FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W3048394943> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W3048394943 abstract "The dissertation investigates determinants and effects of central bank transparency, particularly with respect to the role of communication in promoting the political accountability of monetary authorities. There has been much debate in both political science and economics concerning the desirability and effectiveness of communication within public organisations; however, the link among policy delegation, transparency and accountability remains little understood. The thesis examines this topic looking at different aspects of central bank transparency and how it interacts with the political environment in which monetary authorities operate. In Chapter 2, I study the impact of legislative oversight on the transparency of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). I develop a game-theoretical argument showing how, under reasonable assumptions, a monetary committee should prefer to communicate to political principals to signal competence rather than remaining silent; in this case, disclosures should also increase with political attention. Patterns of communication and transparency within the FOMC strongly support this expectation. Using methods from computational linguistics and features of parliamentary oversight of the Fed in US Congress, I find that the committee discloses additional information in its minutes when the legislative scrutiny of its decisions is likely to increase. In doing so, the study provides empirical evidence of a direct link between transparency and monetary committees’ political accountability. Chapter 3 (co-authored Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey and James Sanders) examines dynamics of legislative oversight of economic policy within the UK parliament. Using several automated content analysis methods, the paper finds consistent differences in deliberative styles between monetary and fiscal policy, as well as across chambers (Commons, Lords). Parliamentarians appear more willing to engage in reciprocal exchange of arguments during monetary policy oversight that in the context of fiscal policy hearings. The paper also suggests some degree of cross-partisan agreement in challenging the officials of the Bank of England on issues related to governance and transparency, reinforcing the idea that these aspects of policy matter for accountability. Chapter 4 investigates a different dimension of communication, namely the relationship between transparency and independence in promoting the credibility of monetary authorities. In the study, I build on a Barro-Gordon framework to show that communication and central bank independence should be considered complementary policy instruments. I then test this argument using panel data for 95 countries in the period from 1998 to 2010. In line with expectations, I find that higher central bank transparency is associated with lower inflation, and that this effect is stronger for high levels of independence. Monetary delegation or transparency alone appear not to have a significant impact on prices, suggesting that the two policies interact." @default.
• W3048394943 created "2020-08-18" @default.
• W3048394943 creator A5035743577 @default.
• W3048394943 date "2020-06-01" @default.
• W3048394943 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W3048394943 title "Essays on central bank transparency, accountability and reputation" @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1447066968 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1488347184 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1492327544 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1493329463 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1494612504 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1499901685 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1515228803 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1516459403 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1518671722 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1522167673 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1532325895 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1538609133 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1574859334 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1579971961 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1581723166 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1582026748 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1595964953 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1598609292 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1606554598 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W167471083 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1753361524 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1833785989 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1880262756 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1919343167 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1936979584 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1940420445 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1950629566 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1956164311 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1969609883 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1973149314 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1983402640 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1985870257 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1991865067 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W1997669826 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2009659525 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2018509595 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2023239665 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2025610165 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2029593486 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2029943593 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2034645929 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2051269286 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2052975629 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2065401533 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2072447383 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2086702849 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2094637634 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2095655043 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2096974619 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2097119464 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2098075861 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2098317876 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2107455791 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2115048421 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2115812713 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2125828838 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2126056404 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2134362232 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2135581599 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2135699079 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2139011416 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2140074439 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2142530775 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2143068265 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2143099036 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2144874182 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2145595890 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2151693890 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2153383412 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2160674103 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W216342353 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2163458930 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2164366152 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2167468761 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2171191585 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2171219380 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2174706414 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2238548246 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2275532486 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2334883855 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2339803327 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2403890490 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2570465660 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2733755964 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2769252714 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2769967772 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2784135349 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2797463800 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2804705294 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2804816507 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2886366476 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2902795002 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2979065114 @default.
• W3048394943 cites W2987960593 @default.

• next