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• W3122045667 abstract "I Introduction Pain-and-suffering damages can account for up to half of the total tort damages paid in product liability and medical malpractice cases. They are a contentious issue in all of the various tort reform attempts made in recent years.1 Many commentators consider them to be a source of the maladies in tort law. Legal economists often debate the efficiency rationale of providing pain-and-suffering damages to injured parties. From an efficiency perspective, awarding pain-and-suffering damages should help achieve two objectives: that potential tortfeasors be given appropriate incentives to exercise care (the 'deterrence' rationale); and that the victims' losses will be efficiently transferred to a larger pool of risk bearers (the 'insurance' rationale). Most scholars rationalize the damages on grounds of efficient [End Page 941] caretaking (deterrence rationale), arguing that defendants should bear the full social cost of their conduct, which includes non-monetary pain-and-suffering costs.2 However, the desirability of pain-and-suffering damages is more questionable with respect to efficient risk-bearing grounds (insurance rationale), the other major efficiency goal of tort law. The latter question is the focus of this article. Following Guido Calabresi, most legal economists accept the notion that tort law (which is essentially a system of third-party insurance) and first-party insurance markets act as alternative solutions to the problem of allocating accident costs.3 Using this perspective, the optimal level of tort compensation should equal the amount of first-party insurance coverage purchased by an independent, rational, and fully informed consumer ('sovereign consumer') in a world without tort laws.4 But only empirical or experimental data can indicate whether sovereign consumers would buy pain-and-suffering coverage in a world without tort law.5 Scholars who support pain-and-suffering damages justify their beliefs with indirect evidence that sovereign consumers would [End Page 942] demand and pay for some coverage for their pain-and-suffering losses in a hypothetical (first-party) insurance contract.6 Other scholars provide indirect evidence that sovereign consumers would prefer not to pay for any coverage at all.7 This article accepts the sovereign consumer paradigm as the relevant way to explore the desirability of pain-and-suffering damages in tort law. It provides, for the first time, direct experimental evidence on consumers' demand for pain-and-suffering coverage relative to their demand for monetary coverage. It shows that people demand not only monetary coverage but pain-and-suffering insurance as well. The article then argues that pain-and-suffering damages may play a vital role in achieving not only the deterrence rationale but also the insurance rationale of tort law. Part II below presents the methodology and results of two experimental studies I performed to study the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage. The experiments were designed to see whether participants perceived any difference between insurance coverage for monetary damages and coverage for non-monetary damages.8 Each participant faced several insurance decisions for different products: padding for roller skates ($40), a portable saw ($100), a facial cream ($100), a computer monitor ($250), a trampoline ($600) and tires for a car ($800). Each product was associated with different types of injuries, ranging from a migraine, to brain damage resulting in a comatose state. Participants stated the price they were willing to pay, above the price of each pro-duct, for insurance to cover monetary damages and pain-and-suffering [End Page 943] damages. I then compared the demand for monetary coverage with the demand for pain-and-suffering coverage. My results in both studies show that the vast majority of the participants (89 per cent in both studies) treated both types of insurance the same – either they bought them both or they bought neither. Moreover, on average, in both studies the majority of participants treated both types of insurance exactly..." @default.
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• W3122045667 date "2005-01-01" @default.
• W3122045667 modified "2023-10-03" @default.
• W3122045667 title "Should Pain-and-Suffering Damages be Abolished from Tort Law? More Experimental Evidence" @default.
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• W3122045667 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/tlj.2005.0031" @default.
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