FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W312299147> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W312299147 startingPage "529" @default.
• W312299147 abstract "I. INTRODUCTION In this Note, I will discuss the ever-growing concerns across the country regarding judicial elections and I will propose solutions. I will show that although elections solved some of the abuses that existed during the nineteenth century under the appointive process, the election system has outlived its usefulness, and governments should initiate reform. I will begin this Note by defining judicial independence and supporting its importance as a legal ideal and analytical construct. To prove its importance, I will present various critiques of judicial independence, generally, and of formal independence, specifically. I will next present recent scholarship that demonstrates a link between the institutional arrangement of courts and the decisions that judges make. I will next propose the normative goals that every judiciary shall aspire to achieve. With the normative goals that I propose in mind, I will then look at the past and present of various judicial selection methods and will illustrate the ways that partisan election systems fail to achieve these normative goals. I will show that a partisan election structure cannot possibly achieve these goals. I will conclude the Note by proposing a wholesale change to the judicial election process-moving to merit selection. I will demonstrate that merit selection combines desired traits from both the election and appointment processes and minimizes the weaknesses of each. Merit selection combines the democratic ideals of the election process with the decisional independence of the appointment process; it can more effectively select highly qualified candidates who are better insulated from the political perils of the election system. I will conclude by arguing for a quick and decisive change to the current election system. Through merit selection, I will show that states can achieve the normative goal of providing a neutral triadic dispute resolution system for the people. II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE A. Defining Judicial Independence Judicial independence has been called an elusive, multi-layer concept that is difficult to define.2 Almost universally, scholars and judges recognize judicial independence as a legal ideal that correlates closely with judicial objectivity.3 Former Chief Justice Rehnquist once noted that [t]he independence of [the judiciary] ... is every bit as important in securing the recognition of the rights granted by the Constitution as is the declaration of those rights themselves.4 As much as judicial independence is regarded as a virtue by scholars, the public has placed great emphasis on the political accountability of legislators, executives, and judges. Whereas legislators and executives should serve the interests of the electorate, judges are charged with fairly and impartially administering the laws of the state and the United States. In the judicial context, independence conflicts directly with accountability, as it is commonly defined.5 As Charles Gardner Geyh explains, An absolutely independent judge is-by definition-dependent on no one.6 So, as Geyh observes, the important inquiry is, Where should independence end and accountability begin? The public does not want the judiciary to return to its elitist, homogenous roots, but can accountable judiciary act and appear impartial?8 To answer these questions, this Note will first define and examine the importance of judicial independence. Many scholars define judicial independence differently but most definitions include three interrelated concepts.9 These concepts include: (1) behavioral or decisional independence-sometimes referred to simply as impartiality at the case level; (2) formal or institutional independence, which describes the judicial system's institutional structure, including selection and retention methods, tenure, and salary; and (3) insularity from other political branches-also referred to as separation of powers. …" @default.
• W312299147 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W312299147 creator A5009580459 @default.
• W312299147 date "2006-07-01" @default.
• W312299147 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W312299147 title "A Gorilla at the Dinner Table:1 Partisan Judicial Elections in the United States" @default.
• W312299147 hasPublicationYear "2006" @default.
• W312299147 type Work @default.
• W312299147 sameAs 312299147 @default.
• W312299147 citedByCount "1" @default.
• W312299147 countsByYear W3122991472015 @default.
• W312299147 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W312299147 hasAuthorship W312299147A5009580459 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C105795698 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C144024400 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C199360897 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C2776639384 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C2778061430 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C2780564088 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C2780801425 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C33923547 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C35651441 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C41008148 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C44725695 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C555826173 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C79638320 @default.
• W312299147 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C105795698 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C144024400 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C17744445 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C190253527 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C199360897 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C199539241 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C2776639384 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C2778061430 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C2780564088 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C2780801425 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C33923547 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C35651441 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C41008148 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C44725695 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C555826173 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C79638320 @default.
• W312299147 hasConceptScore W312299147C94625758 @default.
• W312299147 hasIssue "3" @default.
• W312299147 hasLocation W3122991471 @default.
• W312299147 hasOpenAccess W312299147 @default.
• W312299147 hasPrimaryLocation W3122991471 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W144651318 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W1526084372 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W1539634089 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W1569189120 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W1589497627 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W1599258958 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W20478582 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W2256071510 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W2259902367 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W2263395957 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W243702997 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W2581052730 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W2770700715 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W2772212654 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W2969394672 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W3123857167 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W335434581 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W36167030 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W1795015915 @default.
• W312299147 hasRelatedWork W209377408 @default.
• W312299147 hasVolume "25" @default.
• W312299147 isParatext "false" @default.
• W312299147 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W312299147 magId "312299147" @default.
• W312299147 workType "article" @default.