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• W3025691644 abstract "Purpose This paper aims to examine how compensation committees perceive audit quality as indicated by audit firm tenure. Using the contracting weight attached to earnings and cash flows in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation as proxy for the compensation committee’s perception of audit quality, the study examines whether compensation committees perceive performance metric informativeness as being affected by auditor tenure. Design/methodology/approach The paper regresses CEO cash compensation on accounting-based performance metrics and on interactions between auditor tenure and accounting-based performance metrics while controlling for other factors previously shown to affect CEO pay. Auditor tenure is measured using continuous and dichotomous variables. Findings Auditor tenure is associated with a reduced (positive) weight on earnings (operating cash flows), which suggests lower perceived audit quality as tenure lengthens consistent with the auditor closeness argument. This relation is asymmetric, i.e. the negative effect of longer auditor tenure on incentive contracting is more pronounced for positive earnings. The results are robust to using CEO total compensation as the compensation measure, as well as using level and change specifications. Research limitations/implications The inability to control for audit partner tenure in assessing the effect of audit firm tenure on incentive contracting and the potential endogeneity between auditor tenure choice and incentive contracting are the main limitations of this study. Given the lack of information on US audit partner tenure, the study could not control for the audit partner tenure issue. However, the study has attempted to mitigate the endogeneity issue by using a Heckman selection model that includes in the first-stage a regression of auditor tenure on various firm, performance measure and CEO-related governance characteristics, based on existing models (Li et al. , 2010). Practical implications Compensation committees view auditor tenure as an indicator of accounting quality in setting CEO pay. Further, long auditor tenure is perceived as detrimental to financial reporting integrity, particularly when earnings numbers suggest positive managerial performance and innovations. Originality/value This study provides empirical evidence that auditor tenure matters in setting executive pay. Further, this study shows evidence on the link between auditor tenure and audit quality from an internal user’s perspective. Prior studies have focused either on external users (investors, creditors) or on the preparer (using measures such as discretionary accruals or meet/beat analysts’ forecasts or forecast guidance)." @default.
• W3025691644 created "2020-05-21" @default.
• W3025691644 creator A5047113153 @default.
• W3025691644 date "2020-05-13" @default.
• W3025691644 modified "2023-10-02" @default.
• W3025691644 title "Audit firm tenure and perceived audit quality: evidence from CEO incentive contracts" @default.
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• W3025691644 doi "https://doi.org/10.1108/raf-07-2018-0139" @default.
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