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• W3125514135 abstract "INTRODUCTIONFrom beginning of Republic,1 with increasing energy in last eighty years,2 Congress has been enacting statutes that vest administrative officials with power to make laws governing many aspects of our national life. To act under such grants of statutory authority, administrative officials must interpret them. Courts review only a small percentage of administrative decisions, so administrative agencies are often not only first, but also final interpreters. As scope of administrative responsibilities has grown to match those of modern state, interpreters have become the primary official interpreters of federal statutes.3Perhaps reflecting a nostalgic view that law exists only in hands of courts,4 theory and practice of statutory has received much less attention than statutory interpretation-so much so that even phrase judicial statutory interpretation has an awkward, redundant ring, while agency statutory interpretation invites an explanatory aside.5 The lively debates between textualists and purposivists in statutory have largely passed over question of how agencies interpret statutes. We lack an account of what it means for an to be a faithful agent of Congress, a foundational question for theories of statutory interpretation.6The slender but careful scholarly literature on statutory has made incremental contributions to understanding agencies' interpretive practices. It has revealed interpretive norms that apply to agencies but not courts,7 and gestured at ways in which agencies' institutional competences8 and occasions for interpretation9 distinguish their approaches from those of courts.10 While this comparative exercise has usefully isolated some contrasting norms, it has not sought to bundle or ground norms of interpretive practice. In short, it has not yet developed a theory of statutory interpretation.This Article develops such a theory based on a simple but ambitious claim: Congress, in its statutory delegations, directs agencies to adopt a purposive interpretive method. This argument builds on idea that regulatory statutes-that is, statutes that delegate lawmaking power to administrative agencies-are legally distinctive. Not only do they vest agencies with authority, but they also impose obligations to exercise that authority in accordance with purposes or principles that Congress has established in statute. Congress sometimes specifies purposes or principles to guide in great detail, and at other times sets forth principles or purposes must pursue at a high level of generality. But even when regulatory statutes lack specificity, constitutional law provides a distinctive backstop: A constitutionally valid delegation of lawmaking power to an administrative must include an principle11 to guide agency's action. While Supreme Court has been extremely permissive as to what counts as an intelligible principle, doctrine still requires that there is some principle, however general, to which must conform. That gives regulatory statutes a constitutional distinctiveness. For agency, complying with obligation to conform its conduct to purposes and principles that Congress has established in regulatory statutes administers-whether those purposes are articulated with great specificity or at a high level of generality-requires to adopt a purposive framework of interpretation. By a purposive framework for interpretation, I mean a framework in which interpreter has a duty to (1) develop an understanding of purposes or principles of statute, (2) evaluate alternatives for action in relation to those purposes or principles, (3) act in ways, other things equal, that best furthers those purposes or principles, and (4) adopt only interpretations permitted by statute's text. …" @default.
• W3125514135 created "2021-02-01" @default.
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• W3125514135 date "2015-10-01" @default.
• W3125514135 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W3125514135 title "Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes" @default.
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