FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W3125764470> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W3125764470 startingPage "81" @default.
• W3125764470 abstract "The business judgment rule is corporate law's central doctrine, pervasively affecting the roles of directors, officers, and controlling shareholders. Increasingly, moreover, versions of the business judgment rule are found in the law governing the other types of business organizations, ranging from such common forms as the general partnership to such unusual ones as the reciprocal insurance exchange. Yet, curiously, there is relatively little agreement as to either the theoretical underpinnings of or policy justification for the rule. This gap in our understanding has important doctrinal implications. As this paper demonstrates, a string of recent decisions by the Delaware supreme court based on a misconception of the business judgment rule's role in corporate governance has taken the law in a highly undesirable direction. Two conceptions of the business judgment rule compete in the case law. One views the business judgment rule as a standard of liability under which courts undertake some objective review of the merits of board decisions. This view is increasingly widely accepted, especially by some members of the Delaware supreme court. The other conception treats the rule not as a standard of review but as a doctrine of abstention, pursuant to which courts simply decline to review board decisions. The distinction between these conceptions matters a great deal. Under the former, for example, it is far more likely that claims against the board of directors will survive through the summary judgment phase of litigation, which at the very least raises the settlement value of shareholder litigation and even can have outcome-determinative effects. Like many recent corporate law developments, the standard of review conception of the business judgment rule is based on a shareholder primacy-based theory of the corporation. This article extends the author's recent work on a competing theory of the firm, known as director primacy, pursuant to which the board of directors is viewed as the nexus of the set of contracts that makes up the firm. In this model, the defining tension of corporate law is that between authority and accountability. Because one cannot make directors more accountable without infringing on their exercise of authority, courts must be reluctant to review the director decisions absent evidence of the sort of self-dealing that raises very serious accountability concerns. In this article, the author argues that only the abstention version of the business judgment rule properly operationalizes this approach. I. INTRODUCTION The business judgment rule pervades every aspect of state corporate law, from the review of allegedly negligent decisions by directors, to self-dealing transactions, to board decisions to seek dismissal of shareholder litigation, and so on.1 Countless cases invoke it and countless scholars have analyzed it.2 Yet, despite all of the attention lavished on it, the business judgment rule remains poorly understood.3 We lack a coherent and unified theory that explains why the rule exists and where its limits should be placed.4 This article offers such a theory. My analysis is grounded on the core proposition that the business judgment rule, like all of corporate law, is designed to effect a compromise-on a case-by-case basis-between two competing values: authority and accountability.5 These values refer, respectively, to the need to preserve the board of directors' decision-making discretion and the need to hold the board accountable for its decisions.6 Academic commentary on the business judgment rule strongly emphasizes accountability-i.e., the need to deter and remedy misconduct by the firm's decision makers and agents.7 Although the separation of ownership and control in modern public corporations inevitably raises important accountability concerns,8 accountability standing alone is an inadequate normative account of corporate law.9 A fully specified account of corporate law must incorporate the value of authority-i. …" @default.
• W3125764470 created "2021-02-01" @default.
• W3125764470 creator A5071618845 @default.
• W3125764470 date "2004-01-01" @default.
• W3125764470 modified "2023-09-28" @default.
• W3125764470 title "The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine" @default.
• W3125764470 hasPublicationYear "2004" @default.
• W3125764470 type Work @default.
• W3125764470 sameAs 3125764470 @default.
• W3125764470 citedByCount "16" @default.
• W3125764470 countsByYear W31257644702013 @default.
• W3125764470 countsByYear W31257644702014 @default.
• W3125764470 countsByYear W31257644702018 @default.
• W3125764470 countsByYear W31257644702019 @default.
• W3125764470 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W3125764470 hasAuthorship W3125764470A5071618845 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C120757647 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C145097563 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C170706310 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C187736073 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C25253098 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C2776211767 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C2777063073 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C2778272461 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C2779589421 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C10138342 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C120757647 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C144133560 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C145097563 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C162324750 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C170706310 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C17744445 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C187736073 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C190253527 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C199539241 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C25253098 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C2776211767 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C2777063073 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C2778272461 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C2779589421 @default.
• W3125764470 hasConceptScore W3125764470C39389867 @default.
• W3125764470 hasIssue "1" @default.
• W3125764470 hasLocation W31257644701 @default.
• W3125764470 hasOpenAccess W3125764470 @default.
• W3125764470 hasPrimaryLocation W31257644701 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W1481148846 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W1489611274 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W1494278420 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W1509660139 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W1527886331 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W1540509471 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W1544656748 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W1557027014 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W2046364217 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W2112250384 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W2128356248 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W2209206956 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W2312012308 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W2752617332 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W3121694269 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W3124440300 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W3125757920 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W321381592 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W328902606 @default.
• W3125764470 hasRelatedWork W912837445 @default.
• W3125764470 hasVolume "57" @default.
• W3125764470 isParatext "false" @default.
• W3125764470 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W3125764470 magId "3125764470" @default.
• W3125764470 workType "article" @default.