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• W3121354341 abstract "DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES. By J. Gregory Sidak^ and Daniel F Spulber.^^ Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xx, 631.^^ Reviewed By Jim Rossi* Laws change and, as they do, reliance interests are often affected. For instance, if Congress or the Internal Revenue Service were to abolish tax benefits for certain investment activities, this would undoubtedly affect the revenues of individuals and corporations who have made investmentsperhaps who were induced by incentives in the law to make investmentswith expectations set under previous rules. Were Congress to modify intellectual property laws, retracting or modifying currently protected copyrights or patents, it would wreak havoc on investors who have sunk millions into new technologies, anticipating big payoffs from governmentprotected monopolies in new inventions. When, if ever, does a change in law warrant litigation against the government? Of course, if the change stems from the action of an administrative agency, extensive review of decisionmaking procedures is provided under the Administrative Procedure Act.' Congress, though, can rarely be sued for fault in its decisionmaking procedure, although one can point to classic instances when Congress has seen its actions reversed for denying due process or infringing on other rights protected under the Constitution. In Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract: The Competitive Transformation of Network Industries in the United States, J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F Spulber seek to add more certainty to government regulation by arguing that government can be sued for breach of contract or under the Takings Clause of the Constitution if it does not act to protect expectations as it attempts to deregulate natural monopoly industries, such as telecommunications and electricity. Since the early 1970s, liberal consumer advocates have urged legislatures to use caution before deregulating a variety of industries. Today, these advocates find allies in Sidak and Spulber-hardly proregulation liberals2-who see legal and policy impediments to government deregulation, but who invoke these to the benefit of the firm and its investors. Sidak and Spulber's book is clearly written, accessible, and timely, especially given the debate over deregulation that has been brewing for nearly twenty years. It is also provocative and controversial, as the micropolitics of the deregulation debate might suggest. This review assesses Sidak and Spulber's argument in the context of the case law and normative principles of regulation. Part I explains the concept of a deregulatory taking, summarizing briefly the authors' argument and showing its practical importance to current policy issues in the telecommunications and electricity industries. Part II argues that the case law fails to provide solid support for the extreme argument for compensation advanced in Deregulatory Takings; although the law does not preclude some deregulatory taking claims, successful claims will be far fewer than Sidak and Spulber intimate. Part III addresses faults with the efficiency argument for compensation. It suggests that the efficiency issue should not be seen as one of unilateral risk of breach of a contract with the state, but shared risk for regulatory change in the face of uncertainty; in such circumstances, private markets are often in a better position to insure against risks, and the turn to government for compensation has adverse policy implications for utility regulation and law more generally. At its core, the deregulatory takings argument is imbued with irony. It reaches the opposite of the result one might expect: it relies on a faux progressive notion of regulation-the regulatory compact, a shield protecting vested interests in regulation-while invoking a conservative's artillery-the Takings Clause as a mechanism for insuring investor confidence. …" @default.
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• W3121354341 date "1998-11-01" @default.
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• W3121354341 title "The Irony of Deregulatory Takings" @default.
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