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• W3123982307 abstract "This is a terrific book-I basically agree with everything Bebchuk and Fried wrote-but it's also an important book because it addresses a subject that's going to be very much on the front burner over the next couple of years. ' Let me just say a couple of things. First: is there a problem? I would agree with Arthur Levitt that the level of executive pay per se is not the definition of the problem. On the other hand, high compensation levels pose the question of whether there is a problem. And if you say, Well, for senior executives, compensation has risen three and a half times faster than it has for average workers, then you can say, makes sense if either (a) there's a declining pool of people who can do these jobs, or (b) the job got something like three and a half times harder, or (c) maybe they're creating three and a half times as much value as executives used to create. If you have problems with those conclusions, the compensation levels are probably a little bit high. Next, I want to address the director-as-my-agent issue. I should say I have a public fund role, but in my private life my livelihood is dependent upon financial market outcomes. What I would say generally in both the public pension world and in the private investor world is that the view is that managements are obviously uneven. There are great managements, there are mediocre managements, and there are poor managements. In the instances where there is some divergence between the interests of the owners, us, and management, or in instances where management has to be held accountable and move in a different direction, my experience is that when the interests of shareholders and management diverge, we cannot normally count on directors to act as our agents. I think this idea that they are our agents with an arm's-length relationship to management is an artificial construct. I say this now as someone who has been a director of public companies. None of us was conscripted into these roles. Directors tend to be people who have some degree of optionality in life; they serve because there are financial or nonfinancial benefits that arise from these roles, and if you want to serve you probably want to serve again next year. If you want to get re-elected, staying on the board is not a function of what shareholders think of you, but of what management and directors think of you. Being a member of a board is not like living in an apartment building in New York. When you live in New York, you have no use for many people in the building, and they have no use for you. Thus, what those people think of you makes no difference. Unlike a New York high-rise, the nature of a board is that you operate as a unit, and the leader of that unit is the CEO. Therefore it can be quite uncomfortable to push that CEO on the sensitive issue of compensation. I think there are questions one might ask about some corporate charitable contributions. As a shareholder, whether I want somebody using my resources, or in a fiduciary capacity, somebody else's resources, to make philanthropic contributions that reflect their priorities is an interesting question. But the idea that management would direct those philanthropic contributions to the charities of directors, who are supposed to be my agents on the board, undermines the independence of those directors. That conduct, to me, is utterly preposterous, but is a common practice that takes place below the radar screen. Let me raise the issue concerning the role of compensation consultants.2 This issue comes from direct and highly memorable experience. The theoretical role of the compensation consultant is to make an independent assessment of what senior executives are supposed to be paid. The business model of being a compensation consultant is based on satisfying the interests of the people about whom they're supposed to be making that independent judgment. It's somewhat analogous to writing fairness opinions, but at least when you write a fairness opinion you might get sued. …" @default.
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• W3123982307 date "2005-07-01" @default.
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• W3123982307 title "Pay without Performance: The Institutional Shareholder Perspective" @default.
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