FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2979580490> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2979580490 abstract "Previous studies have reported that the Conservative Government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher failed to promote competition in its privatisation of large monopolistic publicly owned enterprises in the United Kingdom during the 1980s. In consequence, it failed to maximise the welfare gains which were potentially available. This perceived failure in policymaking has been attributed to flaws in government decision making. The interests of public sector managers have also been identified as impediments to welfare maximisation. However, neither the flaws in government decision making, nor the role of enterprise management in the process of privatisation, have been systematically and thoroughly investigated. The normative perspective adopted in most previous studies did not facilitate investigation of why a government would implement privatisation policy which was not socially optimal. An alternative - public choice - explanation of the process of privatisation of large monopolistic publicly owned enterprises in the United Kingdom is advanced in this study. A public choice explanation facilitates investigation of the inherently political process of enterprise privatisation, and permits explicit consideration of the influence of enterprise management in that process. Specific predictions are made about the changes in the relationship between an enterprise and the state, and about the changes in market structures, that occurred during implementation of the Thatcher Government’s privatisation decisions. They are predictions about removal of the constraints of public ownership, restrictions on the entry of competitors into markets served by the privatised enterprises, retention of their horizontally and vertically integrated structures, restrictions on future price increases, maintaining service quality, the continuation of cross-subsidies, commitment of the Government and its successors to the redistribution of wealth effected, and the role of the regulator. Evidence supporting these predictions, and supporting the public choice explanation of this study, is presented. Privatisation created new profit opportunities for the enterprises by removing the constraints of public ownership, and by restructuring the markets they served. It also made possible the provision of incentives, through the introduction of performance-related compensation, for senior management response to those opportunities. The study examines, and provides evidence in support of, expected changes in the level and form of senior management compensation occurring at the time of privatisation of the large monopolistic publicly owned enterprises in the United Kingdom, and immediately afterwards. Senior management could be expected to respond to new profit opportunities through redefining the scope of enterprise activities, and through changing the way in which resource use was coordinated and controlled. Predictions are made concerning the changes expected in the horizontal scope of the activities of the privatised enterprises, and in the extent to which their activities were vertically integrated. Evidence is presented supporting these predictions. Not only does the evidence presented support the public choice explanation of this study. It also indicates that the public choice perspective which has been advanced is superior to the alternative, normative, perspective in terms of predictions made about the outcomes of the process through which large monopolistic publicly owned enterprises in the United Kingdom were privatised. The public choice perspective explains aspects of enterprise privatisation which are not easily explained from the normative perspective." @default.
• W2979580490 created "2019-10-18" @default.
• W2979580490 creator A5086864555 @default.
• W2979580490 date "2000-01-01" @default.
• W2979580490 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W2979580490 title "The privatisation of large monopolistic publicly owned enterprises in the United Kingdom: A public choice perspective" @default.
• W2979580490 hasPublicationYear "2000" @default.
• W2979580490 type Work @default.
• W2979580490 sameAs 2979580490 @default.
• W2979580490 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W2979580490 crossrefType "dissertation" @default.
• W2979580490 hasAuthorship W2979580490A5086864555 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C100001284 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C100243477 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C127576917 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C162853370 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C18903297 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C2778137410 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C2781127519 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C34447519 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C40700 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C41895202 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C80799131 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C84265765 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C86803240 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConcept C91306197 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C100001284 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C100243477 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C127576917 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C138885662 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C144133560 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C162324750 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C162853370 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C18903297 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C2778137410 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C2781127519 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C34447519 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C40700 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C41895202 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C80799131 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C84265765 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C86803240 @default.
• W2979580490 hasConceptScore W2979580490C91306197 @default.
• W2979580490 hasLocation W29795804901 @default.
• W2979580490 hasOpenAccess W2979580490 @default.
• W2979580490 hasPrimaryLocation W29795804901 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W1520653769 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W1539561632 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W1542023822 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W1598585714 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W186765255 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W1978401520 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W2018226459 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W2065861189 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W2085673894 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W2114740691 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W2122625311 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W2157532659 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W2288800984 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W2799296015 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W3122912280 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W3125658155 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W3197901309 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W326301087 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W769219059 @default.
• W2979580490 hasRelatedWork W999763300 @default.
• W2979580490 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2979580490 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2979580490 magId "2979580490" @default.
• W2979580490 workType "dissertation" @default.