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• W3121201303 abstract "Previous chapter Next chapter Full AccessProceedings Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided MarketsMoshe Babaioff, Kira Goldner, and Yannai A. GonczarowskiMoshe Babaioff, Kira Goldner, and Yannai A. Gonczarowskipp.2452 - 2471Chapter DOI:https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975994.150PDFBibTexSections ToolsAdd to favoritesExport CitationTrack CitationsEmail SectionsAboutAbstract We consider the problem of welfare (and gains-from-trade) maximization in two-sided markets using simple mechanisms that are prior-independent. The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] shows that even for bilateral trade, there is no feasible (individually rational, truthful, and budget balanced) mechanism that has welfare as high as the optimal-yet-infeasible VCG mechanism, which attains maximal welfare but runs a deficit. On the other hand, the optimal feasible mechanism needs to be carefully tailored to the Bayesian prior, and even worse, it is known to be extremely complex, eluding a precise description. In this paper we present Bulow-Klemperer-style results to circumvent these hurdles in double-auction market settings. We suggest using the Buyer Trade Reduction (BTR) mechanism, a variant of McAfee's mechanism, which is feasible and simple (in particular, it is deterministic, truthful, prior-independent, and anonymous). First, in the setting in which the values of the buyers and of the sellers are sampled independently and identically from the same distribution, we show that for any such market of any size, BTR with one additional buyer whose value is sampled from the same distribution has expected welfare at least as high as the optimal-yet-infeasible VCG mechanism in the original market. We then move to a more general setting in which the values of the buyers are sampled from one distribution, and those of the sellers from another, focusing on the case where the buyers' distribution first-order stochastically dominates the sellers' distribution. We present both upper bounds and lower bounds on the number of buyers that, when added, guarantees that BTR in the augmented market achieve welfare at least as high as the optimal in the original market. Our lower bounds extend to a large class of mechanisms, and all of our positive and negative results extend to adding sellers instead of buyers. In addition, we present positive results about the usefulness of pricing at a sample for welfare maximization (and more precisely, for gains-from-trade approximation) in two-sided markets under the above two settings, which to the best of our knowledge are the first sampling results in this context. Previous chapter Next chapter RelatedDetails Published:2020eISBN:978-1-61197-599-4 https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975994Book Series Name:ProceedingsBook Code:PRDA20Book Pages:xxii + 3011" @default.
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• W3121201303 title "Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets" @default.
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