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• W3151130860 abstract "I. INTRODUCTION 560II. THREE STUDIES IN SPECIOUS CLAIM MARKETS 563A. Specious Claim Markets in Asbestos Litigation and Settlement 5641. The Historical Litigation and Settlement Environment in Asbestos Litigation 5642. Claim Recruiting and Development 5723. The Impact of Specious Claims on Asbestos Settlements and Recoveries 575B. Silica Personal Injury: A Failed Specious Claim Market 579C. The Fen-Phen Settlement Specious Claim Market 5831. The Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement 5832. Oversubscription and Specious Claims 584III. SPECIOUS CLAIM OPPORTUNITIES, INCENTIVES, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 586A. Development Opportunities in Collective Settlement 5911. Predictability and Fixed Targets 5922. Targeted Development and Claim Manufacturing 5933. Distinguishing True Positives and Positive Potential 595B. Strategic and Targeted Development Incentives 5981. Direct Economic Incentives 5982. Rational Ignorance and Development 599C. Targeted Development and Manufactured Claim Practices 6021. The Targeted Development Spiral 6032. Neutralizing Normative Concerns 605a. Denial of Wrongfulness 606b. Denial of Responsibility 607IV. MANAGING OVERSUBSCRIPTION IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT 611A. Pre-Settlement Opportunism in Modern Practice 612B. Settlement Terms and Administration 617C. Audit Design and Flexibility 6191. Mandatory Audit Pools 6202. Random and Stratified Sampling 6213. Audit Detail and Inquiry Levels 6234. Sanctions and Repeat Players 6235. Deferred and Suspended Compensation 6246. Adaptable Sampling and Flexibility 626D. The Judicial Role in Aggregate Settlement Administration 626V. CONCLUSION 628I. INTRODUCTIONFew problems are more disruptive to the efficient negotiation and operation of comprehensive mass tort settlements than oversubscription, which, at times, appears to be fueled primarily by specious claims. In settlements with opt-out rights, a flood of claims can generate a market for lemons, with the weakest claims submitted to the settlement and the strongest opting out and seeking recovery at trial or in private settlement. In binding settlements, oversubscription may result in a common problem, requiring dramatic reductions in payment that effectively transfer recoveries from those with intrinsically strong claims to those with weak claims.Why are some comprehensive mass tort settlements overrun by specious claims? At first glance, the question suggests relatively straightforward answers: greed, the unethical schemes of a few plaintiffs that are apples, and the inability or unwillingness of courts and defendants to challenge them. Thus, payment of specious claims is merely another cost of settlement,1 and the apples who submit them clearly recognize that it will cost settlement administrators more to uncover than it will to simply pay the claims.Without rejecting the bad apple explanation entirely, the available evidence suggests that specious claims within some mass torts are more complex than this explanation suggests. Specious filings have overwhelmed not only those settlements where advancing frivolous claims is rational, but also those where private self-interest should, in theory, discourage them.2 In these cases, the vast majority of questionable claims were recruited, developed, and advanced by groups of repeat players following a streamlined and compartmentalized model of litigation. And, as in other group settings with comparable patterns of collective misconduct,3 the fact that many participants are strikingly ordinary and otherwise ethical, law-abiding actors indicates that the bad apple rationale is, at best, incomplete.4In order to address this question in greater detail, Part II of this Article provides a descriptive account of the entrepreneurial claim markets5 that generated specious claims in three high profile mass tort litigation contexts: asbestos litigation, silica litigation, and fen-phen litigation. …" @default.
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• W3151130860 title "Specious Claims and Global Settlements" @default.
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