FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W311869747> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W311869747 abstract "The focus of interest surrounding the welfare has changed gradually but sustainably, given the challenges of economic globalization (Scharpf/Schmidt 2000), the segmented Europeanization of national welfare states (Lamping 2009) and the huge internal problems mature Western welfare states face (Ferrera/Hemerijck/Rhodes 2004). Traditional normative premises have eroded while ideas, interpretations and ideologies have entered the political agenda. But how to move the welfare as a bulky commodity and in which direction? In the wake of increasing transformation pressures, protagonist constellations have emerged. Facing challenges and uncertainties, welfare states seem to be less resilient to change than expected in the early new politics of the welfare state debates. The literature provides a plurality of concepts in order to explain both ground-breaking policy innovations as well as stepwise policy change--or indeed inertia. One of the core findings of comparative welfare research is that political institutions as independent variables certainly matter (veto points or veto players, bicameralism, federalism, party system, etc.) when it comes to reforming advanced Western welfare states. But politics and opportunism (Offe 2001, 368) of governments also play an important role. This includes, for example, the deliberate strategy of experimental law-making in German pension policy (Lamping/Rub 2006), the institutionalization of ad-hoc reform commissions in German labor market and health policy reform in order to involve other players in the reform process, to circumvent veto points and to increase the legitimacy of reform proposals (Lamping 2006), or the engagement of complex processes of political exchange (such as in pension and long-term care policy). Therefore, the politics of defrosting (cf. Hering 2002; Palier 2000) the welfare state, i.e. when governments push forward and successfully overcome institutional rigidities and political resistance by opening up windows of reform, appear to be more contingent, surprising, disorderly, and messy (Offe 2001,: 368) than often presumed. The 'new politics of the welfare state' literature, by contrast, tends to underestimate politics and to overestimate the effect of political institutions. Conflicts of interest and electoral threats can be 'tamed' when governments choose a strategy which helps to manage a bundle of political risks and tradeoffs, because in the 'new politics of the welfare state', governments are simultaneously--and perhaps predominantly--concerned with solving their own problems. In welfare-state restructuring or retrenchment it is these pragmatic or 'purposeful opportunists' who are the most creative and effective ones: They make a difference. We call that the purposeful self-enabling of politics. With regard to Germany, the argument, therefore, is that a highly horizontally and vertically fragmented, veto-heavy political system could make fundamental policy change less likely, but it may also facilitate and promote it because it provides governments with many opportunities to shift the blame, to share the blame, to blur accountability--and thus to reduce electoral risks. The scope for policy manoeuvre and reform success might be even larger than in political systems where power is concentrated. Welfare literature shows that there is a different logic between the old and politics of the welfare state: (1) Whereas it is relatively easy to receive support for the development of popular social policies, political leaders are generally afraid of negative reactions to rollbacks of the welfare (vested interests, welfare-state clientele, etc.). Electoral competition is thus risky for governing parties when it comes to adopting far-reaching reforms which are often painful for and unpopular among voters. While the trente glorieuses, i.e. the post-war phase of expansion of the western welfare states, seems to have been sufficiently investigated, the contested politics of re-structuring the welfare is still a challenging field of research: retrenchment and recalibration politics put high strategic and political demands on governments, as many studies demonstrate, since the distribution of cuts and costs and there-adjustment of programs is a sensitive and barely manageable issue in liberal democracies. …" @default.
• W311869747 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W311869747 creator A5054920007 @default.
• W311869747 creator A5072317667 @default.
• W311869747 date "2008-06-22" @default.
• W311869747 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W311869747 title "Introduction: Moving Bulky Goods. How New Ideas and Partisan Politics Are Transforming the German Welfare State" @default.
• W311869747 hasPublicationYear "2008" @default.
• W311869747 type Work @default.
• W311869747 sameAs 311869747 @default.
• W311869747 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W311869747 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W311869747 hasAuthorship W311869747A5054920007 @default.
• W311869747 hasAuthorship W311869747A5072317667 @default.
• W311869747 hasConcept C100243477 @default.
• W311869747 hasConcept C129603779 @default.
• W311869747 hasConcept C138921699 @default.
• W311869747 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W311869747 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W311869747 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W311869747 hasConcept C2776331573 @default.
• W311869747 hasConcept C2777022163 @default.
• W311869747 hasConcept C34447519 @default.
• W311869747 hasConcept C74363100 @default.
• W311869747 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W311869747 hasConceptScore W311869747C100243477 @default.
• W311869747 hasConceptScore W311869747C129603779 @default.
• W311869747 hasConceptScore W311869747C138921699 @default.
• W311869747 hasConceptScore W311869747C162324750 @default.
• W311869747 hasConceptScore W311869747C17744445 @default.
• W311869747 hasConceptScore W311869747C199539241 @default.
• W311869747 hasConceptScore W311869747C2776331573 @default.
• W311869747 hasConceptScore W311869747C2777022163 @default.
• W311869747 hasConceptScore W311869747C34447519 @default.
• W311869747 hasConceptScore W311869747C74363100 @default.
• W311869747 hasConceptScore W311869747C94625758 @default.
• W311869747 hasIssue "2" @default.
• W311869747 hasLocation W3118697471 @default.
• W311869747 hasOpenAccess W311869747 @default.
• W311869747 hasPrimaryLocation W3118697471 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W1595177287 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W1967458151 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2008190716 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2010261991 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2017646314 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2045703370 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2118353757 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2120875292 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2145692387 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2238392919 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2315680912 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2338907861 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2488255598 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2499862866 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2506438612 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2523932951 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2784319973 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W2887927787 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W564179076 @default.
• W311869747 hasRelatedWork W636408111 @default.
• W311869747 hasVolume "4" @default.
• W311869747 isParatext "false" @default.
• W311869747 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W311869747 magId "311869747" @default.
• W311869747 workType "article" @default.