crime consists in what he does to the victim, not what he makes the victim do’.16 Another way to bring out these ambiguities is to ask: who is dominated? Regarding slavery or marriage, the answer seems straightforward: slaves are exposed to the capacity of arbitrary interference by their slaveholders; likewise, married women are exposed to the capacity of arbitrary interference by their husbands. But who is dominated by the mugger? Everyone who has a gun at her head? Or everyone who is in the park and could get shot? The first reading seems too narrow. It disregards the fact that domination does not require the exercise of power. In this respect, the second reading is more plausible. After all, the capacity point highlights precisely that it doesn’t matter whether the mugger points a gun at your head. What matters is that he could. Yet this second reading proves too indiscriminate to capture what it means to be dominated. Is there no relevant difference between the person who has a gun at her head and the guy who sits on the grass, sunbathing, not even having noticed the gunman?17 Pettit specifies two constraining conditions that must be satisfied for a capacity to interfere to effectively constitute domination. The first stipulates that the powerful needs to have the actual capacity to interfere, that is ‘a capacity that is more or less ready to be exercised—not a capacity that is yet to be fully developed’.18 Otherwise, we would speak of potential not of actual domination. A villain, for instance, who possesses a gun, but did not bring it to the park, only has a potential capacity to interfere with you and does not actually dominate you. Even though such potential domination may be of concern, precisely because it may turn into actual domination, from a conceptual point of view, these cases are distinct. The second constraint is a specification of the first. Conceptually speaking, it does not matter whether you have seen the mugger or know of his gun. But as long as the mugger is not aware of his capacity to interfere with you and your vulnerability to him, his capacity is not an actual capacity that he might choose to actualize at will.19 Think of a visitor to the park who carries a gun in his bag without knowing he does. Or think of someone who carries a gun, but has not realized that you are a potential victim, say because you are at the other end of the park and he has not yet seen you. In such cases, on Pettit’s account, you are clearly not dominated. This point even holds when it is only due to your precautions and ‘self-denying steps’ that the villain has not registered your vulnerability; domination requires the dominator’s awareness of his capacity to interfere vis-à-vis the dominated.20 The awareness condition does confine the social reality of domination to those people in the park the mugger has noticed. However, the two constraints do not solve the tension between the two possible interpretations of the mugger case. In fact, these two alternative interpretations point towards two horns of what seems to be a conceptual dilemma. Either it is, effectively, the mere capacity to interfere which constitutes domination—this reading, however, seems far too broad to capture the social reality of domination. Or we restrict the notion of domination to situations in which the powerful actually exercise power over you—this reading, by contrast, seems too narrow, as it loses contact with what is distinctive about domination: that it refers to the mere capacity, not actual interference. The dilemma brought forward by the mugger case reflects some of the most pertinent critics of Pettit’s conception. Grappling with the problem of how to account for the social reality of domination over and beyond interference, they tend to reduce domination to interference. Waldron maintains that ‘it is the prospect of interference, not the mere potential, that is important … All we are doing, with the capacity idea, is figuring out the probability of its occurrence’.21 Similarly, Shapiro holds that ‘having that capacity does not itself constitute domination; rather it creates the potential for domination’.22 Friedman proposes to redefine Pettit’s conception of domination in terms of ‘actual or attempted arbitrary interference’, precisely to avoid an overly broad, indiscriminate conception.23 In what follows, I propose a solution to the conceptual dilemma, which preserves the distinctive nature of the notion of domination without entailing too broad a conception that does not provide a discriminate account of the social reality of domination. However, it requires giving up on the idea that the mugger necessarily dominates his victim. The conceptual dilemma brought forward by the mugger case points to the fact that the notion of domination does not easily capture episodic forms of power. I argue that it can be solved by conceiving domination as a structurally constituted form of power. It is based on norms and practices that systematically empower some, while systematically disempowering others. This structural dimension of domination holds for interpersonal domination (Section II.A), as well as for what I call systemic domination (Section II.B). To see what is wrong with the mugger case, it is worth going back to paradigmatic cases of domination such as traditional marriage or slavery. Marriage and slavery are institutionalized forms of social relationships. They are based on legal rules, which determine and circumscribe the powers of the agents involved. The institutional form of marriage implies that the husband does not dominate his wife merely in virtue of his supposedly superior physical power. His supposedly physical superiority only serves as a power resource that outlasts the actual exercise of violence when violence against women is not effectively sanctioned and thus can be exercised at will. His dominating power is constituted by the legal institution of marriage, which confines female economic activities, makes the woman economically dependent on him and grants him the power to enforce sexual contact at will. Similarly, when it comes to power resources like physical strength or intellectual wit, the slave may well outclass his master. However, the latter holds a crucial power: the legally entrenched power of ownership over the slave that comes, among others, with the power to extract labour through coercion; a power which is backed up by legal sanction. In other words, the husband’s and the slaveholder’s capacities to interfere arbitrarily with the dominated are legally constituted capacities. It is only through the legal institutions of marriage and slavery that existing power resources such as physical superiority are turned into the basis of a dominating relationship. This point does not only hold for legally institutionalized forms of domination. Domination, I propose, is best conceived of as generally characterized by the structurally constituted capacity to interfere (arbitrarily).24 Social structures25 can be legal ones, such as in the case of marriage or slavery, but they can also consist in informal social norms and practices, which mark some as powerful and others as vulnerable.26 Imagine, for instance, a society where the sexual harassment and rape of women are commonly accepted. They are considered as an expression of the natural game of flirting that involves making women accept what they initially don't accept, but what they are assumed to want anyway. Any ‘no’ on the part of women is deemed part of this game. In fact, a woman who complains about unwanted advances by men will be taken to play the game of flirting; her ‘no’ is interpreted as a move that is supposed to arouse even more interest in her male counterpart. Even if rape is outlawed, women who press charges against their tormentor will be reminded that rape is, ultimately, their fault, since they aroused men by rejecting their advances—after all, this is what flirting is all about. These salient sexist norms are not legally entrenched. Yet they put men and women in asymmetrical positions of power to one another. From the point of view of domination, it doesn’t matter whether a man exercises his capacity to enforce sexual contact. What matters is the systematic vulnerability that these norms create and that shapes any interaction women might have with men, whether privately, at the workplace, or in public. Whatever happens between them, women do not have the authority to interpret what it is—let alone to challenge it. If they do insist on their uneasiness, there is something wrong with them, not with the practice. It is neither in virtue of his physical or mental capacities, nor as a result of mere opportunistic coincidence, that a man in this society may enforce sexual contact on women. This capacity is constituted through sexist norms, which systematically empower men while systematically disempowering women. The example of sexual harassment highlights three important points: first, thinking of domination in terms of a structurally constituted capacity to interfere means that this capacity itself is a robust one. It does not merely depend on the dominating and dominated agents having or lacking certain contingent features like superior physical strength or owning a gun. Neither does it depend on certain contingent features of the circumstances of their encounter. It obtains even when these vary. Think of a rapist in a gender-equal society. He might be able to rape a woman, given that there is no one around who could and would stop him. But as soon as someone turns up, he will be stopped and sanctioned. His capacity is an opportunistic one, based on favourable circumstances, and vanishes once these circumstances change. By contrast, think of a rapist in a sexist society. Whether he is particularly strong, whether the woman is trained in self-defence, whether there are other people in the park does not matter. Even if someone calls the police, he won’t end up in jail, as rape and sexual assault are hardly ever brought to court and almost never result in conviction. He will get away with whatever he does. His capacity to interfere with women is a robust one. It does not merely constrain the choices of his victim; rather, it expresses a deeper asymmetry in status—the core idea of domination. Second, on this robust view of domination, the bilateral picture that is often used to analyse domination proves misleading. Interpersonal domination is a relationship between identifiable persons who stand in asymmetrical positions to one another, such as a wife and her husband. But merely looking at their relation to one another misses a crucial point. These asymmetrical positions are co-constituted and reproduced by countless other agents, who reaffirm the common interpretations of sexual harassment as flirting and rape as part of the game of flirting by acting upon them or implicitly accepting them (these can be both men and women, of course). Thus, interpersonal domination is not a dyadic, but a triadic relationship between dominator, dominated, and what Wartenberg calls peripheral agents.27 With regard to a domination dyad, they are not themselves dominators, since they do not enjoy a robust capacity to interfere arbitrarily with the dominated. But they are part of the dominating relationship because they sustain and reproduce aligned social practices that constitute the power of the dominator, as well as the disempowerment of the dominated. Third, structurally constituted, robust domination is not itself an action. It is not something I can choose to do or refrain from doing. Rather, it is a position of power. Whether I welcome the privileges attached to it or resent them, I dominate those subjected to my power simply in virtue of being in this social position. This is not to imply that the interactional dimension in relationships of domination does not matter. The husband in a sexist society may choose to use his power in particularly bad ways, say by raping his wife. Surely, from her point of view, this seems worse than domination without interference. Yet the criteria by which to pass this judgement are external to the notion of domination itself. It is because of the effects of physical harm and emotional trauma, which being raped brings about, that we think of traditional marriage involving rape as worse than traditional marriage as such. Acknowledging this harm does not alter the fact that both are instances of domination. What the husband does, and especially whether he chooses to take advantage of his power, does not alter the fact that he dominates his wife simply in virtue of his position within a sexist structure of social power.28 I have claimed that domination is a structurally constituted, robust form of power which relies on aligned social norms and practices. This conception expresses the core idea of domination as a denial of status. Since I think of status (as well as of domination) as a social practice between humans, I do not consider the mere conceptual possibility of an exceptionally powerful entity, say a deity or an alien, who might be able to wield robust dominating power without relying on the support of aligned norms and practices upheld by peripheral agents, a power, in fact, so overwhelming that it is impossible for humans to control.29 In contexts of human interaction, no single agent may ever acquire such robust power over others without it being at least tacitly enabled by others not constraining such power. A strictly dyadic form of domination which does not involve any enabling broader social context may, at the most, be imagined on an isolated island with only two inhabitants.30 The conception of domination as a structurally constituted capacity to interfere helps specify who is dominated by the mugger in the park. Put briefly, whether the mugger dominates you depends on context, not on what he does. Imagine in our sexist society that mugging women is tolerated or even encouraged; it attests to and reinforces the perception of women as weak and vulnerable. Men who mug women generally go unchallenged; it is part of what is considered normal behaviour. This means that women are certainly dominated by the mugger in the park—not just the woman who has a gun pointed at her head, but also other women who are around and who the mugger is aware of. However, male visitors to the park are not dominated, even if the gunman could also overpower them. But if he did, he would be effectively sanctioned; so his power does not express an asymmetry of standing vis-à-vis male victims. Likewise, if it wasn't a sexist society, and the mugger were just an ordinary criminal who hadn't been captured yet, due to his wit, he will certainly constitute a physical threat to all visitors to the park. Yet he won't dominate any of them, because his power is not structurally enabled and thus does not serve as the basis of a persisting status asymmetry.31 One might object that Pettit’s account of arbitrariness points to a similar, structural solution to the conceptual dilemma brought forward by the mugger case. He repeatedly emphasizes that domination is characterized by a capacity to interfere ‘at little cost’32 or, as he put it earlier, ‘with impunity and at will’.33 This specification of dominating power as arbitrary or uncontrolled34 seems to capture precisely the idea that dominating power is structurally enabled. After all, whether a mugger may interfere ‘at little cost’ seems to depend on the social context. This alternative solution to the mugger scenario starts from a broad account of power and draws on a robust notion of non-arbitrariness to avoid an overly broad conception of domination. However, it fails to avoid the other horn of the dilemma. If opportunistic forms of power count as domination, it is not clear why the issue of control or non-arbitrariness can only be addressed at a structural level. Why is my pepper spray or even my gun not enough to protect me against the domination by an opportunistic mugger?35 Why does the idea that the mugger may interfere at little cost refer to a wider social context and not to the lack of an opportunistic power of retaliation on the part of his victim? There remains a tension between a broad account of domination that includes opportunistic forms of power and a structural account of non-arbitrariness, that is, non-domination. As I will show in Section III.A, it is this tension which accounts for misinterpreting non-domination as mere unlikely interference and thus for jeopardizing the distinctiveness of the ideal of non-domination. Moreover, with his focus on the dominator, Pettit’s solution cannot solve the remaining puzzles about the mugger case. So far, I have followed Pettit’s view that domination presupposes an actual capacity to interfere—and thus only applies to cases where the gunman is aware of the vulnerability of someone else to his power. However, one may still wonder: what about women in the park whom the gunman has not yet noticed? Are they really not dominated and thus in the same situation as male visitors to the park in all relevant respects? And how about the timeframe of domination: when does it start? Only once the gunman sees you? Highlighting the structurally constituted nature of domination can also shed light on these questions by distinguishing between two kinds of structurally constituted power: interpersonal and systemic domination. Analysing the social reality of domination as structurally constituted requires more than merely looking at the power of the dominator and its structural conditions. It also needs to consider the systematic disempowerment of the dominated. Both are a result of the wider system of social norms and practices in which a dyad of dominator and dominated is embedded. Such norms and practices not only make some powerful, they also constitute the markers of vulnerability that render a particular group subject to their domination. Women are not exposed to male domination merely because men are constituted as powerful through legal norms licensing rape. They are exposed to domination because they lack, as Pettit famously put it, anti-power.36 This lack is not due to natural factors; it is a socially produced disempowerment that comes with the marker of being a woman.37 From the point of view of the disempowered, the dominating power structure remains omnipresent even when there happens to be no specific dominator in their life. A woman in the sexist society might avoid relationships with men. She might work at a helpdesk for women and live in a female community project. Yet, even if there is no man in her life who enjoys the actual capacity to interfere with her, she is still confronted with sexist norms and practices that posit her as the object, not the subject, of sexual relations. Think of advertisements displaying female bodies to promote car sales, movies which celebrate female submissiveness, and casual remarks on her physical appearance that men drop when passing by on the street. They send the message that it is men who shape and interpret her sexuality. Thus, a woman may try to avoid being dependent on the will of a particular man, yet she remains dependent on the impersonal, accumulated will of all those who reproduce these norm" @default.
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W2973195518 title "Does a Mugger Dominate? Episodic Power and the Structural Dimension of Domination" @default.
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