FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W3136285951> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W3136285951 endingPage "540" @default.
• W3136285951 startingPage "512" @default.
• W3136285951 abstract "We present three new coordination mechanisms for scheduling n selfish jobs on m unrelated machines. A coordination mechanism aims to mitigate the impact of selfishness of jobs on the efficiency of schedules by defining a local scheduling policy on each machine. The scheduling policies induce a game among the jobs and each job prefers to be scheduled on a machine so that its completion time is minimum given the assignments of the other jobs. We consider the maximum completion time among all jobs as the measure of the efficiency of schedules. The approximation ratio of a coordination mechanism quantifies the efficiency of pure Nash equilibria (price of anarchy) of the induced game. Our mechanisms are deterministic, local, and preemptive in the sense that the scheduling policy does not necessarily process the jobs in an uninterrupted way and may introduce some idle time. Our first coordination mechanism has approximation ratio Θ(logm) and always guarantees that the induced game has pure Nash equilibria to which the system converges in at most n rounds. This result improves a bound of O(log2 m) due to Azar, Jain, and Mirrokni and, similarly to their mechanism, our mechanism uses a global ordering of the jobs according to their distinct IDs. Next we study the intriguing scenario where jobs are anonymous, i.e., they have no IDs. In this case, coordination mechanisms can only distinguish between jobs that have different load characteristics. Our second mechanism handles anonymous jobs and has approximation ratio $O(frac{log m}{loglog m})$ although the game induced is not a potential game and, hence, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is not guaranteed by potential function arguments. However, it provides evidence that the known lower bounds for non-preemptive coordination mechanisms could be beaten using preemptive scheduling policies. Our third coordination mechanism also handles anonymous jobs and has a nice “cost-revealing” potential function. We use this potential function in order, not only to prove the existence of equilibria, but also to upper-bound the price of stability of the induced game by O(logm) and the price of anarchy by O(log2 m). Our third coordination mechanism is the first that handles anonymous jobs and simultaneously guarantees that the induced game is a potential game and has bounded price of anarchy. In order to obtain the above bounds, our coordination mechanisms use m as a parameter. Slight variations of these mechanisms in which this information is not necessary achieve approximation ratios of O(m ϵ ), for any constant ϵ>0." @default.
• W3136285951 created "2021-03-29" @default.
• W3136285951 creator A5046035189 @default.
• W3136285951 date "2012-04-25" @default.
• W3136285951 modified "2023-10-18" @default.
• W3136285951 title "Efficient Coordination Mechanisms for Unrelated Machine Scheduling" @default.
• W3136285951 cites W1521705705 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W1563703481 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W1577419414 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W1579249907 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W1587517322 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W1603834604 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W1608431201 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W1966132455 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W1969954905 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W1978317291 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2027460314 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2029456721 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2054129049 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2054243761 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2064467943 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2070173191 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2072951587 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2074104906 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2086748851 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2095094403 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2097025565 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2099699159 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2102201348 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2102736491 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2103981148 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2111714984 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2118480861 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2123733911 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2125537511 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2133243407 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2143668930 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2150107383 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2156867662 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2162057799 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W2914699946 @default.
• W3136285951 cites W3022321359 @default.
• W3136285951 doi "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-012-9650-6" @default.
• W3136285951 hasPublicationYear "2012" @default.
• W3136285951 type Work @default.
• W3136285951 sameAs 3136285951 @default.
• W3136285951 citedByCount "30" @default.
• W3136285951 countsByYear W31362859512013 @default.
• W3136285951 countsByYear W31362859512014 @default.
• W3136285951 countsByYear W31362859512015 @default.
• W3136285951 countsByYear W31362859512016 @default.
• W3136285951 countsByYear W31362859512017 @default.
• W3136285951 countsByYear W31362859512018 @default.
• W3136285951 countsByYear W31362859512019 @default.
• W3136285951 countsByYear W31362859512020 @default.
• W3136285951 countsByYear W31362859512021 @default.
• W3136285951 countsByYear W31362859512022 @default.
• W3136285951 countsByYear W31362859512023 @default.
• W3136285951 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W3136285951 hasAuthorship W3136285951A5046035189 @default.
• W3136285951 hasBestOaLocation W31362859512 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C107257861 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C111873713 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C111919701 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C11413529 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C126255220 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C126285488 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C144237770 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C160403385 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C188466206 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C199360897 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C206729178 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C24858836 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C2778841147 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C32407928 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C33923547 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C41008148 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C46814582 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C55416958 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C556758197 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C68387754 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConcept C82149807 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C107257861 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C111873713 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C111919701 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C11413529 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C126255220 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C126285488 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C144237770 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C160403385 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C162324750 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C17744445 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C188466206 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C199360897 @default.
• W3136285951 hasConceptScore W3136285951C199539241 @default.

• next