FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W3125999416> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W3125999416 endingPage "126" @default.
• W3125999416 startingPage "106" @default.
• W3125999416 abstract "We examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a privatelyobserved safety attribute. Costly disclosure and price-signaling of safety are alternative firm strategies. The liability system and production cost determine the firm’s full marginal cost. When the firm’s full marginal cost is increasing (decreasing) in safety, a firm with a safer product will distort its price upward (downward) and will sometimes inefficiently choose to signal rather than disclose (to disclose rather than signal). We also allow for a small fraction of naively optimistic (pessimistic) consumers; this leads to less price distortion and decreased (increased) incentives to disclose. (JEL: K 13, L 15, D 82) In this paper we examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a safety attribute. We assume that the firm knows whether its product is of high safety or low safety (its “type”), where a safer product is one with a lower probability of causing harm. Consumers of the product cannot observe directly the product’s safety, but they can learn safety through one of two routes. The firm may, at a cost, disclose its safety prior to sale; alternatively, if a firm does not disclose its safety then consumers can attempt to infer its safety from the price charged. That is, consumers may learn the product’s safety through disclosure or through signaling. The liability system is important because it is a determinant of the firm’s full marginal cost, which consists of both manufacturing cost and liability cost; this dependence of marginal cost on liability in turn affects the price and the output level for the firm, thereby influencing welfare. In particular, if the firm does not bear substantial liability for a consumer’s harm, then the firm’s marginal cost consists mainly of manufacturing cost, which is presumably higher for safer products. On the other hand, if the firm does bear substantial liability for a consumer’s harm, then the firm’s marginal cost consists of both manufacturing cost and liability cost. In this case, it is quite possible for a firm producing a safer product to have lower full marginal cost (the composition of marginal cost and its relationship to liability law will be discussed in detail below). We show that" @default.
• W3125999416 created "2021-02-01" @default.
• W3125999416 creator A5030878632 @default.
• W3125999416 creator A5050489733 @default.
• W3125999416 date "2008-03-01" @default.
• W3125999416 modified "2023-10-18" @default.
• W3125999416 title "Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure" @default.
• W3125999416 cites W1496496395 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W1516257455 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W1528744990 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W1535325486 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W1542183466 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W1570570810 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W1891144061 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W1981399426 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W1993942644 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2012029953 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2037566928 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2039642656 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2050175305 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2052985725 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2060353900 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2066557547 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2069577472 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2106587853 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2109183455 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2114579880 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2120610985 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W2890210835 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W3121596835 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W3121910425 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W3123246594 @default.
• W3125999416 cites W3123935889 @default.
• W3125999416 doi "https://doi.org/10.1628/093245608783742174" @default.
• W3125999416 hasPublicationYear "2008" @default.
• W3125999416 type Work @default.
• W3125999416 sameAs 3125999416 @default.
• W3125999416 citedByCount "21" @default.
• W3125999416 countsByYear W31259994162012 @default.
• W3125999416 countsByYear W31259994162013 @default.
• W3125999416 countsByYear W31259994162014 @default.
• W3125999416 countsByYear W31259994162015 @default.
• W3125999416 countsByYear W31259994162016 @default.
• W3125999416 countsByYear W31259994162017 @default.
• W3125999416 countsByYear W31259994162018 @default.
• W3125999416 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W3125999416 hasAuthorship W3125999416A5030878632 @default.
• W3125999416 hasAuthorship W3125999416A5050489733 @default.
• W3125999416 hasBestOaLocation W31259994162 @default.
• W3125999416 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
• W3125999416 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W3125999416 hasConcept C2777834853 @default.
• W3125999416 hasConceptScore W3125999416C121955636 @default.
• W3125999416 hasConceptScore W3125999416C144133560 @default.
• W3125999416 hasConceptScore W3125999416C2777834853 @default.
• W3125999416 hasIssue "1" @default.
• W3125999416 hasLocation W31259994161 @default.
• W3125999416 hasLocation W31259994162 @default.
• W3125999416 hasLocation W31259994163 @default.
• W3125999416 hasOpenAccess W3125999416 @default.
• W3125999416 hasPrimaryLocation W31259994161 @default.
• W3125999416 hasRelatedWork W1520851539 @default.
• W3125999416 hasRelatedWork W2127855297 @default.
• W3125999416 hasRelatedWork W2328781616 @default.
• W3125999416 hasRelatedWork W2389036130 @default.
• W3125999416 hasRelatedWork W2811405620 @default.
• W3125999416 hasRelatedWork W3124093726 @default.
• W3125999416 hasRelatedWork W4237171349 @default.
• W3125999416 hasRelatedWork W4237750973 @default.
• W3125999416 hasRelatedWork W4241110124 @default.
• W3125999416 hasRelatedWork W4251443880 @default.
• W3125999416 hasVolume "164" @default.
• W3125999416 isParatext "false" @default.
• W3125999416 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W3125999416 magId "3125999416" @default.
• W3125999416 workType "article" @default.