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• W3123325668 abstract "TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. THREE NINETEENTH-CENTURY RIVALS II. AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION III. SOCIAL THEORY OF AT THE CENTER OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE IV. THE CONTINUITY OF SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE V. SOCIAL THEORY OF WITHIN LEGAL REALISM AND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT VI. SOCIAL LEGAL THEORY VII. THREE CONTRASTING-COMPLEMENTARY ANGLES ON VIII. BUT IT'S NOT PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IX. WHY IT MATTERS INTRODUCTION When contemporary legal theorists engage the question What is law? their analyses typically are framed in terms of a grand contest between legal positivism and natural law. In an encyclopedic entry on Nature of Law, Andrei Marmor observes: In the course of the last few centuries, two main rival philosophical traditions have emerged, providing different answers to [traditional] questions [regarding the nature of law]. The older one, dating back to late mediaeval Christian scholarship, is called the natural law tradition. Since the early 19th century, Natural Law theories have been fiercely challenged by the legal positivism tradition promulgated by such scholars as Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. (1) A recent text entitled The Nature of Law covers only the debate between natural lawyers and legal positivists. (2) These two hold pride of place in standard accounts of jurisprudence, (3) standing above an unruly jumble of other theoretical approaches. (4) A common arrangement in jurisprudence texts is to begin with natural law and legal positivism, in that order, followed by legal realism, and then a host of contemporary schools of thought. (5) This ordering is chronological as well as thematic: natural law began in classical times; (6) legal positivism arose in the nineteenth century to challenge natural law; (7) legal realism arose in the 1920s and 1930s to debunk formalist views of law; (8) the Hart-Fuller debate of the late 1950s marked the reenergizing of legal positivism; (9) and in the 1970s, Dworkin challenged Hart's dominance, (10) law and economics examined law from an economic perspective, (11) and critical legal studies of the radical left attacked mainstream legal liberalism. (12) Now we have a hodge-podge of descendants or variations of these schools, with natural law and legal positivism enjoying prominence above all others. A third major pillar of jurisprudence exists, I argue in this Article, and has existed for several centuries as a rival to natural law and legal positivism, though it goes mostly unrecognized today owing to the vagaries of labeling and intellectual fashion. (13) Despite lacking an acknowledged name and identity, several of the core propositions of this theoretical stream are now virtually taken for granted--a remarkable achievement for a theoretical perspective on law that remains all but invisible. Contrary to what the title might suggest, it is not my contention that every existing legal can be squeezed into one of these three jurisprudential approaches; nor do I claim that this is the only way to categorize current theories about law. (14) My claims are more limited: this third theoretical stream constitutes a long-standing and coherent alternative to natural law and legal positivism and the theoretical discussion of law will benefit from recognizing it as such. (15) Recognition of this third branch of jurisprudence will create a framework that facilitates the incorporation of insights currently at the margins of discussions of the nature of law, including insights about legal institutions, legal functions, legal efficacy, legal change, legal practices, legal development, legal pluralism, legal culture, and more. (16) This jurisprudential tradition, labeled legal theory for reasons that will become evident, is characterized by a consummately social view of the nature of law. (17) I. THREE NINETEENTH-CENTURY RIVALS I will first attempt to loosen the grip of conventional assumptions by noting that legal theorists a century ago would have been surprised by Marmor's identification of only two great jurisprudential rivals and also by the prominence he accords to natural law. …" @default.
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• W3123325668 date "2015-05-01" @default.
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• W3123325668 title "The Third Pillar of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory" @default.
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