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• W3122695240 abstract "Deciding how much time a person should spend in prison for a serious crime is an inherently moral and political act. And it is certainly cold-hearted and philosophically problematic to view sentencing as just an agency problem with criminal defendants as objects of a system in which prison terms are simply outputs.1 So I will not even try to justify resorting to a narrow institutional perspective as a normative matter. But, for better or worse, those political actors with the greatest influence on sentencing regimes have to think in aggregate terms. While there is considerable normative appeal to the idea of courtroom actors, and particularly judges, crafting an individualized sentence for each defendant, we need also to recognize that for elected officials at the top of the prosecutorial hierarchy, sentencing-particularly sentencing after a negotiated guilty plea-presents just another iteration of the classic problem of administrative law: how to limit the ability of agents to take advantage of informational asymmetries to slack off or import their own policy preferences.2 One need hardly embrace the policy preferences of elected executive officials or the policy process to see the virtues of considering this internal perspective. The first is simply a matter of advocacy: However convinced one is that sentences are too high or that sentencing policy should be the exclusive province of judges, these are not likely to be effective starting points for conversations with sentencing hierarchs who can promote their sentencing preferences only by restricting the authority of line actors. And these sentencing hierarchs dominate the policymaking and legislative process. Budgetary considerations, at least at the state level, may lead statewide officials to reconsider levels of incarceration, but within these constraints, they will still have enforcement priorities. The second is a matter of accountability and transparency. Legislators, elected officials, and political appointees may be all too prone to go overboard in getting tough on crime, but our general expectation (at least outside the criminal justice area) that unregulated agents are prone to drift or shirk should not be relaxed. Perhaps there is some optimal amount of drifting or shirking that will compensate for the failure of the political process to appropriately calibrate its response to crime. But even as one recognizes the value of working group3 justice-the justice meted out within the courtroom triad of prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge-one can still find some countervailing value in the efforts of politically accountable officials to maintain a degree of control over the compromises reached by their unelected minions in the low-visibility world of plea bargaining. Yet how do these officials exercise such control? And what effects will the successful exercise of such control have on the rest of the system? These are the questions considered here (but hardly resolved) in an effort to start exploring how the internal prosecutorial monitoring project conflicts with or reinforces particular sentencing regimes. As a descriptive matter, this is a technical inquiry into the mechanics of institutional coordination and an attempt to add to the literature that, when it does consider the politics of sentencing, tends to treat prosecutorial interests as monolithic.4 Treatments of prosecutorial discretion in the sentencing context also tend to focus on its challenge to horizontal equity and judicial discretion within sentencing regimes.5 The goal here is to reverse the arrow and, using an internal executive perspective, to start looking at how sentencing regimes and judicial enforcement of those regimes can be used as tools for the hierarchical control of line prosecutors in the plea bargaining process. To be sure, measures that promote hierarchical control will also promote horizontal equity. Indeed, the two goals have much in common. But the focus here, and perhaps in certain policymaking circles, will be on control. …" @default.
• W3122695240 created "2021-02-01" @default.
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• W3122695240 date "2006-06-01" @default.
• W3122695240 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W3122695240 title "Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform" @default.
• W3122695240 hasPublicationYear "2006" @default.
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