FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W3121872716> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W3121872716 endingPage "357" @default.
• W3121872716 startingPage "357" @default.
• W3121872716 abstract "Do the economic consequences of policies affect the political behavior of elected officials? In particular, do the costs and benefits that flow to households in legislative districts affect representatives' support of policy proposals? In recent years, scholars have investigated this question by regressing roll-call vote decisions of legislators against measures of the economic interests of constituents and the ideology of the legislators [3; 5; 8; 9; 10; 11; 13; 14]. With some exceptions, such as Peltzman [13], most scholars who perform such regressions conclude that constituents' economic interests are not the sole determinant of legislators' behavior. Representatives' own policy preferences explain some of the cross-sectional variance in their support of proposals. In the words of economists, representatives shirk from their constituents' interests. Many authors who regress roll-call vote behavior against measures of constituents' economic interests and representatives' ideology are aware that their measure of the latter (summary rollcall vote ratings by groups such as the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)) is not a pure measure of representatives' policy beliefs because it is merely a summary of previous roll-call behavior. To eliminate the contamination, scholars regress the ADA rating against numerous economic, demographic, and regional variables. The unexplained residual variance is then used to measure representatives' ideology. Those who use this technique obviously hope that these residuals represent personal ideology and not other possible causes of vote decisions. The reasonableness of this assumption depends on whether the variables regressed against the ADA rating capture all the other causes of congressional behavior. Kalt and Zupan [9, 293; 10, 112], Carson and Oppenheimer [5, 172] and Kau and Rubin [11, 64] exclude three important classes of variables: the positions of interest groups and executive-branch actors, and the likelihood of proposal passage, all of which affect the decisions of legislators. This exclusion increases the probability that the residuals in the ADA equation represent not only the personal ideology of representatives, but also the ability of executive-branch and interest-group actors to affect reelection.'" @default.
• W3121872716 created "2021-02-01" @default.
• W3121872716 creator A5043135173 @default.
• W3121872716 creator A5091033633 @default.
• W3121872716 date "1993-10-01" @default.
• W3121872716 modified "2023-10-18" @default.
• W3121872716 title "Do Legislators Vote Their Constituents' Wallets? (And How Would We Know If They Did?)" @default.
• W3121872716 cites W1543944614 @default.
• W3121872716 cites W1590997042 @default.
• W3121872716 cites W1984535654 @default.
• W3121872716 cites W2035947598 @default.
• W3121872716 cites W2050472510 @default.
• W3121872716 cites W2050596968 @default.
• W3121872716 cites W2050985734 @default.
• W3121872716 cites W2067591184 @default.
• W3121872716 cites W2080554424 @default.
• W3121872716 cites W2095172060 @default.
• W3121872716 cites W2314684852 @default.
• W3121872716 cites W40836960 @default.
• W3121872716 doi "https://doi.org/10.2307/1060085" @default.
• W3121872716 hasPublicationYear "1993" @default.
• W3121872716 type Work @default.
• W3121872716 sameAs 3121872716 @default.
• W3121872716 citedByCount "7" @default.
• W3121872716 countsByYear W31218727162015 @default.
• W3121872716 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W3121872716 hasAuthorship W3121872716A5043135173 @default.
• W3121872716 hasAuthorship W3121872716A5091033633 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConcept C143838007 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConcept C2778519782 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConcept C38652104 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConcept C41008148 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConcept C520049643 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConcept C61267812 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConceptScore W3121872716C143838007 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConceptScore W3121872716C162324750 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConceptScore W3121872716C17744445 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConceptScore W3121872716C190253527 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConceptScore W3121872716C199539241 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConceptScore W3121872716C2778519782 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConceptScore W3121872716C38652104 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConceptScore W3121872716C41008148 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConceptScore W3121872716C520049643 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConceptScore W3121872716C61267812 @default.
• W3121872716 hasConceptScore W3121872716C94625758 @default.
• W3121872716 hasIssue "2" @default.
• W3121872716 hasLocation W31218727161 @default.
• W3121872716 hasOpenAccess W3121872716 @default.
• W3121872716 hasPrimaryLocation W31218727161 @default.
• W3121872716 hasRelatedWork W1976442908 @default.
• W3121872716 hasRelatedWork W2191922722 @default.
• W3121872716 hasRelatedWork W2259873378 @default.
• W3121872716 hasRelatedWork W2391262439 @default.
• W3121872716 hasRelatedWork W2597576816 @default.
• W3121872716 hasRelatedWork W2785061331 @default.
• W3121872716 hasRelatedWork W2899084033 @default.
• W3121872716 hasRelatedWork W293170168 @default.
• W3121872716 hasRelatedWork W3118867053 @default.
• W3121872716 hasRelatedWork W3162499267 @default.
• W3121872716 hasVolume "60" @default.
• W3121872716 isParatext "false" @default.
• W3121872716 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W3121872716 magId "3121872716" @default.
• W3121872716 workType "article" @default.