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• W2978504157 abstract "Within-subject Preference Reversals in Description- and Experience-based Choice Adrian R. Camilleri (acamilleri@psy.unsw.edu.au) School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia Ben R. Newell (ben.newell@unsw.edu.au) School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia description (DfD) paradigm decision makers are presented with convenient descriptions of all outcomes and their respective likelihoods, and are asked to select their preferred option. For example, the decision maker might be asked to choose between: (A) a 100% chance of 3, or (B) an 80% chance of 4, else 0 (henceforth, Problem 1). Contrary to early belief (e.g., Expected Utility Theory, Savage, 1954) people often make decisions that depart from the prescriptions of rational choice axioms. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) noted that in Problem 1, 80% of decision makers tended to prefer the certain option (choice A) despite it being associated with a lower expected value. In addition, people appear to make decisions as if options with very low probabilities are overweighted but options with moderate and high probabilities are underweighted. Based on the large body of data gathered from the DfD paradigm, choice behaviour appears to adhere to the ‘fourfold-pattern’: risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses of high probability, but risk seeking for gains and risk averse for losses of low probability. The most successful model accounting for these patterns of choice is Prospect Theory (PT; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In spite of PT’s huge success and beliefs about its wide scope of generalization, recent evidence has questioned the applicability of PT, and the very occurrence of the four-fold pattern, to more ecological decisions from experience (Barron & Erev, 2003). In a decision from experience (DfE) paradigm decision makers are initially unaware of their options and must learn about potential outcomes and make estimates of their respective likelihoods through exploration and feedback. In the sampling version of the paradigm, decision makers might be presented with two options that they are asked to sample from. Each sample returns a value randomly selected from a static payoff distribution corresponding to an objective probability that is unknown to the decision-maker. For example, one option might be associated with the distribution “100% chance of 3” and the other option “80% chance of 4, else 0” (i.e., Problem 1). In this exploration stage decision makers are free to sample from each option in any order and as often as they like without consequence. Once the decision-maker has gathered enough information about their options and have formed a preference they move on to the exploitation stage where they select one option to play from for real. Using the DfE paradigm, Hertwig et al. (2004) observed choices that were actually opposite to the predictions of PT. Indeed, strikingly different patterns of choice were observed when compared to decisions made by participants in another Abstract Numerous studies using between-subject designs have found that different decisions can be made about identical binary choice problems depending on whether the options are described or experienced. Using a within-subjects design we examined this Description-Experience ‘gap’ at the level of the individual. We found that: (1) the gap could be observed both at the group and the individual levels, (2) the gap was eliminated, at least at the group level, when controlling for sampling variability, and (3) riskier decisions were made by those with more positive risk attitudes, regardless of format. We conclude that the gap is likely a statistical phenomenon due to biased samples. Keywords: decisions from experience, decisions from description, description-experience, risk taking, risky choice. Introduction Murray and Kluckhohn’s (1953) clever adage that “every man is in certain respects (a) like all other men, (b) like some other men, (c) like no other man” highlights three levels of investigation. The first level refers to universal cognitive or biological mechanisms, the second level to social grouping factors, and the third level to individual differences. Most studies restrict their investigation to a single level and this can become problematic if the research in an area becomes concentrated on just this one level (Lopes, 1987). A current example of where this phenomenon may be occurring is in the context of the “Description-Experience (D-E) gap” debate. The controversy lies with the observation that different decisions are made about structurally identical lotteries as a function of how information about the options is acquired. To date, all of the published studies have used between-subjects designs. This makes sense at the first level of investigation where the intent is to abstract and model universal choice mechanisms. However, several of the most interesting conclusions implied by the “gap” are at the third, and as yet largely unaddressed, level of investigation. In the present study we re-examine some of the conclusions that have been made, and add additional insights, by examining the D-E gap within-subjects while assessing individual differences in risk attitude. Universal Choice Mechanisms Over the last few decades the prevailing methodology used to investigate universal choice mechanisms is the decision from description paradigm (Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004, but see Myers & Suydam, 1964). In a decision from" @default.
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