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• W3123117869 abstract "I. Introduction II. Two Theories of Settlements A. Mechanics of Settlement B. An Economic Theory of Settlements C. A Political Theory of Settlements III. Empirical Evidence on Settlements A. Descriptive Evidence 1. Firm Performance 2. Firm Characteristics 3. Challenger Characteristics B. Inferential Evidence IV. Implications of the Empirical Evidence of Settlements A. Passive Shareholders B. Formal Means of Shareholder Influence C. Informal Means of Shareholder Influence D. Activist Shareholders V. Conclusion I. INTRODUCTION In corporate law, all power rests with the board of directors. (1) The board of directors decides whom to hire as CEO and whether to remove her, (2) makes merger and acquisition decisions, (3) decides when it is time to wind up the business, (4) and though little noticed, decides what strategies to use to sidestep a shareholder vote. As corporate law observers (including this author) have previously lamented, corporate elections are fundamentally broken and give shareholders little real opportunity to participate meaningfully in deciding who should serve on the board. (5) For one thing, board elections at most firms are staggered, such that most board seats are not up for election at annual meetings. (6) At most firms, when director posts come for a vote, shareholders get an opportunity to vote for as few as one-third of the seats on the board. (7) Furthermore, even when one-third of the board seats are up for election, shareholders have practical method of ousting underperforming directors. The vast majority of elections are uncontested. (8) Based on the traditional rules of corporate election voting, shareholders may vote no in director elections, but these votes are largely symbolic. (9) Under the plurality voting rules in place, the contestant with the highest number of votes wins, regardless of whether the contestant secures a majority of the votes cast. (10) Thus, in an election with a single candidate, a candidate only needs one vote to win, since there are other candidates, and thus candidate with a higher number of votes. (11) Without the presence of competition, the incumbents are automatically re-elected to their posts, regardless of how shareholders vote. (12) Significantly, even when there is competition for board seats, directors have yet another arrow in the quiver to sidestep a shareholder vote. (13) Though it has been far less theorized in the general literature (and not theorized at all in law reviews) when there is a challenge, directors have been clever enough to simply settle the dispute in advance of the vote. (14) When they sense potential danger, incumbents entice challengers to drop their bid in exchange for board seats and cold, hard cash. When these pre-voting settlements happen, shareholders do not get a chance to vote on the directors' fate at all. (15) These settlements almost always involve board seats, if the challenger agrees to relent and give up his challenge. Directors can use bylaw provisions to expand the board of directors or carefully orchestrate resignations and then immediately fill board seats. (16) When seats on the board are filled this way, shareholders do not get a chance to take a meaningful vote on who serves on the board. (17) This elaborate dance is undertaken by a board of directors to avoid a contested corporate election. For instance, in 2008, Carl Icahn, a frequent critic of the leadership at several major corporations, famously agreed to give up his challenge for control of Yahoo's board of directors in exchange for three board seats on the company's 11-member board. (18) That same year, Motorola settled a potential fight with Icahn over control of its board by giving up two board seats. Just last year, Genzyme, a large pharmaceutical concern, also agreed to give Mr. Icahn a couple of board seats if he would abandon his contest for control. …" @default.
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• W3123117869 date "2014-01-01" @default.
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• W3123117869 title "Corporate Elections and Tactical Settlements" @default.
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