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• W3113166102 abstract "Information and disclosure duties are a means for overcoming information asymmetries between a party who holds a certain piece of private information and one who does not. The imposition of such information duties or, in short, “mandated disclosure” has been one of the most favorite regulatory tools of social planners in the western world. Some authors even speak of mandated disclosure as being “ubiquitous” by now. Indeed, for a long time information and disclosure duties appeared to be the proverbial “silver bullet” in the arsenal of lawmakers and regulators. However, nowadays legal scholars and regulators have come to realize that ever more information does not necessarily lead to ever better decision making. In contrast, constantly growing evidence provided by behavioral economists and cognitive psychologists shows that human actors often struggle with the correct absorption and procession of relevant information due to their limited cognitive capacities. Even worse, more information may sometimes do more harm than good. Thus, today the traditional regulatory technique of mandated disclosure is in a crisis. Many scholars suggest major modifications of the current disclosure regimes. Some even think of mandated disclosure as a complete failure. Against this background, lawyers and legal scholars are confronted with a crucial question: When is the imposition of information and disclosure duties warranted and when do such duties do more harm than good? In economics, the (overlapping) subdisciplines of contract theory, game theory and information economics deal with this very question when analyzing how information (and the lack of it) affects economic decisions. Those strands of economic research provide certain general concepts and insights which are applicable to such diverse scenarios such as consumer contracts or capital market and securities transactions. These concepts and insights can also help lawyers who tackle the question whether information duties are or should be mandated by the law in a specific context. Drawing on the economic logic of a legal arrangement is a “functional” approach to law which is independent of the idiosyncracies and path dependencies of a specific jurisdiction. Rather, law and economics provides an analytical toolbox that can be applied universally across jurisdictions. It can, therefore, be most fruitfully combined with a functional comparative analysis of the laws of different jurisdictions. Having said that, the following analysis intends to point out and highlight that the issues relating to information duties which will be dealt with in the subsequent articles of this anniversary issue of the Journal of Japanese Law are functionally identical even where German and Japanese law come up with different solutions. From an economic perspective the fundamental questions at issue are the following: (1) Do information asymmetries cause a welfare loss? (2) If so, can this loss be mitigated by imposing disclosure duties? (3) Are there other remedies besides information duties which are preferable from an efficiency perspective, be it because they are more effective, be it that they come at lower costs? This article addresses these questions by showing why and when information asymmetries lead to welfare losses (II.). Subsequently, it will be pointed out under which circumstances information duties may mitigate this problem and produce welfare gains (III.). However, information duties also come at a cost which may sometimes be higher than the gains to be had from mandatory disclosure (IV.). Furthermore, mandated disclosure has its limits where the disclosee is not capable of (correctly) absorbing and processing the disclosed information (V.). Against the background of the lessons learned the article ends with a conclusion (VI.)." @default.
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• W3113166102 date "2017-01-01" @default.
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• W3113166102 title "Information and Disclosure Duties from a Law-and-Economics Perspective - A Primer" @default.
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