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• W3156280148 abstract "This dissertation deals with the contract choice of upstream suppliers as well as theconsequences on competition and efficiency in a dynamic setting with inter-temporalexternalities.The introduction explains the motivation of the analysis and the comparisonof different contract types, as for example standard contracts like simple two-parttariffs and additional specifications as contracts referencing the quantity of thecontract-offering firm or the relative purchase level. The features of specific marketstructures should be considered in the analysis of specific vertical agreementsand their policy implications. In particular, the role of dynamic changes regardingdemand and cost parameters may have an influence on the results observed.In the first model, a dominant upstream supplier and a non-strategic rival selltheir products to a single downstream firm. The rival supplier faces learning effectswhich decrease the rival’s costs with respect to its previous sales. Therefore, learningeffects represent a dynamic competitive threat to the dominant supplier. In thissetup, the dominant supplier can react on inter-temporal externalities by specifyingits contract to the downstream firm. The model shows that by offering market-sharediscounts, instead of simple two-part tariffs or quantity discounts, the dominantsupplier maximizes long-run profits, and restricts the efficiency gains of its rival. Ifdemand is linear, the market-share discount lowers consumer surplus and welfare.The second model analyzes the strategic use of bilateral contracts in a sequentialbargaining game. A dominant upstream supplier and its rival sequentially negotiatewith a single downstream firm. The contract choice of the dominant supplier aswell as the rival supplier’s reaction are investigated. In a single-period sequentialcontracting game, menus of simple two-part tariffs achieve the industry profit maximizingoutcome. In a dynamic setting where the suppliers sequentially negotiate ineach period, the dominant supplier uses additional contractual terms that condition on the rival’s quantity. Due to the first-mover advantage of the first supplier, therival supplier is restricted in its contract choice. The consequences of the dominantsupplier’s contract choice depend on bargaining power. In particular, market-sharecontracts can be efficiency enhancing and welfare-improving whenever the secondsupplier has a relatively high bargaining position vis-`a-vis the downstream firm. Fora relatively low bargaining position of the rival supplier, the result is similar to theone determined in the first model. We show that results depend on the considerednegotiating structure.The third model studies the contract choice of two upstream competitors thatsimultaneously deal with a common buyer. In a complete information setting whereboth suppliers get to know whether further negotiations fail or succeed, a singleperiodmodel solves for the industry-profit maximizing outcome as long as contractualterms define at least a wholesale price and a fixed fee. In contrast, this collusiveoutcome cannot be achieved in a two-period model with inter-temporal externalities.We characterize the possible market scenarios, their outcomes and consequences oncompetition and efficiency. Our results demonstrate that in case a rival supplier isrestricted in its contract choice, the contract specification of a dominant suppliercan partially exclude the competitor. Whenever equally efficient suppliers can bothstrategically choose contract specifications, the rivals defend their market shares byadapting appropriate contractual conditions.The final chapter provides an overview of the main findings and presents someconcluding remarks." @default.
• W3156280148 created "2021-04-26" @default.
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• W3156280148 date "2015-01-01" @default.
• W3156280148 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W3156280148 title "Essays in Industrial Organization: Vertical Agreements in a Dynamic View" @default.
• W3156280148 hasPublicationYear "2015" @default.
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