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• W297476896 abstract "As Michael Howard asserted whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong However, strong leadership can rapidly adapt to new situations in time of war, provided the doctrine is not too far off track Therefore, we need to develop leaders capable of adapting to crises in the information age, even as we conduct Force XXI exercises to evolve our organization, doctrine and tactics. THE US ARMY RECOGNIZES the revolution in military affairs (RMA) sparked by the technological advances (IT). Force XXI is a conscious and deliberate effort to evolve the Army's organization, doctrine and tactics to integrate advances in technology. Since all good leaders adapt their leadership style to fit the situation, military leadership in the coming century will have to evolve as well to accommodate the changing situation. History has shown that superior technology is not always victorious-technology is only a tool. Militan leaders decide how to use the tool to accomplish their mission Inappropriate use of war's tools will result in military defeats, which, if significant, can lead to national disaster. Perhaps the most dramatic example of leaders who failed to grasp the impact of technological change is the fall of France in 1940. France emerged from World War I victorious and a world superpower. The French military leadership was aware of significant emerging technological developments, and their official army regulation, Provisional Instructions, specifically addressed them in 1936.1 Although the French industrial complex could manufacture state-of-the-art military equipment of any type, the problem lay in the French leaders' lack of understanding about how these emerging technologies would fundamentally alter warfare's nature. The astonishingly rapid defeat of the French army in 1940 is often incorrectly attributed to inferior technology. The fact is, France was technologically superior in many ways. For example, they not only had tanks, they had bigger, more powerful tanksand lots of them. Without even counting the British forces on French soil, the French had 3,254 tanks compared with only 2,574 for the Germans. In addition, the French Char B was probably one of the best tanks in the world in terms of firepower and armor thickness. However, the Char B was tactically inferior, even if it was not technologically inferior. The French clearly intended it to be armored artillery, parceled out piecemeal to support the infantry. In doing so, they planned on set-piece slugging matches that did not require mobility. The most striking evidence of this philosophy was the open engine grille on the left side of the tank. This allowed even smaller-caliber German guns easy immobilization shots from the left flank. In addition, the Char B was slower, nearly impossible to fire outside of its forward arc and lacking in radios. In short, it was totally unsuited to combat the highly mobile German Blitzkrieg warfare.2 In addition to the tactical deficiencies caused by poor conceptual design, the French employment of armor was doctrinally deficient. The French subordinated small groups of armor under infantry leaders who did not understand armor. This ensured that the armor could not maneuver faster than the infantry and could not mass effectively. Further, poor logistics support led to large numbers of French tanks running out of fuel. Even though the Germans were hundreds of miles from their internal lines, they did not experience these problems. Independent tank units were capable of massing to penetrate and exploit breakthroughs.3 The lesson of France in 1940 is relevant to us today because we are in a similar situation. We are the victorious superpower and have the superior industrial capacity, resources and technology. Like the French military leaders, we recognize the RMA and have begun to address it in our doctrinal manuals. All our senior Army leaders acknowledge that the world has changed every time they brief an audience. …" @default.
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• W297476896 date "1999-05-01" @default.
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• W297476896 title "Leadership in the Information Age" @default.
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