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• W3118739016 abstract "1 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXVII, No.1, Fall 2013 Iranians and the Bomb: Elite Cues and Support and Opposition to the Development of Nuclear Weapons C. Christine Fair* Karl Kaltenthaler* William J. Miller* Introduction Iran’s nuclear ambitions vex the international community, bringing the Islamic Republic into ever-sharpening conflict with the United States and its key European allies.1 The United States, working with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), and the European Commission, among others, has sought to increase the pressure on Iran in a variety of ways, including increased bilateral sanctions and through UNSC Chapter VII resolutions. While calls for military action were most prevalent during President Bush’s tenure, President Barack Obama’s initial approach of engaging the regime through diplomacy has failed to fructify, and his administration has *C. Christine Fair is Assistant Professor at the Center for Peace and Security Studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. *Karl Kaltenthaler is Professor of Political Science at The University of Akron and Case Western Reserve University. *William J. Miller is Director of Institutional Research and Effectiveness and instructor of political science at Flagler College. 1 Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs 91, no.1 (2012): 76-86; Colin Kahl, “Not Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012): 166-173; Colin Dueck and Ray Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear Challenge,” Political Science Quarterly 122, no. 2 (2007): 109-110; James Lindsay and Roy Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (2010): 33-49. 2 publicly discussed punitive options.2 Israel, an important American ally, is weighing military action in an attempt to retard Iran’s nuclear program.3 Muslims around the world, already deeply worried by the enduring Palestinian-Israeli conflict, unwavering U.S. support for Israel, and the U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, are widely suspicious of American intentions.4 An Israeli or American attack on Iran would thus be deeply inflammatory, despite the fact that some Arab leaders bear a strong antipathy towards Iran and even support military action to prevent the Iranian regime from acquiring nuclear weapons.5 Given the high stakes of Iran’s nuclear program, a number of organizations have undertaken polling of the Iranian public in order to assess the degree to which Iran’s citizenry supports the development of nuclear weapons.6 All of these polling efforts present only tabulations are geared to producing media headlines. They offer few if any explanatory insights 2 Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, “U.S. Eyes New Sanctions Over Iran Nuclear Program,” New York Times, February 8, 2010; Mohamed El Baradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2011); Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs 91, no.1 (2012): 76-86; Colin Kahl, “Not Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012): 166-173. 3 Charles Levinson, “Israelis Debate Striking Iran Without U.S. Consent,” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2010; Jacques Hymans, “Botching the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs 91, no.3 (2012): 44-53. 4 ”Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and US Policies,” World Public Opinion, February 25, 2009. 5 Ian Black and Simon Tisdall, “Saudi Arabia Urges US Attack on Iran to Stop Nuclear Programme,” The Guardian, November 28, 2010. 6 ”Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007: A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World— Sharp Decline in Support for Suicide Bombing in Muslim Countries,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 24, 2007; Dalia Mogahed, “The Battle for the Hearts and Minds: Moderate v. Extremist Views in the Muslim World,” Gallup World Poll Special Report, 2006; “Public Opinion in Iran and America on Key International Issues,” World Public Opinion, January 24, 2007. “Poll of Iranians and Americans,” World Public Opinion, April 7, 2008; “Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Iran Before the June 12, 2009 Presidential Elections,” Terror Free Tomorrow, June 2009. about why Iranians support the development of nuclear weapons.7 Furthermore, with one exception, noted below, the firms that do such polling work..." @default.
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• W3118739016 title "Iranians and the Bomb: Elite Cues and Support and Opposition to the Development of Nudear Weapons" @default.
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