FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W3122225198> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W3122225198 startingPage "299" @default.
• W3122225198 abstract "Prior discussions of management turnover during financial distress have examined bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms as distinct groupings with little overlap. Separately investigating rates of turnover in-bankruptcy and out-of-bankruptcy, without a direct comparison between the two, has resulted in a narrowing of the accepted influence of law to post-petition, in-court decisions. Based on new evidence of CEO turnover in 2001, I argue empirically that this distinction between in-court and out-of-court restructuring has become meaningless from a perspective. In 2001, filing for did not change the rate of CEO turnover when one controls far financial condition. This statistically significant finding indicates that the shadow of bankruptcy has lengthened, making law a central tenet of policy regardless of whether a Chapter 11 petition is ever filed. After presenting these results, this article considers the implications of these results on the changing perceptions of the role of CEOs and the evolution of the multi-pronged U.S. corporate system. Introduction & Summary of Findings How much influence does the Bankruptcy Code have on non-bankruptcy corporate policy? During the first five years after the adoption of the new Bankruptcy Code (1979-1984), the answer appears to have been very little. Over that time period, Stuart Gilson found that operating in placed unique pressures on management, resulting in a significant difference between levels of management turnover recorded in reorganizations and in nonbankruptcy restructurings.1 After twenty years and several waves of large bankruptcies, however, it is time to revisit that question. New data from 2001 demonstrates that whether a firm operates inside or outside of Chapter 11, the levels of CEO turnover remain constant. The equalization of CEO turnover across these two regimes provides concrete proof that the Bankruptcy Code has become so ubiquitous that its rules permeate corporate decisions for financially distressed companies, whether or not they file a petition. This result is counterintuitive, as practitioners are accustomed to thinking of as a specialized environment with completely different rules. In fact, the operating rules for a corporation in are substantially different from those which never file a petition. Simply changing the rules of daily operation, however, does not necessarily change the rules of governance. Corporate governance refers to a comprehensive system of rules for complex internal negotiations between disparate parties with conflicting interests. Governance systems dictate how, under what assumptions, and due to which incentives, officers make managerial choices. Though a subtle distinction, it is vitally important to recognize that choosing to operate in no longer appears to change the overall system of governance. Filing for is not a binomial decision, but rather a perpetual choice. From an historical perspective, this consistency across financial distress regimes is a relatively novel result. Previous authors who studied CEO turnover in the context always found some disparity between rates of CEO turnover in and non-bankruptcy distress.2 Because a majority of U.S. filings are made at the election of management,3 some authors have used that disparity as proof that management behavior is being driven by changes in the Bankruptcy Code-while others have hotly contested that conclusion.4 Regardless of which line of argument one finds most persuasive, the theoretical underpinning is undeniable: the corporate manager, like the child who learns to avoid a hot stove, will generally act out of self-interest and choose the safest haven provided by the rule-based legislation then in effect. While this study does not profess to explain a causal relationship between changes in the Bankruptcy Code and management behavior, the timeline is noteworthy from a theoretical perspective. …" @default.
• W3122225198 created "2021-02-01" @default.
• W3122225198 creator A5030500389 @default.
• W3122225198 date "2006-04-01" @default.
• W3122225198 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W3122225198 title "All's Fair in Love, War & Bankruptcy? Corporate Governance Implications of CEO Turnover in Financial Distress" @default.
• W3122225198 hasPublicationYear "2006" @default.
• W3122225198 type Work @default.
• W3122225198 sameAs 3122225198 @default.
• W3122225198 citedByCount "5" @default.
• W3122225198 countsByYear W31222251982012 @default.
• W3122225198 countsByYear W31222251982015 @default.
• W3122225198 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W3122225198 hasAuthorship W3122225198A5030500389 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C117797892 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C15744967 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C4163816 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C45237549 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C504631918 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConcept C542102704 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C10138342 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C117797892 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C121955636 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C144133560 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C15744967 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C162324750 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C190253527 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C39389867 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C4163816 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C45237549 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C504631918 @default.
• W3122225198 hasConceptScore W3122225198C542102704 @default.
• W3122225198 hasIssue "2" @default.
• W3122225198 hasLocation W31222251981 @default.
• W3122225198 hasOpenAccess W3122225198 @default.
• W3122225198 hasPrimaryLocation W31222251981 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W1494183760 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W1540658556 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W2054733280 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W2096055254 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W2102112908 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W2144402053 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W267901134 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W2935752603 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W2954776647 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W2982138345 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W2993387807 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W3090176588 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W3108770052 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W3121199687 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W3121782403 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W3123414681 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W3123766363 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W3123902877 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W3125261524 @default.
• W3122225198 hasRelatedWork W3142588896 @default.
• W3122225198 hasVolume "11" @default.
• W3122225198 isParatext "false" @default.
• W3122225198 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W3122225198 magId "3122225198" @default.
• W3122225198 workType "article" @default.